*1 A.2d PHILADELPHIA, Appellant, The CITY OF
v. AUTHORITY, Joseph The PHILADELPHIA PARKING T. Ash dale, Cibik, Marshall, Michael A. Catherine Alfred W. Tauben
berger, Wagner, Wrigley, Appellees. Russell R. Karen M.
Supreme Pennsylvania. Court of Sept.
Submitted 2001. May
Decided 2002. Patrick Cawley, Forney, Schaffner Susan Harrisburg, Jane for Attorney amicus curiae Office of General. Trujillo, Shelley Smith,
Kenneth Israel Roxanne Christo- Booth, pher Schiller, Roulhac Suzanne llene Michael S. Blume, Staton, Wendy Thompson, M. William R. Christopher Barnes, Grant Paul R. for Philadelphia. Rosen Gosselin, Putnam, Bruton, Jason Peter Alfred W. David P. Philadelphia, for Catherine Marshall. Putnam, Philadelphia,
Alfred W. Joseph for T. Ashdale. Bochetto, Philadelphia, G. Alexander for A. Michael Cibik. Melinson, Gregg R. Taubenberger. for Alfred W. Bruton,
David P. Philadelphia, Wagner. for Russell R. Putnam, Bruton, Alfred W. David P. Philadelphia, for Karen Wrigley. M.
ZAPPALA, C.J., CAPPY, CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN, EAKIN, SAYLOR and JJ.
ORDER PER CURIAM: NOW,
AND day May, this 31st the order of the Commonwealth Court is VACATED and the matter is RE- on the disposition to the Commonwealth MANDED issue, jurisdictional disposition light of our merits. of Act implementation stay of further hereby lift the we *2 moot. DENIED as Contempt for is Petition Appellant’s which is Concurring a Statement CASTILLE files Justice by Justice NIGRO. joined Concurring Statement. SAYLOR files
Justice which Dissenting Statement ZAPPALA files Chief Justice joined by Justice CAPPY. is CASTILLE, concurring.
Justice per the Court’s my joining reasons for explain I write to vacating the order of the Commonwealth curiam order disposition on the this matter to that court for remanding Concurring Saylor’s I of Mr. join I section Justice merits. that, transfer of light in of Act 22’s concluding Statement (Board) board governing control of the (PPA) Philadelphia to Mayor from the Parking Authority Governor, part PPA constitutes of the Commonwealth origi- purposes for of the Commonwealth Court’s government however, I also be- Saylor, jurisdiction.1 nal Justice Unlike to this action indispensable party is an lieve that the Governor My conclusion in this declaratory injunctive for relief. additional, holding for independent ground regard provides an jurisdiction rests in the Commonwealth original that exclusive basis independent I to address this separately write Court. Court. original jurisdiction the Commonwealth indispensable not that the is Appellant argues Governor generic is his only his interest the matter the case because general this that Act 22 be declared lawful and concern Moreover, indispensable. not render him interest alone does may argues that whatever interest the Governor appellant on the merits is not essential to a decision have the case against appellant requested any specific not relief because has procedur- Saylor ably the factual and 1. As Justice has also summarized background appeal, repeat I will here. al of this not information appellant nor has accused the Governor Governor wrongdoing. Finally, appellant contends that the Governor joined does not need to named because defendants appellant adequately represent protect will his interests. that,
Appellees notwithstanding that appellant counter has requested specifically, appel- relief the Governor authority lant’s lawsuit seeks to invalidate the Governor’s Board, Act 22 to appointments under make new cause, appoint remove Board members for and to successors interests, governing body. ap- to the PPA’s The Governor’s contend, pellees “inextricably are thus intertwined” with the necessarily granted lawsuit and will if be affected relief addition, appellant. appellees appellant’s stress that com- plaint declaratory seeks and that such an action will not relief parties all having lie unless interest the issues are joined. *3 notes, Saylor correctly inquiry
As Justice “the basic in determining party indispensable whether a is concerns wheth justice party....” er can be of a third done the absence CRY, Inc., Service, 462, 372, Inc. v. Mill 536 Pa. 640 A.2d 375 (1994). indispensability The determination of “at involves following least” the considerations: 1. parties right Do absent a or to have interest related claim? so, right
2. If what is the of that nature interest? right 3. that Is or interest essential to the merits of the ' . issue? . justice violating pro- Can be afforded without the due rights parties?
