City of Seattle v. Pullman

September 27, En Banc. 1973.] 42313. [No. Ronny City Pullman, Seattle, Respondent, Gene

Appellant. Jr., Austin, Austin, Russell A. & Rutherford, Kargianis for appellant. Corporation Myron Newbould, Counsel, L. L. Cor-

A. respondent. nelius, Assistant, for charged Ronny Pullman J . Defendant Gene was Utter, Municipal and

and convicted in both Court on Seattle superior appeal in court of a ordi- with violation Seattle during prohibits accompanying a nance which child hours.1 grounds. on

We find the ordinance unconstitutional two vague, process It is first too and is violated where due persons guess meaning intelligence of common must at its liberty. secondly peril at the exer- of their It is an invalid city’s police power of it no cise the makes distinc- because tion between conduct to harm that which calculated is essentially By any language statute, innocent. the of this age standing minor under of the 18 could be arrested for playing or at on the sidewalk in front of his home 10:01 p.m. evening. on a warm summer prohibit imposing

We do not the state from reasonable during evening controls on the conduct minor children (section 95984). 1 12.40.040 4 of unlawful ordinance No. “It for anyone parent guardian any age not the or child the under eighteen anyone having years, express or consent of such parent accompany any guardian, or to be with or such child who at the violating time Section 12.40.020.” (section 95984). “Loitering during 12.40.020 of ordinance No. cur eighteen hours. It is child few unlawful minor under years loiter, idle, play streets, sidewalks, wander or on or in the parks public places highways, alleys, or other or in an automobile or conveyance upon premises unoccupied grounds during other or or in or Provided, curfew hours: that a minor child shall deemed to not be loitering, idling, wandering, playing or where such minor child is accompanied by parent guardian, traveling by her or or or is his direct regular employment route to or from in the work course of where such occupation employment approved by pur have been authorities possession to state such suant law and child in his has evidence such travelling by approval, duly or is route to or direct from activities sponsored religious organizations, or educational or is sent his guardian parent errand, or on some lawful business or in which case parent child shall with him such have of his written consent .guardian.” constitutionally precise require do a statement of hours, but activity calculated to the criminal conduct both protect the state seeks to itself. harm from which high at Pullman, senior, was arrested Defendant school May arresting approximately on 1971after the 4:30 a.m. stopped followed, and the defendant his observed, officer emitting the vehicle was excessive automobile because stopping vehicle, After amounts noise. officer proper and that it lacked a muffler discovered accompanied two minor females. The defendant defendant party girls minor had attended a with the two told arresting they “had officer decided take a drive around going There is no evidence that the beach before home.” wandering, passen- or that the the defendant’s vehicle was gers idling playing. were standing challenge has the consti defendant tutionality of 2 and 4 of ordinance No. 95984.One of sections necessary accompanying for a elements conviction during 4 an curfew hours under section actual child by 2. ordinance, the minor of the curfew section violation a without determination that His conviction cannot stand curfew ordinance was violated. valid recently City in Tarver v. As this court most stated (1967): 735, 531 Comm’n, 726, 72 435P.2d Wn.2d litigant challenges validity an ordinance A who infringement peculiar per- and an interest must claim distinguished himself, cause’of to from a dis- sonal general the ordi- framework of satisfaction with Lundquist, (2d) 401, 397, v. 60 Wn. 374 P. nance. State (2d) (1962) 246 and cases cited. infringement an has. claimed defendant has such

The standing challenge to the entire ordinance. city challenge to its cited

Those cases2 constitutionality standing question the of the- to defendant’s City 726, (1967); Comm’n, 435 531 Seattle v. 72 P.2d 2 Tarver Wn.2d (1963); Lundquist, Long, 737, v. 60 61 380 P.2d 472 State v. Wn.2d Rowe, 797, (1962); 397, v. 60 376 374 246 State Wn.2d P.2d Wn.2d P.2d Bowman, (1960). 266, (1962); 57 356 999 446 State v. Wn.2d P.2d

797 contrary holding here be- ordinance are not to our validity therein of the ordinance statute cause complainant’s infringe upon questioned did personal here the defendant’s constitu- However, interests. rejected, challenge for the ordinance under tional cannot be charged, 4, contains as one of its which he was section challenged provision, ordinance, elements the the curfew App. Court, 419, section 2. Alves v. Justice 148 Cal. 2d 306 P.2d 601 vague

