161 S.W.2d 58 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1942
Affirming in part and reversing in part.
The city of Richmond brought this suit against the Madison county fiscal court for a declaration of the rights and duties of the city of Richmond and Madison county relative to the care of paupers who reside within the corporate limits of the city of Richmond, and the plaintiff in the prayer of its petition asked specifically for a judgment declaring whether it is the duty of the city of Richmond or the county of Madison to provide funds for hospitalization and medical aid for these paupers. It was alleged in the petition that the city of Richmond has a population of approximately 8,000 inhabitants, and is located within and is a part of Madison county; that its citizens pay county taxes for the maintenance of the county government and the necessary expenses of the county in the same proportion and at the same rates as citizens of the county who live outside the corporate limits of the city; that the rate of taxation levied by the Madison fiscal court applied alike to property located within the corporate limits of the city of *295 Richmond and property located in the county outside the corporate limits of the city; and that the fiscal court had failed and refused to furnish assistance to the paupers who reside within the corporate limits of the city of Richmond or to provide them with hospitalization and medical aid upon the theory that it was the duty of the city alone to furnish assistance, hospitalization, and medical aid to the paupers who live within its corporate limits. In an amended petition the mayor and the members of the board of council of the city of Richmond, suing as officers, residents, and taxpayers of the city, were named plaintiffs. In the amended petition it was alleged that the Madison county fiscal court had entered into an agreement with a privately operated hospital in Richmond for the hospitalization of the paupers of Madison county, and that medical aid and hospitalization had been furnished under the contract to citizens of the county residing outside the corporate limits of the city of Richmond, but that the fiscal court had failed and refused to furnish hospitalization and medical aid to indigent persons who lived within the corporate limits of the city. A special and general demurrer to the petition were filed, and after the amended petition was filed a special plea to the jurisdiction was filed. The general and special demurrers and the plea to the jurisdiction were overruled. The defendant filed an answer and counterclaim. In the answer the defendant denied that in caring for the paupers of the county it had discriminated against those who resided within the corporate limits of the city of Richmond, and alleged affirmatively that it had furnished them assistance and hospitalization and medical aid when needed and that this expense incurred by the county is and should be a joint expense of the county and city governments. In its counterclaim it alleged that, under Section 1851 of the Kentucky Statutes, the treatment, care, medical attention, and, when necessary, hospitalization of poor sick persons residing within the corporate limits of the city of Richmond are made the joint and equal responsibility and obligation of the city and county, the necessary cost and expense thereof to be borne equally and proportionately according to the total assessed value of the property located in each municipality. It further alleged that since it entered into the contract with the privately operated hospital in Richmond it had furnished hospitalization to pauper residents of the city and had expended therefor *296 the sum of $1,877.10, and that during the period from July 1, 1939, to February 1, 1940, it had spent the further sum of $7,997.36 for the care and maintenance of poor persons who resided within the corporate limits of the city, and it sought to recover one-half of these two items, of $4,937.23, the city's proportionate part under the statute. A demurrer was filed to the answer and counterclaim, and the case was submitted on the pleadings. The court overruled the demurrer to the answer and sustained the demurrer to the counterclaim, but adjudged as follows:
"The Court being of the opinion that both the plaintiff, City of Richmond and the defendant, County of Madison have the authority under the Statute laws of Kentucky to provide and appropriate funds to defray the necessary expenses for hospitalization of the indigent poor, is further of the opinion and so adjudges that the obligation to defray said expenses is a joint obligation of said City and County, and that the City of Richmond should bear and pay such proportionate part of said expense as the taxable value of the property located in said City bears to the entire taxable value of the property of the County of Madison including said City, and the County of Madison shall bear and pay the balance of said expense."
The plaintiffs have appealed from so much of the judgment as holds that the obligation to provide hospitalization for the indigent sick is the joint obligation of the city and county, and the defendant has prayed and been granted a cross-appeal from so much of the judgment as dismisses its counterclaim.
Appellee's contention that its plea to the jurisdiction should have been sustained is based on the theory that there is a defect of parties plaintiff (1) because the paupers who reside within the corporate limits of the city are the real parties in interest and they are not made parties as required by Section 18 of the Civil Code of Practice, which provides that every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, and (2) because Section 25 of the Civil Code of Practice has not been complied with. This section reads:
"If the question involve a common or general interest of many persons, or if the parties be numerous *297 and it is impracticable to bring all of them before the court within a reasonable time, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of all."
Neither of these sections has any application. The plaintiffs are not seeking in this action to recover any amount for the pauper residents of the city, but are seeking a declaration of the rights of the parties concerning a controversy which exists between them respecting certain duties. Section 639a — 1 of the Civil Code of Practice provides that the plaintiff, where an actual controversy exists, may ask for a declaration of rights either alone or with other relief. Here, an actual controversy exists between the governing authorities of the city and county relative to the duties of the two municipalities concerning a governmental function common to both, and we know of no reason why either cannot seek a settlement of that controversy under the Declaratory Judgment Act. Ex parte County Board of Education,
The chancellor, in adjudging that the city of Richmond should pay such proportionate part of the necessary expenses for the hospitalization of the indigent sick as the taxable value of the property located in the city bears to the entire taxable value of the property of the county of Madison, apparently intended that this payment should be in addition to the taxes paid to the county by the property owners of the city. According to the briefs of both appellants and appellee, he was influenced by Section 1851 of the Kentucky Statutes which reads:
"Where for county governmental purposes a city is by law separated from the remainder of the county, that portion of the county outside of the limits of such city shall be deemed the county within the meaning of this act: Provided, however, That both such city and county shall each pay its proportionate part of all county expenses common to both said city and county, to be based upon the value of taxable property in each as shown by the last preceding assessment for state purposes."
Section 1851 of the Statutes was enacted in 1892 at the first session of the General Assembly after our present Constitution was adopted. Section 144 of the Constitution, *298
which treats of fiscal courts, concludes as follows: "But where, for county governmental purposes, a city is by law separated from the remainder of the county, such commissioners may be elected from the part of the county outside of such city." For the history of this clause of Section 144 of the Constitution and the legislation following it, reference is made to Joyes v. Jefferson County Fiscal Court,
On the cross-appeal the judgment is affirmed, and on the original appeal the judgment is reversed, with directions to enter a judgment in accordance herewith.