cess of absent Dairies, Inc., 398, Lehigh Centolanza v. 540 Pa. Valley (1995) CRY, A.2d (quoting supra) (quoting 338-39 Me Kline, chanicsburg Area District v. Pa. School (1981)). A.2d Applying these criteria to the matter judice, sub it apparent indispensable that the Governor is an party declaratory injunctive to this action for and relief. direct, a clearly Governor has concrete interest matter, legislation Saylor aptly which involves that Justice complaint, In its “unique a character.” having as describes § 5508.1 is that 53 Pa.C.S. appellant sought declaration null, void, unlawful, sought temporary perma- and and and any of carrying into effect injunction preventing the nent section, seating any of new including provision appointment. serving gubernatorial of the Board members addition, manner appellant sought In a declaration changed until all may which the Board is selected not be discharged, as outstanding fully bonds of the PPA are met and temporary permanent injunction preventing as a and well seating any Board until such bonds are new members discharged. 5508.1 authorizes the Gov- fully met Section to appoint immediately six additional members ernor arise, Board, they fill Board as vacancies convincing upon Board members clear and evidence remove 53 Pa.C.S. misfeasance or malfeasance office. See 5508.1(e)-(h). fact, act to point the Governor did legislation by appointing six new members implement the new Indeed, triggered Board. it was this action that in- declaratory and Appellant’s requests instant lawsuit. relief, junctive granted, if would act to restrict the Governor powers and necessarily implicate specific the Governor’s Act 22. interest under argument validity appellant’s
I do not doubt the unconstitu- challenged may the fact that a statute be declared not, itself, indispensable tional does make the Governor Boards, 696 party Pennsylvania to an action. See School Indeed, law, if that A.2d at 867-68. were the the Governor *4 indispensable every challenging to action the could be deemed Here, however, nature of constitutionality legislation. the contends, not, decidedly is as appellant the Governor’s interest lawful; in it merely generic seeing a interest Act declared having unique to do with character of specific is a interest the legislation, authority and the Governor’s under the stat- challenged grants to certain ute. The statute the Governor implementation. to its Those powers respect and duties with vesting in the Gover- powers merely By are not ministerial. PPA, legisla- the power nor the to decide who will control the tion to to attempt promote authorizes the Governor frame and Indeed, policies. very aggrieves certain it is this fact which i.e., City, Governor, the the fact that it will be the rather than Mayor, responsible. to whom Board now will No the explains why City sought enjoin seating doubt this to joined of the new Board and the Governor its federal lawsuit. The Governor thus has a direct interest in the i.e., litigation, participating an interest in the determination validity scope authority unique, of his under this legislation. take-over This is an interest that is not shared any party. the named defendants or other Contrast id. at 868 (Governor indispensable challenging legality to counts they any law since are not towards “directed the Governor way, and law ... does not give any powers Governor or administration”) duties respect with to its enforcement added). (emphasis
, say This is not to indispensable the Governor is dispute involving governmental a body appointed by the Gov- Owing to expansive appointive powers, ernor. the Governor’s such a would a indispensable rule render the. Governor to vast lawsuits, would, most, many number of of which only at matter, however, tangentially implicate his interests. This garden-variety not a action a involving governmental entity happen whose appointed by members to have been the Gover- direct, nor. It is a constitutional challenge by very statutory provision authorizing Governor to and monitor the Authori- members appoint ty’s governing body thereby policy. direct PPA It in- that dramatically volves statute shifts control of an Mayor Moreover, from complaint the Governor. Where, declaratory seeks relief. See discussion as infra. Governor’s, here, appointive power merely is not incidental but, fact, declaratory judgment litigation, is the sine qua dispute, right non of the I believe that the Governor has to be heard in the matter. also is Governor’s interest essential to the resolution of underlying dispute. A party “rights is essential if his directly
so connected litigation affected [the]
435
rights.” Me-
party
protect
of record to
such
he must be
Trans-
(quoting