Defendant 2 and an un claims that section is city’s police power therefore reasonable exercise vague agree. concept of “void for unconstitutional. We process require ness” born out of the constitutional due ments of fair and of standards in laws notice,3 clear prevent arbitrary discriminatory police enforcement application by juries.4 judges and inconsistent per- requires It is fundamental that no ordinance which guess meaning intelligence sons of at the common at its peril liberty, may constitutionally property of life, permitted to stand. “All are entitled to be informed as what Lanzetta v. New State commands forbids.” Jersey, 451, 453, 888, 306 L. Ed. 59 Ct. 618 U.S. 83 S. 3 Papachristou 162, 110, Jacksonville, 156, v. 31 L. 2d 92 405 U.S. Ed. 278, (1972); Cramp Instruction, S. Ct. 839 v. Board 368 U.S. Pub.

287, Harriss, 285, (1961); 7 2d 82 United v. L. Ed. S. Ct. 275 States 347 George, 612, 617, 989, (1954); De U.S. 98 L. Ed. 74 808 Jordan v. S. Ct. 223, 230-32, 886, (1951); U.S. 95 L. Ed. 71 S. Ct. 703 Lanzetta Jersey, (1939); 451, 453, 888, New 306 U.S. 83 L. Ed. Ct. 618 S. Connally Co., 385, 391, v. General Constr. 269 U.S. 70 L. Ed. 46 S. (1926); Grocery Co., 81, 89, Ct. 126 United States v. L. Cohen 255 U.S. (1921); L. Ed. S. Ct. International A.L.R. Kentucky, 216, 223-24, 1284, Harvester Co. v. 234 34 U.S. 58 L. Ed. S. (1914). 853 Ct. 4 Papachristou Jacksonville, supra; Cincinnati, v. Coates v. 402 U.S. 611, 614, 214, (1971); Circuit, 29 L. Ed. 2d 91 S. 1686 Interstate Inc. Ct. 676, Dallas, 684-85, 225, (1968); v. 390 20 U.S. L. 2d 88 S. 1298 Ed. Ct. Kentucky, 195, 200, 469, Ashton v. 384 16 2d U.S. L. Ed. 86 1407 S. Ct. (1966); Birmingham, 87, 90-91, Shuttlesworth v. 382 U.S. 15 L. 2d Ed. (1965); York, 176, 558, 559-60, 211 86 Ct. Saia v. New 334 S. U.S. 92 L. 1574, (1948); Alabama, 88, 68 1148 Thornhill v. 310 Ed. S. Ct. U.S. 97-98, 1093, (1940); Lowry, 60 84 L. Ed. S. Ct. 736 Herndon v. 301 U.S. 242, 261-64, 1066, 81 L. Ed. 57 732 S. Ct. process citizens, of due is violated where first essential (be jury guilt it officers, or the finder of enforcement

law speculate guilt judge) be- as to the standards or must vagueness of the ordinance or statute. cause language loiter, idle, here at wan issue—“to On play” Drew, 405, 522, 423 P.2d v. 70 Wn.2d der —Seattle (1967), controlling. Drew, In on 25 A.L.R.3d 827 beyond vague grounds the munici the ordinance was pal police powers, ordinance we struck down Seattle persons loitering making abroad, abroad it a crime satisfactory give suspicious to fail to a circumstances, under police upon demand a officer. account of themselves dictionary meanings providing of “loiter” After lay loitering meaning cannot we found “the “wander” reasonably activity.” Drew, Seattle v. connote unlawful approval doing, supra the find In so we cited with at 409. 1931) (9th ing Anduha, 171, 48 F.2d in Hawaii v. Cir. meaning “have no idle, loiter, loaf sinister that the words part imply wrongdoing on the no or misconduct practices.” again prohibited engaged in affirm those recently Oyen, ruling, in State v. 78 Wn.2d we did this (1971).5 909, P.2d 766 standing alone, word[s] Drew, have “the

