Thе Greater Sioux City Press Club and the Iowa Freedom of Information Council, who are defendants in this declaratory judgment action, appeal from the district court’s order allowing the plaintiff, City of Sioux City, to withhold from public inspection employment applications received from candidates for the position of city manager. For reasons which we disclose in the following discussion, we affirm the orders and judgment of the district court.
The positiоn of city manager for the City of Sioux City became vacant on October 7, 1986. On October 20,1986, the city council adopted the following resolution:
RESOLUTION NO. 86/T-005012
RESOLUTION DETERMINING THAT APPLICATIONS FOR CITY MANAGER WILL BE DISCOURAGED IF AVAILABLE FOR GENERAL PUBLIC EXAMINATION.
WHEREAS the City Council is presently accepting applications for the positiоn of City Manager for the City of Sioux City, Iowa; and
WHEREAS the City Council has been advised and does believe that otherwise qualified applicants will not make application for the position of City Manager if their applicаtions are made public because of possible repercussion with their present employer; and
WHEREAS the City Council is advised and does believe that, pursuant to Section 22.7, of the Iowa Code, as amended, the Counсil may find that otherwise qualified applicants would be discouraged from making applications if their applications were available for general public' examination.
NOW THEREFORE, BE, AND IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED by the City Council of the City of Sioux City, Iowa, that it hereby determines that otherwise qualified applicants for the position of City Manager of the City of Sioux City, Iowa, will be discouraged from making application for the position if their application is available for general public examination.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that the applications for City Manager be and the same are hereby ordered to remain confidential pursuant to the authority granted by Section 22.7, the Code of Iowa. PASSED & APPROVED: October 20, 1986
Subsequent tо passing the above resolution, the counsel advertised in various trade journals soliciting applications for the city manager position.
The city received fifty applications for the position. Four applicants eventually withdrew. Of the remaining forty-six applicants, nine consented to public disclosure, and thirty-seven indicated they did not desire public disclosure of their applica *897 tions. When a reporter for the Sioux City Journal was denied permission to see the applications of those candidates who expressed a desire for confidentiality, that paper expressed dissatisfaction to the city council.
To resolve thе dispute, the council agreed to bring the present declaratory judgment action and abide its result. Initially, the action was brought against the Sioux City Journal but subsequently the Greater Sioux City Press Club was substituted as the party defendant. The Iowа Freedom of Information Council subsequently intervened on the side of the defendant.
On January 12, 1987, the district court entered a declaratory judgment that the resolution of the city council mandating confidentiality of the employment applications was not in violation of the public disclosure provisions of Iowa Code chapter 22 (1985). In so ruling, the district court relied on a legislative exception to public disclosure which is now codified аs Iowa Code section 22.7(18) (1985). The sole issue on this appeal is whether the employment applications sought to be inspected by the defendant and intervenor are communications of the type described in thаt statutory exception from the disclosure provisions of chapter 22.
In
Howard v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co.,
In
City of Dubuque v. Telegraph Herald, Inc.,
The appellant news organizations urge that thе issue must be resolved favorably to them by virtue of the so-called “narrow” construction rule approved in the Telegraph Herald decision and in Howard. We disagree with that contention for two reasons. First, the entire thrust of Iowa Code section 22.7 is to describe information which is not required to be disclosed. Consequently, overutilization of the “narrow” construction principle could easily thwart rather than promote the legislative intent underlying that section. Second, and of more significance, the legislative exception upon which plaintiff relies in the present controversy is broadly inclusive in its provisions. Where the legislature has chosen to use broadly inclusive language to describe those arеas where an established policy does not apply, mechanical application of a “narrow” construction rule does not aid in the ascertainment of the legislature’s intent. If the legislature had intended a narrowly drawn exception, it would, we believe, have narrowly described the categories of information which were excluded from public disclosure.
The language of the statutory exception under which the district сourt determined that disclosure was not required is as follows:
The following public records shall be kept confidential, unless otherwise ordered by a court ... :
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18. Communications not required by law, rule, or procedure that are made to a government body or to any of its employees by identified persons outside of government, to the extent that the government body receiving those communications from such persons outside of government could reasonably believe that those persons would be discouraged from making them to that govеrnment body if they were available for general public examination.
Iowa Code § 22.7(18) (1985) (emphasis added). There are three exceptions to the area of confidentiality described in this statute. These relate tо (a) consent of the communicating party, (b) information which may be disclosed without identifying its source, and (c) information surrounding the occurrence of a crime. The parties agree that none of these exceрtions to the category of confidential information apply to the employment applications which are at issue in the present case.
Appellants urge that, prior to the enactment of section 22.7(18), the subject of employment applications was clearly recognized as a recurring area of controversy under the public disclosure provisions of chapter 22. From this premise, they argue that, had the lеgislature intended to confer confidentiality upon employment applications, that category of communication would have been specifically identified in the legislation. They seek to buttress this argument by showing thаt a bill had been introduced which specifically designated employment applications as confidential records. That bill went nowhere in the legislative session in which the present legislation was enacted.
We сonclude that the legislative fate of the other bill is not a convincing demonstration of the legislature’s intent on this issue. The city urges that the bill which was enacted includes the same subject matter as the bill which was not and also inсludes other types of communications to which the legislature intended to afford the same treatment. If that assertion is correct, it supplies its own explanation of why the other bill was not carried further.
A court construing a statute to ascertain legislative intent must take account of the object sought to be accomplished or the problem sought to be remedied and arrive at a construction that will effect that purpose.
In re Girdler,
Appellants suggest that sectiоn 22.-7(18) should not be applied to defeat disclosure of these employment applications because the statute only applies to communications which are “not required by law, rule, or procedure.” They urge that under procedures adopted by the city council any applicant interested in the city manager position was required to submit an application. We disagree that the circumstances outlined herе serve to establish that these communications were “required by law, rule, or procedure” within the meaning of the act. The candidates were not required to submit these applications because they were not required to apply for the job. Appellants also urge that the employment applications were required by law under regulations of the federal Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). Our attention has not been directеd to any regulation *899 of that agency which required these employment applications to be submitted to the city. Moreover, information required under EEOC regulations is entitled to confidentiality under federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(e).
We conclude that the district court’s interpretation of section 22.7(18) was correct. The employment applications which are involved in the present litigation and for which the applicants themselves did not authorize disclosure may be maintained with confidentiality by their public custodians.
AFFIRMED.