Echoing apparently a view shared the Commonwealth (“the Court, City has Slip Op. see Court at 11 himself, requested any against the Governor and the relief merits”), is not to a determination of the Governor essential only appellant party contends that a is essential nevertheless party such plaintiff requests specific relief where wrongdoing. alleges party engaged that the some sort of argu- Appellant support cites Centolanza and CRY Centolanza, Department held that the ment. (DER) was not to the case Environmental Resources essential July appointees joined 2. The Governor’s the Board at its . meeting plaintiffs alleged since the had “not that the Commonwealth halt, cease, [complained ... or abate failed the nuisance *6 in request any type the action the Centolanzas did not and] directly involving A.2d at relief the Commonwealth.” 658 DER, CRY, contrast, In plaintiffs failing accused the illegal discharge to halt the defendant’s of hazardous waste which, sought among things, require and relief other would any the Commonwealth to forebear in the issuance of further well, permits appointment to defendant as as the of a natural property. resources trustee over defendant’s This Court held indispensable that DER was to action. Appellant alleges Centolanza, that, plaintiffs in plaintiffs like the and unlike the CRY, claiming any it wrongdoing part on the do, and is not asking Governor the Governor to or refrain from Thus, doing, anything. appellant argues, the Governor is not A litigation. essential to the closer examination of the cases appellant shows that is ihistaken.
Centolanza involved an action private alleging citizens storage that at least one of the defendants’ tanks and/or had connecting pipes property. plain- leaked onto their sought payment anticipated tiffs for the oil contamination cleanup costs and diminution in property the value of their Storage Spill under the Tank and Act. An Prevention issue jurisdiction arose as to whether the courts had to hear the plaintiffs join matter because the had failed to DER as indispensable party. that We held DER was not to essential plaintiffs alleged the case because the had not that DER engaged any wrongdoing respect regulatory to its obligations plaintiffs requested any nor had the type relief directly involving Accordingly, the Commonwealth. that DER not indispensable Court held was to the action and that this Court had appeal. resolve the CRY, In plaintiffs brought suit various under environ- mental statutes the owner of a hazardous waste stor- age facility. sought by plaintiffs The relief included enjoining from disposing treating the defendant hazardous site; enjoining wastes at the issuing Commonwealth from any permits allowing further defendant continue its natural activities; a trustee of appointing storage waste crite- Mechanicsburg Applying the facility. for the resources “[bjecause activity regulatory DER’s ria, that this Court held case, in th[e] entered by any order affected may be coopera- may require order with that compliance because A.2d at 376. DER, is essential.” its interest tion suit, it party not a addition, if DER were we noted carrying out of in the cooperate required would not be court, non-coopera- such by the judicial remedy fashioned likelihood, litigation. further We would, require in all tion action. concluded, therefore, DER must included requested of the relief on the nature Appellant’s emphasis of this case. Unlike Centolan ignores the context pleading its CRY, monetary damages or sought plaintiffs za and where declaratory *7 measures, appellant here seeks other remedial that Act 22 is unconstitu a declaration Appellant seeks relief. minimum, tional, or, a declaration that the manner at a changed until all may not be which the is selected Board discharged. fully PPA outstanding bonds of the are met Thus, have accused the plaintiffs focus on whether a specifically wrongdoing sought or relief appropriate not here. party simply is against Commonwealth Indeed, aggrieved by it allege not that has been appellant does The including the named defendants. specific party, any Pennsylvania law is instead, Act challenge, is to the itself. action all interested declaratory judgment that in a clear in the regardless parties named parties joined, must be (“When 7540(A) declaratory relief pleadings. See Pa.C.S. parties who have or claim sought, persons all shall be made and no which affected the declaration any interest would be parties rights persons prejudice shall declaration Fulton, 520, 224 v. 423 Pa. see also Mains proceeding”); (1966) will (“[D]eclaratory judgment proceedings A.2d issue are parties having an interest not lie unless all the (citations omitted). joined”) request sounds in a overlooking that this matter
Even relief, may be party the law that a declaratory it cannot be specifically alleges if only plaintiff deemed essential party engaged wrongdoing directly or seeks relief rule, involving party. could, such such a a plaintiff Under through intentionally incomplete or tactical pleading, effective- ly preclude joinder a party rights directly whose at prejudiced by litigation. issue and could be The absence however, of an indispensable party, goes to court’s juris- “[Ujnless indispensable diction. all parties parties are made action, an powerless grant a court is Sprague relief.” v. (1988). Casey, 520 Pa. 550 A.2d The mere fact omitted, plaintiff inadvertently or intentionally, either indispensable party an otherwise does not overcome this fun- damental bar to merits review.