As in we unqualified . . .” standards ascertainable otherwise Oyen, supra Drew involved 916. It is true that State v. at “suspicious term “loi- but if the in circumstances” qualifying vague attached to such ter” is deemed when standing certainly precise phrase, Nor alone. it is no more infirmity vagueness proviso of section cure the does the proviso’s plaguing cir- four involved herein. The the words Washington, Oyen Supreme 408 U.S. 5 The Court in v. United States judgment Oyen 933, 745, (1972), in our L. Ed. 92 Ct. 2846 vacated 2d S. Dep’t light of Police the case for further consideration and remanded (1972) 212, Mosley, 92, 2d 92 S. Ct. 2286 408 U.S. 33 L. Ed. v. 222, Grayned Rockford, 2d 92 S. Ct. 33 L. Ed. 408 U.S. August By judgment supplemental has been the case County Superior Whatcom for reconsideration. Court for remanded analysis Oyen’s However, herein used is affirmance of the Drew by that reconsideration. affected finding which there can no of “loiter- cumstances under be idling, wandering ing, playing” not are exhaustive and many possible other fail account for the “innocent” acts. proviso’s presentation protected Thus, number of the sufficiently precise the ordi- situations does make more prohibition. parte language of McCarver, nance’s See Ex (1898). Tex. Crim. 46 S.W. 936 “loiter, words idle and wander” embraced the authority only “play”

aforementioned and must decided be lay in this behavior, case we find it innocent for meaning play reasonably also cannot unlawful connote activity. play” loiter, “to idle,

Since words do not wander provide locating ascertainable standards for line be- tween innocent and behavior, unlawful the ordinance is uncertainty.” Collings, void its “unconstitutional Un- Uncertainty Appraisal, L.Q. constitutional 40 Cornell —An (1955); Requirements Note, Due Process of Definite- (1948). in Statutes, ness 62Harv. L. Rev. 77 vagueness finding good It is no answer to a only faith actions law enforcement will result in proper penal exercise of this ordinance. stated in As we pages Drew at 409-10: assurance, however,

This does not save the ordinance prosecutors because “well intentioned do not ... vague Baggett neutralize the vice of a Bullitt, law.” v. Sup. L. 360,373, 12 U.S. Ed. Ct. 1316 2d Regulation only compli in this area must not be in process with standards, ance due but must come within the authority police power government. of the For the exercise police power regulation valid, area must government’s scope authority par be within the regulatory ticular ordinance must abe reasonable measure support Advertising of the area of concern. Markham Co. (1968); Ragan State, 405, 420-22, 73 Wn.2d 439 P.2d 248 regu v. Seattle, 58 Wn.2d 364 P.2d 916 If the scope police power authority, lated area exceeds the of prohibitions ifor the ordinance’s do not real have a relationship government’s interest, the to the substantial ordinance is unconstitutional. independent recognize government has an may youth well-being in certain in the its

interest primary respon to assist those whose situations enact laws Ginsberg sibility well-being New v. of minors. is for the 195, Ct. 1274 L. Ed. 2d 88 York, 629, 639, 390 U.S. 20 S. designed (1968). to fur However, ordinances and statutes reasonably purpose to their must relate ther such interests protected rights. violating As we em and do so without phasized page that no “It is Drew, in at 408: fundamental unnecessarily may unreasonably interfere or ordinance person’s or to to move about freedom, with a whether it be stand still.” already of its ordinance

We have found that the because vagueness process addition, that it now, in violates due proclaimed relationship no real or to the bears substantial governmental protection of minors. interest —the conduct no between

This ordinance makes distinction essentially innocent to calculated harm and that which is police thereby and is of an unreasonable exercise power. page Drew, As we stated in at 408: right with inviolate; to is interference be let alone necessary only right to that if it is be tolerated

protect rights of others. and welfare way public sauntering on a facie, mere “Prima right woman, or child.” man, is lawful Carpenter, 521, 91 N.E.2d 325 Mass. v. Commonwealth uniformly jurisdictions struck down have Other 666 “loiteririg-type” Cleveland v. ordinances. See conduct mere (1960); People 119 502, 167 N.E.2d L. Abs. Baker, 83 Ohio 313, 151 N.E.2d 871 176 4 N.Y.S.2d Diaz, v. N.Y.2d App. (1958); 839, 90 S.E.2d Vidalia, 92 Ga. Soles v. Carpenter, supra; (1955); famous v. Commonwealth 1931) (9th Cir. F.2d 171 Anduha, Hawaii v. case Drew); (cited approval Mo. Gloner, Louis v. in St. with 502, 109 S.W. opinion, Supreme in Court

