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City of Phoenix v. Geyler
697 P.2d 1073
Ariz.
1985
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*1 697 P.2d 1073 PHOENIX, municipal

CITY OF сorporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, GEYLER, Richard E. widower of deceased, Geyler, Bernice H. Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17615-PR. Supreme Arizona, Court of

En Banc. March *2 issues are follows: upon What are standards

to determine whether relief a civil granted in judgment should be order litigant privilege taking accord appeal? delayed *3 determining 2. What is the test for court has whether abused its dis- granting or denying cretion discretion- ary relief where that court has failed indicate the for its decision and patent where none is in the record? What for are the standards determin- ing neglect whether mistake is “excusa- ble”?
Deeming questions these of be law to important require issues furthеr clarification, granted peti- defendants’ 23(c)(4),supra. tion for review. Rule

FACTS August 8, 1979,

On City of Phoenix complaint filed a seeking condemnation property. defendants’ The matter was tried a jury, which returned a verdict for defendants in $1,295,507.00. the amount of parties stipulated had that the rate of interest as well as the date of its accrual Baumert, City Atty. Phoenix Andrew were to be decided the court after the Reinhold, Phoenix, plaintiff-ap- T. for Kent verdict. On hearing October a pellee. regarding was held accrual, date of & Associates Robert Robert C. Stubbs only issue on which parties had been Stubbs, Schubart, Trudy Lawrence C. G. agreement. unable to reach an On October Tucson, defendant-ap- Kapley, Nelson 21, defense counsel mailed alternate forms pellant. to the trial judge. On October trial judge signed and filed a form judgment awarding interest from the OPINION judgment, date deciding thus the accrual FELDMAN, Justice. contrary issue to defendants’ contention Defendants, Geyler, Richard and Bernice that interest should accrue from the date petitioned us to review decision of summons. Because more than two (City Geyler, ‍‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‍of Phoenix years elapsed between issuance of the 1984). May filed No. 1 CA-CIV judgment, summons and the date decision the tri- The memorandum affirmed (at stipulated difference interest rate denying al order defendants’ motion court’s 12.75%) $350,000.00. was over As re- brought pursuant for relief quired by 77(g), Ariz.R.Civ.P., 60(c), Ariz.R.Civ.P., 16 A.R.S. We to Rule A.R.S.,1 notice of of judgment was Const, pursuant Ariz. jurisdiction have mailed counsel. notice consisted § 5, Ariz.R.Civ.App.P., and Rule order, art. in the form minute follow- ing: 17A A.R.S. na of Civil Procedure.