, Gas, example, For supra, plaintiff brought Columbia rightful action to determine the disputed owner of a repair right-of-way. maintenance and plaintiff neglected, however, to name as a defendant the owner fee of the servient across which disputed tenement easement existed. Notwithstanding plaintiff that the did not accuse this individu- any wrongdoing him, al of seek relief the Court found him to indispensable dispute: question the instant case there can be no that the fee
simple owner of the servient tenement
is an indispensable
party.
right
enjoyment
to the use and
property
of his
adversely
by any
will be
litigation involving
affected
easement, and, therefore,
joined.
he must be
The failure to
deprives
do so
jurisdiction.
the court of
its officers in an action conclusively does establish jurisdiction. the Commonwealth Court’s See Penn- (citation Ass’n, sylvania School Boards at A.2d omit- ted). however, corollary, certainly is also true: the failure of a plaintiff allege wrongdoing part to on of a the party or to seek redress that party does, not necessarily party mean that the is not indispensable litigation to in which it has a direct interest. Because the powers appoint, replace Governor’s to monitor and members governing board of PPA at very the are the heart of action, unques- will power this declaratory judgment granted appel- is to declaratory if relief tionably affected be adjudica- lant, is essential the I that the Governor believe of matter. tion that process require the Governor
Finally, principles of due that Appellant in asserts participate the case. permitted be violating Governor’s inter- can afforded without justice in case may have est because interests the Governor Appel- adequately represented by the named are defendants. challenging Governor’s exercise argues lant that it is not statute, legality but powers of his under a lawful rather the underlying statute: important is an one.... the former The difference circumstance, unique has a interest —his exer- the Governor ,In latter rights only protect. of his he can cise —that (like here), case the Governor’s “interest” circumstance unique. seeing His “interest” is the relevant is (Act 22) lawful. That is the same interest statute declared individually as that of the named defendants. at 19-20. the interests
Appellant’s Brief Because defendants, of the named Governor are identical those litigation appellant argues, interests the Governor’s fully protected presence required and his is not granting of relief. argument pivots again faulty prem- once on the
Appellant’s only that Act be declared ise the Governor’s interest above, explained As Act 22 vests the office constitutional. manage- specific powers respect with to the the Governor government party PPA. ment and control He is the charged acting challenged portion under necessarily legislation. Because invalidation of Act will statute, he strip unique powers the Governor of his under the direct, appellant’s challenge has concrete interest generic That concern law. interest transcends mere indeed, above, constitutional; as noted the Act be determined *9 foregone it conclusion that the will is not even Governor always challenged of a law that affects him.3 advocate favor
Moreover, from the Governor’s interests are distinct those and his of the named defendants. While both the Governor appointees obviously in these individ- recent share interest Board, maintaining uals on the the Governor is their seats power to monitor additionally maintaining interested his and to performance appoint their their successors. The Gov- ernor’s are to the merits of the matter and interests essential sufficiently distinct from the interests of the named defen- participate litigation. to permitted dants he must be Manzo, 545, 552, v. 85 S.Ct. Armstrong See U.S. (1965) (“A requirement L.Ed.2d 62 fundamental heard”). process opportunity due is the to be Justice in this declaratory judgment only partic- action can done Governor, ipation required implement this party legislation.