A unanimous United States strongly its vagrancy striking ordinance, stated down prohibiting such activities ordinances on those view loafing: wandering, loitering, strolling, walking, historically part amenities . . [TJhese . are They mentioned are not have them. life as we the Constitution known Rights. These unwritten Bill of or in the giving part responsible our been in amenities have feeling independence self-confidence, people dignified creativity. feeling have amenities These the the nonconformists They right right have honored of dissent and defy right submissiveness. and the high spirits encouraged rather than lives have suffocating silence. hushed, might people loaf or or presumption who walk A liquor frequent sold, houses where or stroll

loiter who suspicious supported look or who their wives precar- police criminals is too future are to become to the rule of law. ious for a

Papachristou 164,31 L. Ed. 2d Jacksonville, U.S. Lacey, Vagrancy also See 92 Ct. 839 110, S. Condition, 66 Harv. L. Rev. 1203 Personal Crimes Other (1953) of the historical connection between for discussion vagrancy. and common-law ordinances modern Drew, like the one in and the ordinance, The Jacksonville attempt criminal, activities us, to make one now before municipality normally innocent. This the deemed which police power. fact that of its The the claim cannot do under ordinance, in which the above curfew have a minor we prohibited, conclu- not alter the does innocent behavior protect government interest minors has an The sion. (Prince Massachusetts, 158, 165, 321 U.S. from “abuses” (1944)), are the but what Ct. 438 88 L. Ed. S. against prohibition the cannot be said that here? It abuses wandering, idling playing loitering, minor in a of a mere during (but conveyance public place hours the curfew proviso) exempted has the in the circumstances alleged purpose requisite to the ordinance’s connection protecting speculate as to the abuses to be minors. We must protected spec-

avoided, but the invasion of freedoms very ulation, it is real. showing

There whatsoever, has been no in the be- case alleged us, fore that the curfew violators’ conduct or that of rights the defendant’s interfered with welfare improper operation others. record reveals no of the any impermissible automobile the defendant, nor con- by any questioned duct being of those involved. On they officer, the minor two females stated that head- were ing absolutely party. home after a The record is devoid of showing evidence “bad The defendant’s auto- conduct”. stopped mobile was because excessive noise and presence mere fact that the defendant in the of two was during prosecution. minors in hours resulted this Moreover, the record does al- not disclose whether the leged curfew violators did or did not have the consent parents guardian their company to be in out during Assuming defendant permis- or out curfew hours. present sion given was in the it us, case before was unless parameters within the narrow and limited of the section 2 proviso, permit this ordinance nevertheless ar- would prosecution rest, and conviction of minor fe- these two support discharge males. Such an ordinance, claimed to parental responsibility, despite parental of pervision operate can su- derogation parental responsi- thus bility for their children. goes beyond

This scope ordinance, as drafted, of le- gitimate police power authority. Faircloth, Lazarus v. Supp. (S.D. 1969); F. Fla. Court, Alves v. Justice App. Cal. 2d find, P.2d 601 therefore, that ordinance No. drafted, has an insufficient objective relationship safeguarding to of minors and is unconstitutional. valid when have been found curfew ordinances

General public imposed emergency to restore in circumstances (4th Cir. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277 United States v. order. 1971); State, 2d 163 N.W.2d Ervin v. 41 Wis. (D.C. (1968); Columbia, 250 A.2d v. District Glover of Riot 1969). Curfew, App. Control Note, Judicial Similarly, ordinances minor curfew Yale L.J. prohibi- they specific in their may permissible where necessary curing evil. social a demonstrable in tion and Ju- Nocturnal and the Control Note, Ordinances Curfew L. Crime, venile 107U. Pa. Rev. stated, the defendant’s we have For each of the reasons is reversed. conviction Brachten- Hamilton, Stafford, Rosellini,

Finley, bach, JJ., concur. (dissenting) majority the defend- states J.