1. Unless otherwise indicated all further refer- Rules to "rule" the "rules” to the Arizo- ences refer *4 the words dates Immediately those (October above The the minute date of stamped, Center” were 1981) space near Distributiоn “DATE” “Mail shown the completely were words top page. the Near the bottom first two the might be which page only the two other dates: The word illegible. The “Center.” was the word out 24 made “Received Oct 1981 the dates three-word, phrase and stamped 26 Processed Oct 1981” accompanying actually appeal. it file a identified re- notice of On November spective however, dates on the order had been he did file a motion for relief received and mailed to the cen- 60(c). from The trial mail tral distribution the Marico- center of judge denied defendants’ motion. Subsе- pa County Superior Court. quently, correctly a different denied 52(b) the Rule motion that it Thus, stamped dates of October had not been filed. Edwards and October 26 had no with the connection Young, supra. However, filing judgment. date of secretary both defense counsel and his appeals rejected court showing overlooked the date line October Geylers’ argument that relief should be 22 or took the misunderstood the form and granted because the trial had violated judg- October 24 to be the date date 58(d) by signing proposed form of filed, 15-day ment and calculated waiting, required by without 52(b) mоtion to time limit for a Rule rule, days for five after form was alter amend Oc- lodged by (Slip op. defense counsel. produced erroneous tober date. This an citing Gutierrez, Ariz.App. Gutierrez assumption day filing the that the last (1973)). agree P.2d 677 Monday, motion was November Geylers the court that the were papers Defense counsel filed the on that prejudiced by the trial court’s violation day. counsel, day Unknown to last 58(d). Geylers argue of Rule also Friday, actually file motion had been failing grant court erred in day November the fifteenth by amending judgment, relief pro nunc *5 judgment of on October 22. tunс, to reflect on 24. We October timely While a motion under Rule agree. do not Both the and the 52 extends the time for a notice of appeals of holding court were in correct appeal (Rule 9(b), judgment after Ariz.R. authority that there is no to enter a nunc A.R.S.), Civ.App.P., untimely 17A the mo in pro tunc order a where situation the filed in the case did tion at bench record what reflected the court had actual accomplish an extension. Edwards v. ly done. Surety See American Co. v. (1971). Young, 107 Ariz. 486 P.2d Mosher, (1936). 48 Ariz. 64 P.2d 1025 Thus, day appeal the last for from the conclude, therefore, Geylers that the judgment оn entered October 22 was Mon relief, all, only were entitled to if at under day, 30-day November the end of the 60(c). subsections 1 or 6 of Rule While appeal period post-trial allowed when no only generally defendants’ motion referred 9(a), motion has been filed. Rule Ariz.R. 60(c), supporting to Rule the memorandum Civ.App.P., 17A A.R.S. explicit commenced with to reference and (1) (6) quotation of of subsections and the If defendants’ counsel had known that deem, therefore, rule. We such issues that Rule the 52 motion had not been presented. explicit fairly They were were filed, he could have withdrаwn that motion presented in the court ly the briefs filed in appeal filed a notice of and at time on appeals of and were the focus of that before November 23. He remained in decision. court’s ignorance City the immedi- because did not ately raise the issue of in the untimeliness FOR GRANTING RELIEF STANDARDS response which it filed on November 16. APPEAL FOR OF DELAYED TAKING day one the time On November after to appeal begin noting true expired, City the its We that defendants’ consulted 52(b) judg- the quash object to Rule here is not “relief from calendar moved filing. judg- untimely they on of This not seek to have motion do ment”— litigate they that suspected may the first that ment vacated so was time error, has al- he had an it was too matter on the merits. The issue that made but the mer- untimely ready argued his been and decided on late to withdraw motion rather, objective, “Specifically is to its. Defendants’ we hold that determin- reentered, ing 60(b) applicable whether Rule is a have the vacated [in delayed appeal they timely appeal should may that then file a so situation] 77(d) (1) notice; seek, therefore, consider absence Rule they truly it. from What (2) (3) prejudice respondent; lack of to delayed appeal. privilege In is Vital prompt filing of a motion actual Johnson, 128 Ariz. 624 P.2d 326 notice; (4) diligence, due or reason (1980), held Rule our court that thereof, by attempt- for lack counsel in 60(c) party used relieve could not be to ing to be informed date party’s objec- from a when that decision.” vacated and tive was have reentered, factors, permit delayed so as 722 F.2d at These then 460. combined showing Strick, under disapproved in with a Park v. su- appeal. We the Vital rule pra, “unique,” “extraordinary,” 137 Ariz. P.2d circumstances, “compelling” 60(c)(6) establish (1983), held Rule where we proper determining for standard whether purpose utilized for such a when could be 60(c) grant party Rule relief. The seek- “aggrieved party a lack of establishes delayed must, therefore, ing appeal knowledge judgment has en- been showing only generally required make the tered, and reasons that asserts additional 60(c), relief Rule must also under but extraordinary justify re- are so as stringent meet more