Opinion of the Court by
Reversing.
About two o’clock in the afternoon of one day in July, 1923, the appellee was walking along Seсond street in Pikeville, Kentucky.' Between the Pike Hotel and the Weddington Theatre the sidewalk along Secоnd street crosses an alley which at that time was unmade. The level of the sidewalk was about a fоot above that of the alley. In stepping from the sidewalk into' the alley the appellee fell, breaking her thigh and receiving other injuries of a severe nature. Appellee admits that she' knеw the alley was there and that it was necessary in .order to cross the alley for her to make а step down, but says that she did not know or realize that it was such a high step, and that she was thinking about some оther matter at the time she did step from the sidewalk. She claims that she was caused to fall by reason of the height of the sidewalk above the surface of the alley. There is . nb material dispute in the еvidence concerning any of the foregoing facts except possibly those 'concerning the extent of apellee’s injuries. She brought this suit against the appellant to recover damаges for the injuries she thus received, and on the trial the jury awarded her a *54 verdict of $1,000.00. From the judgment entеred on that verdict the appellant brings this appeal.
This is not a case of where a sidewalk properly eonstrueted has by reason of wear or injury become defective or unsafe. If appellee has a cause of action, it must be because the method of construсtion of the sidewalk was dangerous. This being true, the case is governed by that line of cases illustrated by Teager v. City of Flemingsburg,
“It is argued for the city in this case that the plan of street improvements is .one within the discretion of the council, and not to be interfered with by the courts. Some authority is cited from other states supporting this contention. But we rather incline to the view that, while the city governing body may exercise its discretion in the selection of a plan of street improvement, if the plan adoрted is one palpably unsafe to travelers, the city would be liable. But when the plan is one that many prudent men might approve, or where it would be so doubtful upon the facts whether the street as рlanned or ordered by the city governing board was dangerous or unsafe or not—that different minds might entertаin different opinions with respect thereto—the benefit of the doubt should be given the city, and it should not be held liable.”
This.Teager case was a “step case.”
In Gower v. City of Madisonville,
“A sidewalk constructed according to a plan adopted by the municipality, and whiсh by its legis *55 lative body was considered reasonably safe, may not become the basis for an aсtion for damages on account of personal injuries received by pedestrians slipping аnd falling thereon, unless, after the walk was completed in accordance with the plan adopted, it was so obviously or palpably dangerous as to impress the mind of a reasonably prudеnt person as unsafe.”
In this Grower case there was a descent in the sidewalk of seven inches in four feet to the street level. Applying this rule to the.facts before us and remembering that corpоrate authorities of the city of Pikeville had a broad discretion in the plan to be adopted for the construction of this «sidewalk, we cannot say that a step of one foot from the level of the sidewalk to the level of the alley is so palpably or obviously unsafe and dangerous as to impress the mind of a reasonably prudent man that the sidewalk as constructed was unsafe. In almost every municipality in the state there are many «sidewalks, the level of which is a foot above thаt of the streets or alleys along which they run. Such «sidewalks are in daily use by thousands of pedestrians. It is a matter of common knowledge that it is exceedingly rare than any accident like the one herеin complained of occurs because of such difference in those levels. At all events it devolved upon the apellee to show that the method of construction here involved was рalpably or obviously dangerous or unsafe, and this she did not even undertake to do. It results, therefore, that under the rule as above stated the city was not liable for the unfortunate accident aрpellee sustained and the court should have peremptorily instructed the jury to find for the appellant as it requested. For its failure so to do its judgment must be reversed, with instructions to grant the appellant a new trial in conformity to this opinion.