54 Misc. 2d 855 | N.Y. Sup. Ct. | 1967
The Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation (hereinafter R G & E) has challenged the right of the City of Rochester to condemn certain real property owned by it, on the ground that such property is already being devoted to a “ public use ”. A trial without a jury has been had pursuant to an order of severance made and entered at Special Term, Supreme Court, Monroe County [Lambíase, J.] under date of December 11, 1965, at which time substantially undisputed testimony was adduced which fully supports essential and ultimate facts, viz:
R G & E is an operating public utility engaged in the sale and distribution of gas, electricity and steam in various classes of service to various consumers in and about the City of Rochester, Monroe County, and neighboring counties and com
Directly opposite the system’s control center on the west side of Front Street, R G- & E owns real property which was purchased in about the year 1930 with the intention of ultimately using it as a site of an electric substation to serve anticipated expanding needs in the central business area. In the meantime the property has been used in conjunction with the system control center for the private parking of company vehicles.
On or about October 15,1965, the City of Rochester instituted the within Genesee Crossroads Condemnation Proceeding No. 4 to acquire property for the use and development of the G-enesee Crossroads Urban Renewal Project NYR-80, a concededly “ public.purpose ”. The included property owned by R G- & E has been designated as Condemnation Parcels Numbers 3-1, 3-9, 3-12, 3-13 and 3-14. To sustain its challenge to the legality of the proposed taking, R G & E points to a long-established general rule that the general power of condemnation does not extend to property devoted to a prior “ public use ” (Matter of Boston & Albany R. R. Co., 53 N. Y. 574; Matter of Rochester Water Comrs., 66 N. Y. 413; Matter of Mayor, etc. of City of New York, 135 N. Y. 253) unless the circumstances are “ special, unusual and peculiar” and unless “the intention of the legislature that such lands should be so taken is shown by express terms or necessary implication ” (New York Cent. & Hudson Riv. R. R. Co. v. City of Buffalo, 200 N. Y. 113, 117, 118), which principle applies even though the property devoted to a prior ‘ ‘ public use ” was acquired by purchase and not by condemnation (Matter of Mayor [East 161st St.], 52 Misc. 596, affd. 135 App. Div. 912 [1st Dept., 1909], affd. 198 N. Y. 606). Nor does the inhibition of the “ prior use ” rule apply when the lands proposed to be taken are not indispensable for the owner’s present or future purpose (Matter of New York Cent. & Hudson Riv. R. R. Co. v. Metropolitan Gas-Light Co., 63 N. Y. 326, 335).
Here, we have a situation that is on its face, ‘ ‘ special, unusual and peculiar ” in that the right of condemnation is being used to deal affirmatively with the crucial problem of urban decay and its clear and growing menace to the economic and social well-being of the city. No one quarrels with the desirability of the Crossroads Project. The area was a deplorable slum which could only be effectively dealt with by acquiring and clearing all
The Council of the City of Rochester, in adopting the resolution, unanimously found after a duly noticed public hearing, that the Crossroads Project area is “ substandard, insanitary, slum, blighted, decadent area and tends to impair or arrest the sound growth and development of the City of Rochester and that it is detrimental and a menace to the safety, health and welfare of the inhabitants and users thereof and of the locality at large ” (p. 189) and qualifies as an eligible project area under article 15 of the General Municipal Law of the State of New York under the provisions of subchapter I of the Housing Act of 1949, as amended (City Council Proceedings, 1965, Resolution 63-79 [p. 188]).
As we know, statutes designed to promote the public good are to receive a liberal construction and be expounded in such a manner that they may, so far as possible, attain the end in view (McKinney’s Cons. Laws of N. Y., Book 1, Statutes, § 341). In sum, this is a situation where the prior ‘1 public use ’ ’ must yield to the imperative of the greater public need. Notwithstanding such ruling, B G & E will suffer no monetary loss because of the taking. Both Federal and State Constitutions guarantee that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation (U. S. Const., 5th and 14th Amdts.; N. Y. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. [a]).
For these reasons, the first affirmative defense raised by the respondent B G & E should be and hereby is stricken as insufficient.