standards at at 669 P.2d lief. ...” Id. Watt, supra. Rodgers v. In have recent times other courts bench, the case notice was applying strict less devoted become sent, mistakenly interpreted by coun procedurаl more con law and letter sel, type now who claims that this disposition equitable cerned “inadvertence, ne mistake or excusable Watt, 722 F.2d E.g., Rodgers v. merits. glect” recognized grounds for un relief (en (9th Cir.1983) banc); Expeditions 60(c)(1). proper factu der Where Enterprises v. Aquatic Unlimited Smith made, showing no al see difference (D.C.Cir. Institute, 500 F.2d 808 sonian principle allowing delayed 1974). However, “compelling ‍‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‍60(c) there is a long so as the any subdivision of *6 finality ap judgments” delayed interest standards for proper additional Watt, peal Rodgers v. lightly disregarded. Rodgers applied. be See should turn, Strick, We Watt, supra. v. supra; supra2 supra; Park v. v. therefore, propriety to of the consider the delayed allow a considering In whether to of all relief. should, therefore, trial court’s denial appeal, trial party seeking has relief remember that APPELLATE REVIEW OF STANDARD day has his in court since case had 60(c) OF RULE ORDERS In already litigated its merits. been on situation, principle finality a such We an acknowl commence with greater weight the mov apply than when to edgement carries the standard by granting seeking is relief from ant of a trial court’s order the review therefore, 60(c) showing, A is stronger wheth denying default. or relief justify re its ordinarily required be discretion. Coconi should er the abused Marvin, Watt, Ariz. 83 Rodgers supra. Pulp Paper believe and Co. v. lief. v. no (1957). exercising its 117, In panel en banc 317 P.2d 550 the criteria established an discretion, is not authorized ade the trial court Rodgers 9th Circuit v. Watt nor to arbitrarily inequitably, or to act quately address these concerns: regard- proceed ordering recognized principle execution to when 2. This court first this appeal delayed a which had of the documents it refused to consider the defendant under sentence of less of merits death, holding State, Ariz. 151 been filеd. Villalobo attempt days the expired time (1915). P. 946 appeal” “pretended was no more than a unsupported by make decisions or facts tute our for his or hers. This Hall, legal policy. sound Bowman v. sometimes, process unfortunately, is de- (1957). Ariz. 316 P.2d 484 Neither does scribed as a determination that the misapply discretion leave a court free to judge “abused his discretion.” legal principle. law or Johnson v. How- Chapple, State 135 Ariz. 297 n. ard, 433, 436, 45 Wash.2d 275 P.2d (citations (1983) 660 P.2d 1224 n. 18 (1954). previously As we have noted: omitted). The term “abuse of discretion” un- is question here, then, Our is wheth ordinary language, fortunate. er the trial сourt’s denial of relief was implies corrupt “abuse” some form of grounded upon a disputed determination of practice, impropriety____ deceit or How- questions credibility, balancing of fact or ever, context, legal in the ... the ordi- interests, competing pursuit recog nary meaning of the word has con- been inappropriate phrase judicial policy, any sidered and the nized as a other basis interpreted whole has been apply give which we should deference. The court given by where the reasons the court for provided has us with little assistance untеnable, its clearly legally action are answering question.3 It denied the incorrect, or amount to a denial jus- explanation motion without or comment Similarly, tice. discretionary act which referring 60(c) and without to Rule purpose reaches an end or justified provisions. of its The four-paragraph or by, clearly against, reason and evi- der seems to have dealt with none of the dence “is an abuse.” legal and, issues raised in facts The law would be better served if we stead, only recites a few of the non-deter term____ were apply a different [W]e minative facts. The order reads as follows: keep operative should some principles in 1. The records and file herein reflect Something mind. discretionary be- Judgment that a formal written cause it is based on an assessment of signed by the Court and filed with the conflicting procedural, eq- factual or Clerk of the Court on October vary uitable considerations which 2. The Court’s minute of Octo- to case and which can be better 22,1981 correctly determined or judge, resolved the trial ber reflects the Court’s who has a more grasp immediate of all signing Judgment case, the facts of the an opportunity to said date. parties, lawyers witnesses, see the ambiguity, any, 3. The if occurred and who can better impact assess the through counsel’s reliance on the Clerk what occurs before him. Where a deci- of the Court Mail Distribution Center’s basis, sion is truly made on that it is stamp at the bottom of the Court’s min- discretionary and we will not substitute entry indicating ute that the Distribution our judge; for that of the trial *7 Center received the Court’s minute Where, will second-guess. we not how- processed on October 1981 and the ever, the facts or inferences from them minute order on October 1981. dispute are in and where there are jurisdiction 4. The Court lacks to en- conflicting procedural, few or no factual indicating ter a Nunc Pro Tunc order the considerations, equitable the resolu- signed Order was October 1981 when question tion of the logic. one of law or Judgment signed in fact the was on Octo- responsibility

