146 Ga. 737 | Ga. | 1917
(After stating the foregoing facts.) There was no error in granting an injunction in this case. The section of the charter of the City of Sandersville which confers upon that municipality the authority to do the acts against which the injunction is sought is as follows:
“Sec. 36. Be it further enacted, that the mayor and council of said city shall have full power and authority to pass all laws and ordinances concerning the draining and proper maintenance and care of the streets, alleys, and sidewalks and other public places of said city; to provide for the paving of the same, or any part thereof, whenever in their judgment the same becomes necessary; and to provide how said paving, maintenance, or care shall be paid, whether by said city or whether by the adjacent landlords, or by both.” • Georgia Laws 1902, p. 578. The ordinance under which the city was about to exercise the power conferred by this section of the charter provides for the paving of certain specified streets, the material with which they shall be paved, the quality of the material, and other such matters. In neither the charter itself nor in the ordinance is there any provision whatever for giving the property-owner and taxpayer an opportunity to be heard as to the necessity of the paving and as to the reasonableness of the cost; and for that reason we are of the opinion that the ordinance is in violation of the provision of our constitution that no one shall be deprived of Ms property without due process of law. Shippen Lumber Co. v. Elliott, 134 Ga. 699 (68 S. E. 509).
This ruling disposes of the issue immediately before us in this particular case; but we do not think that the judgment of the court should be affirmed in its entirety. In so far as the trial judge
We think, therefore, that while the grant of an injunction should stand, the judgment, in so far as it holds the section of the charter set forth above to be unconstitutional and void, should be reversed.
Judgment reversed in part, and affirmed in part.