According Mechanicsburg to the criteria set forth and its progeny, I an indispensable party believe that the Governor is join I Accordingly, per the action. while the Court’s vacating curiam order the order of the Commonwealth Court merits, disposition to that I remanding tribunal on the Pennsylvania join party would also the Governor of as 2232(c). defendant. See Pa.R.C.P. joins concurring
Justice NIGRO statement. SAYLOR, concurring. Justice City of appeal This involves what is described Philadelphia as a Commonwealth takeover Authority Pennsylvania Parking initiated General As- sembly explain my via Act of 2001. I write to reasons for supporting curiam present per this Court’s order. 1947,1 Parking Authority Law of the General Assem- Governor, Furthermore, plaintiff, it should be for the and not the in a action, declaratory judgment say whether his interest is otherwise adequately represented. 5, 1947, (as §§
1. Act of June P.L. 458 amended 53 P.S. 341-356 (superseded)). *10 Pennsylvania in to political subdivisions bly authorized certain enactment, Pursuant parking create local authorities. (the “City”), created the City Philadelphia Appellant, the 1950, City’s Mayor Parking Authority in with the Philadelphia authority over all five directors exercising appointment Law, to 8 of the authority’s governing pursuant board Section Philadelphia Park- (superseded). Initially, § 53 P.S. 348 only parking off-street ing Authority asserted control over however, 1983, functions, it parking garages; such as as well.2 The responsibility parking on-street assumed existence, also, throughout its issued numerous authority has bonds, issues that re- tax-exempt municipal including several outstanding. main 2001, 19, 2001, recodified signed
Act 22 of into law on June through 5517 of Parking Authority at 5501 Law Sections Statutes, §§ 5501- 53 Pa.C.S. Pennsylvania’s Consolidated 5517, primary import material amendments. Of several here, by: increasing authority’s board Act reconstituted the members; complement repo- from to its maximum five eleven appoint- branch of siting the executive the Commonwealth (a majority of the maxi- authority for six new members ment membership); phasing positions mum out the (e). 5508.1(b), § mayoral appointees.3 See Pa.C.S. Philadelphia Park- requires the reconstituted enactment also (“PPA”), ing Authority during year beginning its fiscal portion to transfer to the School District within this function was the and maintenance 2. Subsumed installation meters; regulations; parking promulgation parking in- of on-street signage; parking parking permits; collection of stallation issuance fines; tickets; towing receipts parking and the meter issuance of illegally parked vehicles. mayoral appointees continue in office 3. Pursuant to Act are to office, expire they their or leave at which time their until terms abolished; further, serving positions member on the no board may beyond of the Act remain in office June 2006. See effective date (i). appointment power § is a con- 53 Pa.C.S. 5508.1 The Governor's one, original serving year, tinuing appointees for one after with his six nine, eight, staggered appointments which time the are to be in terms of addition, 5508.1(1). § years. 53 Pa.C.S. In the Governor and ten See authority change composition of board removal of has the appointees in office. See 53 Pa.C.S. for misfeasance malfeasance 5508.1(g). § $45,000,000, earnings, exceeding its retained that will not jeopardize ability payments or to its meet debt service outstanding 5508.1(q). retire bonds. See Pa.C.S. subsequent years, PPA must maximum it transfer the amount purpose. deems available for such See id.
Shortly law, signing after Act into the Governor invoked provisions appoint its six new of PPA’s board. members 29, 2001, Subsequently, complaint on June filed a Philadelphia County against the Court of Common Pleas of alia, PPA and appointees,4 alleging, the Governor’s six inter guarantees that Act 22: violates constitutional of Home Rule City; statutory' for the breaches various found in pledges Law; Parking Authority *11 prohi- contravenes the constitutional passage any impairing bition of the law of obligation contracts; constitutes unconstitutional special legislation; ef- delegation municipal fects an unconstitutional of a to function commission; special a and part was enacted as of a bill containing subject more than one in violation of the constitu- passage tional bar addressing multiple bills topics. relief, request declaratory City addition to a for a sought permanent injunction preventing into carrying 5508.1, provision including seating effect of Section gubernatorial appointees of the to City, the board. The however, party did not name the Governor as a to action.5 its 10, 2001,
By July pleas order dated court common determined that the should properly matter have been com- in menced the Commonwealth Court provisions under the establishing the Judicial Code the Commonwealth Court’s original jurisdiction and exclusive over most forms of actions 761(a)(1).6 “against 42 § the Commonwealth.” Pa.C.S. convenience, party 4. For the sake of we refer to the defendants before court, here, pleas appellees collectively, the common as “PPA.” City Apparently, also filed a federal action in the United States Pennsylvania District Court for the Eastern District of in which it did party name the Governor as a defendant. See Phila. v. Governor Pa., (E.D.Pa.). the Commonwealth No. 01-CV-3291 pleas jurisdiction general, 6. The common courts’ own see Pa. Const. V, 10(b), law, subject § exceptions provided by Art. such as government, branch of state court reasoned that the executive Governor, indispensable party was an person in the of the regard, primarily In this the court referred action. his seats having appointees take their Governor’s interests common making appointments. Accordingly, future proceeding the Commonwealth pleas court transferred 5103(a) Code, 42 of the Judicial pursuant to Section 5103(a). § Pa.C.S. City’s challenge, the Common
Upon presentation
PPA
hearing
and determined that
wealth Court conducted
Commonwealth,7
hence,
its
agency
was not an
one
party
as a
defendant could
render the action
status
ac
Commonwealth Court
against the Commonwealth. The
“public
Act 22
that PPA shall
knowledged that
directs
exercise
agency
powers of the Commonwealth as
of the Common
wealth,”
instrumentality of
and “shall not be deemed to be an
(3).