Hunter, —The unless Ronny Pullman, cannot be convicted ant, Gene of a valid an actual violation there is a determination by girls in his com- were the minor who curfew ordinance undisputed the ordi- pany. evidence shows I believe 15-year-old girls, by that the minor nance was violated the ordinance is valid. clearly the defendant told

The record shows that they (he girls) police minor “had and the two officer going the beach before decided to take a drive around Clearly, morning. this con- at hour in the home” this late prohibition meaning of the duct comes within the 12.40.020), (Seattle providing: ordinance Code under the It minor child unlawful play years eighteen or on or in loiter, idle, wander alleys, public highways, parks or other streets, sidewalks, conveyance places or or in or in an automobile or other during grounds unoccupied premises upon or deemed child shall not be Provided, that a minor hours: playing idling, wandering, loitering, or where such to be minor child is parent by accompanied or her his by travelling guardian, route to or from work direct or is occupa- employment regular such where course in the tion and pursuant approved employment authorities have been possession has in his child to state law such travelling by approval, route direct or is evidence such by religious duly sponsored or edu- to or from activities parent guard- organizations, his or is sent cational errand, which case business lawful ian on some him the consent of his such child shall have with written parent guardian. or (Italics mine.)

Seattle Code 12.40.040states: anyone parent guardian

It not is unlawful the any years, anyone eighteen the not child under express accompany parent guardian, having be with or violating the consent of such any at the time is such child who purposes For the of this sec- 12.40.020. Section “express a defense to tion, such consent” shall be charge under this section. majority is no evidence that

The states there the children acting parents. of their It not with consent were implicit that this conduct was not with the consent they acting by admittedly parents were' reason of their decisions, furthermore, it would be difficult to own give responsible parents imagine their consent that would 15-year-old daughter driving to be around on the for their boy attending party after at the with an older beaches morning. Moreover, even hour of 4:30 in the with late sojourn parents, on the beaches would consent of the this proviso exceptions in the of the ordi- not come within the nance. contends the Seattle curfew ordi- defendant entirety, abridgment an of certain in its constitu-

nance, rights citizenship, including among tionally guaranteed (2) (1) association; freedom of freedom of move- others: discriminatory legislation; (3) from class ment; freedom right process (4) in the form of a clear to due majority agrees, law, ex- with which understandable cept it item three which did discuss. general analyzing certain

In the defendant’s contentions kept propositions of law must be mind. constitutionality of an ordinance is chal- First, when presumed lenged, constitutional and valid until it will be contrary clearly appears. Dixon, State v. 78 Wn.2d (1971), Furthermore, cited therein. 479 P.2d 931 and cases possible, interpretations of a one when two statute constitutionally constitution- other valid which is upholding adopt ally the construction the court will invalid, supra, validity. therein. and cases cited Dixon, State its power police that the local it is well established Second, except police power state, as the is the same cities by legislative Patton enactments the state. as restricted (1934), Bellingham, and cases 566, P.2d 364 179 Wash. 38 legislative cited established that therein. It also well enacting under ordinances bodies broad discretion in have police power. 646, 74 445 State, their Reesman v. Wn.2d (1968), in P.2d cited therein. We stated cases page Reesman on 650: by given adopted legislature in measures the

Unless the palpably invade arbitrary circumstances so unreasonable and needlessly rights property personal as to legislative protected by will judgment constitution, the the prevail. (1971). 929, Kirkland,

See Hass v. 78 Wn.2d 481 P.2d 9 also authority over “the state’s children’s activities Third, like of adults.” Prince v. Massa- broader than over actions chusetts, 645, L. Ed. 64 Ct. 438 321 U.S. S. may wholly permissible may for not be

“What adults so parents’ either with their consent.” children or without supra. Ginsberg also Prince v. See v. New Massachusetts, York, 2d 390 U.S. L. Ed. S. Ct. background reference, to

With this as a let us turn the presented by merits issues the defendant to deter- city’s legislation mine if is so unreasonable and arbi- trary needlessly rights personal interfere with the as to the defendant. the Seattle,

The defendant contends that curfew ordi- right his First nance violates Amendment freedom of by applied association as the Fourteenth Amendment necessary considering contention, states. In this it is right of observe the manifest distinction between the regulate state to conduct and that of adults. The children’s Supreme clearly recognized United in Prince States Court this There of fur- distinction. the defendant was convicted 9-year-old