Then it is our final to de- ber policy termine law and and it becomes duty our to IT deny- “look over the shoulder” of IS THEREFORE ORDERED and, appropriate, the trial if ing substi- Defendant’s motion. review, judges generally required appellate may prevent

3. While trial unnecessary are not and give discretionary rulings, support to reasons for some reversal where facts are close and for a brief, explanation, greatly ruling patent however assists in is not from the record. 330 recognize obligation the facts of which stand The uncontroverted. appellate to courts affirm where rea affidavit indicates that counsel received a might sonable view of the and law facts ‍‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‍28; copy on of the October 22 order October support judgment the the trial court. stamp indicating that noted “Re- he the This if rule is followed even the trial court 1981; ceived: Oct Processed: Oct right wrong has reached the result for the 1981”; interpreted that he this the date as Gary Advertising reason.4 v. Outdoor Co. on the court received which clerk of had 240, 242, 650 P.2d Lodge,

Sun Ariz. filing; he signed the for and that (1982). Thus, appeal on secretary instructed his to mark the office 60(c) relief, denial of Rule the trial court “15 days calendar for from October “undisputed will be sustained facts unless 1981 so that affiant could file a require contrary and circumstances rul 52(b).” post-trial to pursuant motion Rule ing,” event court can and will which The that coun- affidavit states defendants’ rul discretionary overturn the trial court’s Marvin, ing. Pulp secretary’s computation 83 Ariz. at sel the Coconino v. reviewed 121, 317 P.2d at 552. 52(b) 15-day the time limit set agreed day her the last file the that practice usual will not suffice The also av- motion was November 9. Counsel given for the at bench. We are no preparation ers the was that motion indication that the trial court exercised dis firm, the that assigned cretion court’s decision to to an associate of at all. trial deny made a time when relief was Vital prepared, was and that on No- motion was the law and before we Johnson lawyer “flew to vember 9 defendants’ disapproved that case deliv- to file said mоtion hand Phoenix authority supra. principal was the Vital necessary copies er to minimize the time City opposition de advanced required.” Finally, if the affi- appeal, for motion for We think it is fendants’ relief. that, (eight on November davit states likely as that trial court denied relief City days responded to the motion after power thought grant it had no because it had day time for and the motion, it is the trial court that expired), city attorney called an assistant and found exercised its discretion that him “disclose” that the motion should proper showing had not been made. factual it filed on and that have been November grounds having giv its No action been untimely was and had extended court, clearly appear and none en appeal, expired.” had “now time for which record, disposed to ing from we are not contains a clear averment affidavit the trial court exercised its assume that the date that defense counsel believed that proper for some and denied relief discretion Instead, 24” date permissible we exam “Received: Oct was the stamped reason. of the case to determine ine the facts he filed5 on grounds might exist for whether tenable neither realized that 60(c)(1) of relief either denial 22 nor been filed and entered October apparent in 60(c)(6). If such simply the 24 date was that the October affirm, record, even then should mail room had received date on which the may have reached though trial court coun- to be mailed to copy the minute wrong right for the reason. result sel. court’s attempting support THE BASIS—STANDARDS FACTUAL discretion, presumed OF EXCUSABILITY exercise of *8 not was that the order appeals asserted 60(c), Rule de- seeking relief under In it dated Oc- affidavit, ambiguous, was really the because filed an fendants’ counsel Filing judgment evidently with the clerk "constitutes affirming, 5. the court In (Slip compelling. judgment.” principles entry Rule 58. of such considered these 6.) op. at stated, further, “immediate,” tober 22. The required by 77(g),6 court that so