3 Wash. 84 | Wash. | 1891
Lead Opinion
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Respondents move the court to dismiss this appeal for the alleged reasons that the notice of appeal was not given within the time prescribed by law; that the statement of facts is not certified, as required by law; that the notice, or pretended notice, of appeal was never legally served; and that no transcript has been prepared and filed in this' court, as required by law. The argument of counsel for respondents upon the motion was mainly directed to the objection that the notice of appeal was not filed or served in time. It is claimed by counsel that the appeal was taken by giving notice thereof in open court on the 5th day of January, 1891, and that, having abandoned that appeal, appellant could not appeal again by subsequently giving written notice. It appears from an examination of the record that on the day above mentioned the judge who tried the cause announced in open court that he found for the defendant, whereupon counsel for plaintiff, no doubt thinking that judgment in the cause had been rendered by the court, gave notice of appeal to the supreme
Opinion on the Merits
ON THE MERITS.
This was an action to enforce the collection of a local assessment charged upon the property of respondents for
“Second: That, between the 29th day of May, 1888, and the 14th day of September, 1888, by virtue and in pursuance of the following ordinance of the said city, plaintiff, to wit, ordinance No. 155, entitled ‘An ordinance to provide for the grading of Second street between the east line of Washington street and the west line of Chestnut street,’ passed by the city council of said city May 29, 1888; and an ordinance, No. 33, entitled ‘An ordinance prescribing the mode of making and collecting assessments for street improvements,’ passed by the city council of said city, July 7, 1886; and an ordinance amending said ordinance number 33, and numbered ordinance No. 83, entitled ‘An ordinance to amend sec. 2 of an ordinance entitled “An ordinance prescribing the mode of making and collecting assessments for street improvements,” passed by the city council, and approved July 7,1886,’ which said ordinance was passed by the city council of said city, September 28, 1887, and approved the same day — plaintiff did improve and grade said Second street between the limits aforesaid.
“Mfih: That, by virtue of and in accordance with the provisions of said above mentioned ordinances, the above described real estate was duly assessed as the property of defendant J. J. Browne.
“Seventh: That, the sum of eight hundred and twenty-two and twenty-five one-hundredths dollars is a proper proportion of the value of such improvements and grading, and the material furnished thereon, which is chargeable on said real estate according to the true intent and meaning of the provisions of the charter of said city relating to grading and improvements of streets, and making special assessments therefor.”
The answer of defendants denies that by virtue of the ordinances mentioned in the complaint, or any of them, the
It will thus be seen that the defense to the action relied on in the lower court was the alleged insufficiency and illegality of the assessment sought to be collected; and the same objections are raised here. The respondents insist that the assessment was void for two reasons: (1) That upon the face of the assessment roll it appears that no value in dollars or cents, or otherwise, was set apposite the lands therein described, or any of them, or extended upon said roll; and (2) that the ordinance of said city, by virtue of which the assessment is alleged in the complaint to have been made,, is in direct contravention of the city
But respondent’s second objection raises a more difficult and serious question. The power of the city to levy assessments for local improvements must be found in its
It follows, therefore, that the judgment of the court below must be affirmed, and it is so ordered.
Scott, Stiles, Hoyt and Dunbar, JJ., concur.