nishing the defendant was niece, of whom her religious on the streets literature to sell custodian, with prohibited which of Massachusetts’ statutes contravention selling young on from literature of 18 ladies under supplying upon persons the streets and furnished sanctions The defendant on the streets. to minors for resale literature Supreme appeal Court on her to the United States based right of her was in violation the contention said statute practices of her faith to teach her child the tenets and preaching right to observe the in violation of the child’s gospel public also con- The defendant distribution. paren- of her tended that the statute was in contravention process right of the four- tal due clause as secured In Constitution. teenth amendment the United States pri- Supreme the individual’s case, this Court balanced youth society against in its vate interests interest and held: proclaiming public We think that with reference to the religion, upon public similar the streets and in other

places, power the the to control the conduct state of of authority beyond scope over its children reaches of and the freedoms, true in the case other adults, as is of rightful boundary power not been crossed its has of (Italics mine.) Massachusetts, 158, 170, Prince v. U.S. Ed. 645, 88 L. 64 S. Ct. 438 ordinance, a child under I read the

As Seattle may play” after 10 of wander or “loiter, idle, not p.m. does curfew ordinance in the listed areas. The Seattle going rights from minors restrict the of the included specified upon areas between streets other listed play- only wandering “loitering, idling, hours but from ing” given in areas. must

Against of we of the children Seattle this interest society having bal- mature, in well of the interest balance supra Massachusetts, Prince v. in anced citizens. As stated at 165: and these freedoms between accommodation make

To always authority . . . delicate an exercise state Against private in a democ- interests, basic these sacred society protect racy, of children . to the welfare stand the interests youth itself, and interest of . It is the . community, be both safe- that children of the whole opportunities growth given guarded into free and and from abuses well-developed independent men and citi- zens. recognized Supreme in Court of the United States

The guidance Ginsberg parental is not control case that society protect- always provided in that the interest justifies regulation ing youth of the conduct reasonable its judicial that children with- of children. can notice take purpose wandering of the at all hours out about the streets night their and to the often leads to mischief to detriment society who, instances, in become victims members some mugging other violent crimes assaults, robberies and say, juveniles. rightful bound- committed Suffice ary city restricting in the the activities of the child society instant in the interest of and the child case is best city’s boundary police power rightful itself, and the has not been crossed. city’s power police exercise of its in this instance

appears relationship to the evil it seeks bear reasonable prevent Hass v. Kirk- and thus should be sustained. See supra, land, and cases cited therein. curfew ordi-

The defendant contends the Seattle guaranteed nance restricts his freedom of movement under the fifth amendment to the Constitution. The United States reasoning logic applies argument ap- same to this plies argument to the defendant’s under the first amend- placed ment to the constitution. The narrow limitation on against movement the child must be balanced socie- ty’s youth. supra, Massachusetts, interest in its Prince v. As grounds legislation. indicates, Thus, reasonable exist for the this enactment should be sustained.

The defendant also contends that the Seattle curfew ordi- unconstitutionally vague. cites, nance is does the He majority, P.2d 408, 423 Drew, Seattle v. 70 Wn.2d (1967), proposition for the that: A.L.R.3d 827 give be

A fair notice of what acts will law that fails to punished process. is violative of due argues “loiter, idle, wan- that the words The defendant play” not ordinance do in the der, or as used Seattle relying punished, give on be fair notice of what acts will contrary, authority. supra, I Drew, as an To Seattle v. complete to this contention. find the Drew case a answer prohibits Specifically, the curfew ordinance Seattle idling, “loitering, age wander- minor from under the ing playing” sidewalks, etc., between streets, or -inthe on or type p.m. in this and 5 a.m. Words the hours ordinary lay meaning. given In to their ordinance are “loiter” as the Drew case determined that the word we Dictionary by Third New International defined Webster’s (1961) meant: unduly away . . slow time . . . be .

fritter place doing something in or near a in an . . . remain apparently . . . idle manner idle or dictionary by said as defined “wander” And the word goal course, aim, or a fixed move about without meant: “to con- words do not determined that said . . .” then activity. any type the ordi- case, In that of unlawful note any attempt distinguish, to question not make did nance in meaning question. In of the words in or restrict define, away “frittering city that all has stated case, the the instant idling moving course, a fixed or without time, about by prohibited playing” children under the Then insure that the p.m. areas. to in the listed after guidelines or not a to determine whether have will officers away moving “frittering time or about his given child is city gone great goal,” has etc., fixed a without types spell of behavior will not be lengths out what playing. going idling, wandering, Thus deemed route is within ambit direct from work to and going a direct route activities ordinance. Nor organizations. Nor is by religious sponsored or educational one has written running ambit where an errand within So, too, parental business. some lawful and is about consent p.m. by guardian parent accompanied after 10 a a child exceptions to the curfew the ambit. The list is not within probably it could be added inclusive, all ordinance is not exceptions exceptions. However, the listed other numerous very types of activities nature their demonstrate proscribed stated in As we outside the behavior. which are page drawn 410: “The law should be so the Drew case on obviously inapplicable are not to cases which as to make it City its terms.” The intended to be included within Seattle just designing the curfew this in Seattle Council has done ordinance. prohibits

