54 Ga. App. 391 | Ga. Ct. App. | 1936
Mrs. Mattie Brinkley brought suit against the City of Rome, for damages on account of personal injuries alleged to have been sustained by her. She alleged, that about eight o’clock p. m., she was walking along a sidewalk in said city, about 100 or more feet from the nearest street light, and at said point the trees overhung the sidewalk, making it entirely dark there; that the street light did not shine upon this place in the sidewalk, and it was impossible for any person to see the defect in the sidewalk; that at this point there was a break in the sidewalk, “one joint of said sidewalk standing approximately six inches above the level of the joint below the same, and causing an obstruction in said sidewalk of approximately six inches;” that plaintiff had no knowledge or notice of said defect in said sidewalk; and that while so walking along the sidewalk, and “exercising all due care for her own protection,” she “stepped off of said
While municipal corporations are not liable for failure to perform, or for errors in performing, their legislative or judicial powers, they are liable “for neglect to perform or for improper or unskilful peformance of their ministerial duties.” Code, § 69-301. “If a municipal corporation has not been negligent in constructing or repairing the same, it is not liable for injuries resulting from defects in its streets when it has no actual notice thereof, or such defect has existed for a sufficient length of time for notice to be inferred.” § 69-303. The petition in this case does not allege that the city was negligent in the construction of said sidewalk, but alleges that it had notice and knowledge of the existence of a defect therein (six-inch break or unevenness) by reason of its being in a sidewalk that paralleled one of the main public streets in the city, patrolled by its officers, and having-existed therein for more than two years. See City of Rome v. Stone, 46 Ga. App. 259 (167 S. E. 325). The general rule of law is that a municipal corporation is bound to keep its streets and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition for travel in the ordinary modes by night as well as by day; and if it fails to do so, it is liable in damages for injuries sustained in consequence. Brown v. Milledgeville, 20 Ga. App. 392 (93 S. E. 25); Herrington v. Macon, 125 Ga. 58 (54 S. E. 71); City of Silvertown v. Harcourt, 51 Ga. App. 160 (179 S. E. 772); City of Atlanta v. Hampton, 139 Ga. 389 (77 S. E. 393); City of Columbus v. Anglin, 120 Ga. 785 (48 S. E. 318); Butler v. Atlanta, 47 Ga. App. 341, 343 (170 S. E. 539); City of Atlanta v. Robertson, 36 Ga. App. 66 (135 S. E. 445); Jolly v. Atlanta, 37 Ga. App. 666 (141 S. E. 223); City
Whether the difference of approximately six inches of the sidewalk, as described in the plaintiff’s petition, would be a normal irregularity or defect, or whether it 'was of a dangerous character, would be for the jury under the facts in the case. Of course, where the defect in a sidewalk is so slight that the minds of reasonable men would not differ in the conclusion that it was not dangerous for walking by persons using due care, a cause of action against the city would not be alleged. Whether a particular defect or obstruction in a sidewalk was such as to give a right of action to a person injured thereby is ordinarily a jury question, since it is a complicated question of fact, involving the height of the obstruction, its appearance to pedestrians, and the peril which might have been anticipated by the municipal authorities in the exercise of reasonable forethought. Therefore, under the facts of this case, whether the defendant municipality was negligent in permitting the alleged uneven condition to exist in the sidewalk in said city for two years, and whether or not such condition was sufficient to render the city liable to one injured thereby who was
Judgment affirmed.