as Rule if ambiguous, even it was defense counsel copy counsel did not the order receive a by “calling could have clarified the date days until October six after it was office,” by consulting clerk’s his own file to entered. What he did receive contained a determine the full stamped text of the no- only mail stamp distribution used in one file, tation on other minute entries in the county. stamp only partially leg- That was by calling the clerk ask[ing] of court “and ible, and the words which would have iden- stamp what the said.” He did none of legible tified the October 24 date were not 12, 13.) things. (Slip these op. at All of order, erroneously all. Counsel read the this, though true, indisputably misses assumed that the words Oct “Received: mark. If defense counsel had been 24” meant the date on which the clerk had doubt as to the date on which the order judgment, received and entered the entered, was he would have been inexcus- very carefully computed an'd entered erro- ably negligent in fаiling to do one of a neous dates on his office calendar. From things might number of have re- forward, point extremely that counsel was problem solved the confusion. The diligent in all he prepared that did. He this reasoning line of is that counsel had no time, motion to alter and amend on took it doubt as to the judgment date on which the air, by to Phoenix hand-delivered it so that was entered. Because of his mistake as to filed, timely it promptly would be deliv- filing, the date of carefully he had copies opposing ered counsel. Either erroneously computed the time in which to intentiоnally or unintentionally, City ne- file the motion. Counsel’s failure to con- glected to inform defense counsel that the sult his file or call the clerk to find the date motion untimely. was If it had informed mistake, was the result of the earlier, he could have filed notice Thus, its cause. we do not believe that days within 30 from October 22. denial of relief under Rule 60 can be based Instead, City until waited November upon arguments by made the court of by telephone, to deliver the news followed appeals. by quash. a motion to Once he learned of If question we consider first the of relief predicament, рromptly his defense counsel 60(c)(1) (which under Rule requires the action, motions, multiple took filed and at showing mistake, inadvertence, or excus- every step prompt diligent acted neglect), able we find much that tends to manner. establish the described in the rule.

First, determining The standard for erroneously the order signed by was whether conduct is “excusable” is whether five-day period before the expired lodging. neglect It or inadvertence is such was not mailed by might the courtroom by reasonably prudent clerk but rather be the act of a mail Mailing distribution center. was person under the samе circumstances. Co- Superior Maricopa County Thursday, evidently 6. The Court of is the filed on October re- only superior Saturday, court to use a central mail distri- ceived the mail center on October counties, system. including Monday, bution In all other and mailed on October 26. We do County, Geylers’ requirement Pima where the offices of the not believe this fulfills the of im- located, attorneys mediacy. fairly minute orders are The rules set short deadlines typed by judge making judgment the court clerk of the for action counsel after has been judge’s Important rights litigants may and are order mailed stаff. entered. be County Maricopa prepared by appropriate post-judgment proceedings the orders are lost if judge’s Except by trip staff and sent to the mail distribution commenced. are not mailing. provides center for No local rule the courthouse to look for book, 77(g) system. provides inspect stamp that the "clerk the date the docket coun- determining copies shall mail of all minute entries sel has no method of the date on [of court] parties.” signed employees We to all assume that the which a was and entered. Therefore, deputy 77(g) requires mail in the distribution center are clerks. that notice be requires given "immediately.” urge superior The rule also notice of “immediately upon entry" greater be sent clerks use caution to observe this judgment. question The order in rule. *9 332 Marvin, Pulp de-