5505(a)(1),
Nevertheless,
municipality.”
P.S.
concluding
implicated,
that its
was not
it relied
upon
prior
pre
PPA’s local function and
decisions which the
Philadelphia Parking Authority
Act
had been deemed
Parks,
E-Z
Inc.
jurisdictional purposes.
local
See
Larson,
(1985), aff'd,
v.
91 Pa.Cmwlth.
Section of the Judicial which establishes in the against Commonwealth Court over actions the Commonwealth. purposes jurisdiction, 7. For of the Commonwealth Court’s "actions against expressly proceedings subsumes civil Commonwealth” agencies. See 42 Pa.C.S. Commonwealth more, and that appointments, nothing bodies these do not implicate jurisdiction. the Commonwealth Court’s jurisdiction lay
While it therefore concluded that in the court, pleas citing disapproval this Court’s common cases, Rank, practice retransferring see v. Pa. Balshy 384, 388, (1985),8 490 A.2d the Commonwealth Court City bring nevertheless dismissed the action to allow the to jurisdictional question Additionally, before this Court. although jurisdiction, it had concluded that it lacked court n indicated that, judicial for purposes economy, it would request discuss the merits of the for preliminary injunction City. regard, submitted the court reached the City conclusion that the had failed demonstrate the essen- tial prerequisites right clear and irreparable relief harm.
Subsequently, City an emergency application filed for stay seeking with this Court meeting forestall a of PPA’s day board to be held that at which the Governor’s six new appointees to join. were scheduled also filed a King’s petition requesting Bench the Court to entertain the original jurisdiction, appeal matter our as well as a notice of dismissing the Commonwealth Court order the matter for jurisdiction. lack of While this application Court denied the stay jurisdiction as moot and declined to plenary exercise matter, it expedited over the established an briefing schedule question original jurisdiction. on the Because both the pleas Commonwealth Court and the common court found tribunals, lacking respective their thereby de- laying matter, disposition underlying the Court also stayed implementation further 22 pending of Act resolution jurisdictional This present issue. Court’s order lifts such stay, order, vacates the' Commonwealth Court’s and remands disposition to that- tribunal for City’s action on its merits. note, however, Balshy
8. We that the Court's comments in were directed practice pleas to the of "retransfer” courts of common Court, appellate jurisdiction which has over them. *13 this Court due appellant before City is the Although the claims, supports it the Commonwealth its dismissal of agency local and the Gover- PPA is a conclusions that Court’s reasoning as well as the indispensable party, nor is not an PPA, on the of these determinations. support provided enabling of its hand, plain language emphasizes other its status as Commonwealth establishing as statute original jurisdic- Court’s of the Commonwealth purposes tion, interests are inextrica- and contends that the Governor’s necessarily will ad- with the lawsuit bly intertwined if to obtain relief. versely affected the were jurisdiction lies in original of whether question Because the is a pleas or court of common Commonwealth Court See, law, scope plenary. of review is question of this Court’s Co., 124, 130, 542 Pa. v. A-Best Products e.g., Phillips (citation omitted). (1995) As Common- A.2d recognized, have our central task parties wealth Court and the statute, jurisdictional apply is to the Commonwealth Court’s applicable provides, exceptions which limited here (a) original jurisdic- Court shall have The Commonwealth proceedings: civil actions or
tion of all (1) government, including any Against the Commonwealth thereof, acting capacity.... in his official
officer 761(a)(1). 42 Pa.C.S. Agency
I. PPA is a Commonwealth Whether 761(a) of previously explained This has that Section as a Code establishes the Commonwealth Court the Judicial ques- judicial forum for uniform and consistent resolutions actions that impact, tions of statewide include Co., Painting T R Inc. v. Phila- the Commonwealth. See & Auth., 493, 498, 353 A.2d Housing 466 Pa. delphia (1976). indicated, general proposition, has also as a The Court particular is no need for such uniform statewide there involving powers and duties of local resolution of issues operating single county, city, municipality. in a authorities See id.