The fact that the curfew ordinance all Seattle playing,” provides “loitering, idling, wandering or and then examples type of that is not this behavior within distinguishes category, case from the Drew the instant validity challenged the case. In that case the defendant provided: 12.11.290, Seattle Code which any person wandering It shall be unlawful or loiter- ing suspicious abroad, or abroad other circum- under stances, from one-half hour after sunset to one-half hour give satisfactory sunrise, before himself to fail to a account of upon any police the demand of officer. terms of The defendant contended the ordinance unconstitutionally vague. agreed were with the defend- page ant and stated on 410: nothing him

There is in the ordinance that would enable dividing loitering (for to know the line between innocent example shopping) loitering. and criminal window Loi- tering spell ordinances that fail to out this distinction struck down. have been Wn.2d, Drew, 423 P.2d

Seattle v. A.L.R.3d city provided dividing case, In the instant has a line loitering. between criminal and innocent All loi- tering is unlawful under the curfew ordinance. In Seattle p.m. and 5 force between the hours

order avoid its given to or from a be in a direct route a.m., one must activity parent. accompanied We are deal- unless satisfactory type ing in the account of ordinance as with a suspicious dealing cir- case, Drew nor are we with “under ambiguous nothing There is about Seattle cumstances.” clearly It states that children under the ordinance. age p.m. “loiter, idle, after 10 must not wander of 18 play” If children are not in a direct in the listed areas. activity given areas, and are in the listed to or from a route they idling, wandering, playing.” “loitering, then curfew ordi- contends that the Seattle The defendant also Const, § four- art. and the nance is in violation Constitution, in teenth amendment to the United States purports grant, withhold, and basic freedoms that it from one class of citizens and not another. Towne, stated in State ex rel. O’Brien v. Wn.2d (1964), that: therein, 392 P.2d and cases cited

581, 582, provisions The of the state and federal constitutions special privileges prohibit granting and im- which protection guarantee equal laws, re- and munities legislation persons apply quire to all must alike that class ground a and must exist class, within reasonable for making and between those within those a distinction designated the limits of such class; but within without legislature has a wide measure rules, restrictive expressed determination, in stat- its when discretion, and successfully utory enactment, attacked unless cannot arbitrary, inequitable, manifestly unreasonable, it is unjust. legislation applies mine.) (Italics case, the the instant In age persons Prince Massa- of 18. v. under to all alike grounds supra, that reasonable exist for indicates chusetts, growth protect legislation designing children. The of a maturity process. gradual reach at var- Children child is a legislative that the ages. determination Therefore, the ious distinguishing chil- provides between a basis of 18 manifestly arbitrary, appear un- and adults does dren unjust inequitable thus should be sus- reasonable, See Hass 481 P.2d Kirkland, tained. Wn.2d summary, legislative In be little there can doubt authority the curfew ordi- Seattle, the enactment of on minor intended to exercise reasonable restraints nance, wandering or in on the auto- children streets night, at the evils of mobiles hour of correct resulting potential mischief and the of crimes commission therefrom, to children and the detriment both the so- ciety. judgment of the trial court affirmed. should be

Hale, C.J., Wright, J., J. Hunter, concur with September 27, 42498. Banc.

[No. En 1973.] Development Diversified Corporation, Industries Ripley Respondent, Appellants. al., et v. R. Bruce (of Keller, Rohrback, Horswill, J. Bracelin Elizabeth Moren), appellants. & for Waldo Hayes,

Davies, Pearson, Anderson, P.S., Gadbow & Wayne respondent. Davies, J.

Case Details

Case Name: City of Seattle v. Pullman

Court Name: Washington Supreme Court

Date Published: Sep 27, 1973

Citation: 514 P.2d 1059

Docket Number: 42313

Court Abbreviation: Wash.