conino v. grant permit 83 Ariz. at mine to relief to whether Many P.2d at cases layed factor, 317 have been of appeal. The first absence Pulp, Coconino decided since and we do notice, by the case. is satisfied facts in this recently intend to all. review them We Strick, v. inAs Park here there was more indicated that and secretarial errors clerical than a failure to notice mere receive the procedures in office are “unavoidable and required 77(g). by Rule In there was Harris, Daou v. ... excusable.” [often] notice, in a lack while at bench of the case (1984). 139 Ariz. 678 P.2d 941 confusing there late and result- notice again We noted that the “test of what is ing in calendaring error in the time for an neglect is excusable whether the or inad- filing. result is The the same —counsel type might is vertence” of the be “the was of the date on unaware which Id. prudent person.” reasonably act of a judgment was entered. The second factor 359, 678 940. If there a trend at P.2d at is question prejudice is the of to consider 60(c)(1) in the Rule cases and decided those party. Here, opposing the motion to rule, under the identical federal it is that working alter was late by or amend one diligence is the final arbiter of whether day. City’s If it were not for the failure to Rodgers neglect mistake or is excusable. give prompt filing notice of in untimeliness Watt, 459-60; generally v. see 722 F.2d at motion, pre- of appeal the notice would Harris, supra; Daou v. Smith v. Jackson par- sumably have been filed. The Die, (5th Cir.1970); Tool 426 F.2d 5 litigating ties for over five have been Calkins, The Due Emerging Diligence years; imagine difficult to how a short it is Filing Delayed Notice Standard for of delay preju- could in time have been Courts, Appeal in Federal Willamette Third, City. dicial to the defense counsel (1983). L.J. 609 promptly learning acted the error. strongly The facts of and last factor deals with fourth suggest neglect the mistake which displayed due dil- issue of whether led to the late of the motion to alter thereof,” igence or a “reason for lack or amend and the failure to file the notice Watt, Rodgers supra, to v. attempting in appeal, type was thе of clerical error Here, entry judgment. learn date of might reasonably pru which be made attempt while counsel did not to learn person attempted dent to who handle the judgment, reason for date of prompt diligent in a matter fashion. his to do so erroneous failure was the Marvin, supra; Pulp Coconino v. Daou v. resulting interpretation of the order and Harris, supra. 60(c)(1) under Relief computing time. mistake appropriate would be the usual default excusability ‍‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‍moving situation. The su Thus, Park v. as weight in party’s conduct is also of deter pra, more than mere there is counsel’s mining appropriate whether relief would be of the failure to learn Erickson, 60(c)(6). Webb comply clerk to failure of the with (1982). Ariz. P.2d 77(d) requirement giving notice. excusability to to addition failure quite unique circumstances file, circumstances, there are other such mistake, compelling. did make a Counsel City’s to inform counsel of the failure purpose so all. The of the rule do we motion, might untimeliness of the which provide relief for those mistakes require relief from a default under inevitably despite dili errors occur “any other standard of reason” subsection comply the rules. gent efforts (6). 188-89, Id. at P.2d at 12-13. Here, diligent record shows counsel’s ANALYSIS OF THE FACTS UNDER consistent, business, and care attention AND PARK RODGERS in a comply ful with the rules attempt We consider turn, then, prompt and efficient manner. Rodgers four-part (see Watt impor- paramount analysis these ante 1077) circumstances to deter- *10 60(c) tance under vacated, purposes appeals both for are both and the case is relief from judgments default as well as by remanded for further action the trial delayed appeal under the analysis. court. In affirming court, the trial GORDON, V.C.J., and and CAM- HAYS court of upon relied the decision of ERON, JJ., concur. Wаtt,