446 concluding agency, that PPA is not a Commonwealth the upon
Commonwealth Court relied the latter of precepts, these supporting finding regarding predominate its local charac- Parks, entity of in E-Z ter with the decisions 91 Pa. 600, 1364, Rhoads, Cmwlth. at 498 A.2d at and 103 Pa.Cmwlth. 303, 122, parking at 520 A.2d at in which had authorities been agencies purposes immunity jurisdic- deemed local of and however, difficulty analysis, tion. 22 is that Act governing body enabled the reconstitution of PPA repositing in the executive branch of ap- the Commonwealth pointment authority majority present over PPA’s board complement by phasing existing out board positions. See Therefore, § pre-Act Philadelphia 53 Pa.C.S. 5508.1. Parking Authority subject that was E-Z simply Parks PPA appeared party was the. as a defendant in the Philadelphia Commonwealth Court —E-Z Parks concerned Parking Authority entity body governing whose five-member appointed solely by City’s was Mayor pursuant Parking Authority former Law.9 As described the Com- Court, monwealth the net effect of Act 22 was “to transfer Authority immediately control of the from present board appointed by Mayor members to the six appointed by new board members the Governor.” reconstituting governing body of PPA is the predominate my factor assessment here. While the mem- do not exclusively bers the reconstituted board serve at the Governor,10 pleasure of the the fact remains that PPA’s control longer structure no resembles traditional local au- Moreover, thority. although the Commonwealth Court ob- se, PPA served that does not serve a statewide function it per that, PPA significant by obliging substantial channel funding, Assembly revenues to school directly the General has Parking Authority, organized Rhoads concerned Lancaster also Rhoads, pursuant Parking Authority Law of 1947. See Pa.Cmwlth. 520 A.2d at at 123. noted, previously 10. As Act 22 fixed establishes terms for board mem- only provides upon convincing bers and for their removal clear and evidence of misfeasance or malfeasance in office. See 53 Pa.C.S. 5508..1(g). instrumentality furtherance PPA as an employed for the provide obligation constitutional Legislature’s own system thorough of a and efficient support maintenance III, § 14. The sub Pa. Const. Art. public education. See funding is in education and educational stantial state interest Act, Act Empowerment Education further manifested Code,11 inter the Public School 16 of which amended alia, Pennsylvania school to address distress facets of the See, e.g., P.S. system, including budget funding issues. first in school districts of the (pertaining § 6-696 to distress class). Commonwealth, Pa. Marrero v. generally See *15 (1999)(crediting 739 A.2d the Commonwealth Assembly has satis Court’s that the “General determination provide thorough to ‘a fied constitutional mandate [the a public by enacting number system education’] efficient operation funding public relating statutes and, in particular, in both in system school the Commonwealth original)). Together in Philadelphia” (emphasis Assembly that express with the admonition the General agency, see 53 Pa.C.S. PPA constitutes a Commonwealth 5505(a)(1), convincingly § these factors establish against City’s present action is one the Commonwealth. Moreover, unique and the charac given the interests involved validity Act legislation, City’s challenge 22’s ter is, nature, uniquely its a matter suited to the Common original jurisdiction.12 wealth Court’s Party Indispensable II. is an Whether Governor present I action is one While have concluded that as a Common- against the Commonwealth due to PPG’s status properly wealth and thus was the Com- Court, support I Court’s monwealth do the Commonwealth party. indispensable conclusion that the Governor is not an 10, 1947, (as P.L. amended 24 P.S. 1-101-27 11. Act of March 2702). treasury Although exposure in an the lack of direct of the state significant monetary damages may factor action for constitute determining Commonwealth for immu- whether an action is nity purposes, controlling I do not consider such factor here. pertinent inquiry This