a Ninth panel Circuit in Rodgers v. (1982), (Callaghan) Fed.R.Serv.2d 683 HOLOHAN, Justice, dissenting. Chief applying a delayed ap strict standard for by The decision in the court this case is peal and requiring showing First, somewhat unusual for two reasons. rarely “should (quoting be found.” Id. judge the trial making is reversed for Hensley Chesapeake Railway, Northern ruling correct on the motion which counsel (4th Cir.1981)). 651 F.2d One of filed; second, begins practice this court the few Rodgers situations which the making advisory rulings. panel granted indicated that relief would be The by motion filed counsel asked the was where the failure to file the notice of 60(c), pursuant triаl court to Rule Rules of upon resulted from reliance affirma Procedure, A.R.S., clarify Civil representations tive findings or 22, 1981, minute dated October opposing court or parties. panel’s This de pro to rule nunc judg- tunc that the final (after cision was withdrawn for amendment ment was filed October 1981. appeals) decision of our court of replaced by was the en banc decision which judge The trial ruled that he no throughout we have cited opinion. this jurisdiction pro to enter a nunc tunc order While we believe that the circumstances indicating signed the order was warranting delayed appeal should be “ex 24th signed when fact the was traordinary,” “unique,” “compelling,” or the 22nd. majority agrees The Park v. supra, we do not believe Appeals and the Court of were rigid standards should be as as indi holding correct in authority that there is no original cated in the Rodgers decision. pro to enter a nunc tunc order in a situa- correctly tion where the record reflects comments made connection what actually Slip the court had done. with our recitation of the facts indicate our opinion, p. majority agreed Once regard conclusions with to counsеl’s con correct, ruling that the trial court’s I fact, If duct. we were the finders of we thought would have that the matter was excusable, would find the mistake counsel resolved, proceeds but the court write diligent, Rodgers and Park standards new motion for counsel and decide the case satisfied, However, appropriate. and relief on the new motion. may opinions the trial court have about determining has credibility now turned on or other matters which we do share, judge correctly whether the trial give but to which ruled deference. this court’s We remand to the trial court motion. to dеtermine whether circumstances were so “extra Taking the motion as construed ordinary,” “unique,” “compelling” as to court, agree Appeals, I with Court of 60(c)(1) (6) justify relief under Rule implicit and what in the trial court’s purpose allowing the sole defendants ruling, ambigu- that the minute is not delayed appeal. take a This decision ous, confusion suffered according should be made to the standards could have been remedied a minimum of set out ante at 1077. We assume that the phone effort such as a call to the clerk’s findings trial court will indicate its on these office. order, by apprоpriate issues however brief. Departing previous practice from our The order of the denying making advisory rulings, majority trial court relief and the memorandum decision of the court offers their view that “the record shows business, diligent attention

counsel’s consistent, attempt comply careful man- prompt in a and efficient rules *11 If Slip opinion, p. 17. ner.” counsel indicates, majority diligent as the that it never in the situation would be is. nobly parting majority

As a note defers to whatever decision the remand, would majority makes on excusable, find dili- “the mistake gent, sat- Rodgers standards

isfied, Slip opin- relief appropriate.”

ion, p. 18. majori-

I dissent the decision of the ty, ‍‌‌​​‌‌‌‌‌‌​​​‌​​‌‌‌​​​​​​‌​​​​‌‌‌‌‌​​​​‌​​‌‌​‌‌‌‍attempt negli- especially to turn

gence poor diligence practice into

efficiency.

697 P.2d 1084 In the Matter of Member of Arizona, Bar of Fred T.

State Jr., SCANLAN, Respondent. No. SB-303. Arizona, Supreme Court En Banc. March

Fish, Duffield, Miller, Young, Adamson Duffield, Alfred, Tuc- & P.C. Richard son, respondent.

Case Details

Case Name: City of Phoenix v. Geyler
Court Name: Arizona Supreme Court
Date Published: Mar 19, 1985
Citation: 697 P.2d 1073
Docket Number: 17615-PR
Court Abbreviation: Ariz.
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