has described the as “whether CRY, justice can third party.” be done the absence [the] Service, Inc., 462, 469, v. Inc. Mill 536 Pa. 640 A.2d (1994). regard, In this I credit the Commonwealth Court’s no observation that the Governor maintains direct role implementation operations of Act or in the of PPA above beyond appointment obligations. of his the fulfillment circumstances, many and as in other instances of civil I proceedings against agencies, Commonwealth conclude sufficiently the Governor’s interests are not immediate and require presence party, direct as to his as a but of such are they adequately appoin- nature that his represented Certainly, to pursue tees. the Governor remains free inter- vention, liberally pursuant which should be allowed applicable procedural if he to choose to do so. rules were See generally Pa.R.C.P. Nos. 2326-2350. ZAPPALA, Dissenting.
Chief Justice I per reversing dissent from the curiam order the Common- remanding wealth Court’s order and the matter to the Com- for proceedings monwealth Court further on the merits with party majority the Governor as a has not defendant. proffered an opinion explain reasoning reversing its order, leaving parties and the Court’s *16 any guidance proceed. lower court without as to how to Indeed, I majority’s am at a loss to understand the decision caution, however, myself. I majority’s that whatever the perception importance Philadelphia’s it problems, short-sighted should not be so that the rest of the Common- follow, I wealth must be sacrificed. For the reasons that affirm would the order of the Commonwealth remand this to common pleas pro- matter court further ceedings. City I would of Philadelphia’s also review the Contempt, Petition for than dismiss it as moot. rather 20, 2001, July Judge On Commonwealth Court’s President Doyle action The dismissing entered order docketed as v. City Philadelphia Parking Authority The al., 2001, jurisdiction. et No. 343 M.D. for lack of In a
449 opinion July Judge memorandum dated President 27, 2001, Doyle underlying litigation. summarized the relevant facts this Philadelphia Parking Authority
Before June 19, 2001, - PPA) (Authority or by gov was controlled a five-member erning appointed by Mayor City board Phila delphia. City The Philadelphia is a the First Class and a municipality. Authority home-rule was 2 incorporated pursuant to a Philadelphia adopted ordinance January Parking on as Authority authorized 11, 1950, (Law), amended, Law Act of June P.L. as 5, 1947, formerly §§ governing P.S. board of the 341-356. Authority appointed by Mayor was as authorized Law, Section 8 348. For formerly P.S. some creation, thirty years after its authority the PPA exercised functions, only parking over off-street parking ga such as 1983, however, ordinance, rages. City, by authorized PPA to responsibility parking, assume the for on-street including the installation and parking maintenance of me ters, promulgation of parking regulations, on-street installa signage, tion of parking permits, issuance of collection of fines, parking receipts parking meter issuance tickets towing of illegally parked vehicles. The PPA has also, existence, throughout its tax-exempt issued numerous bonds, municipal including several bond issues that remain outstanding. These include bonds in the amount of over million for incomplete projects, two referred to as the $112 Square Project Rittenhouse Disney Quest Project. and the projects Because completed (essentially these have not been they started), they currently produce have even been no revenue. Assembly
On June passed 12, 2001, General Senate Bill which codified including Parking several acts Authority signed legislation Law. The Governor on 19, 2001, thereby enacting June it into law as Act of Parking Authority Pursuant to Act Law has become part Pennsylvania, of the Consolidated Statutes of codified *17 §§ at 53 Pa.C.S. 5501-5517. While most of the substantive provisions intact, of the Law remained Act contained one 22 addition, litigation. subject is the of this which
significant addition, “special § 5508.1 contains found at 53 Pa.C.S. That of First Class.” for authorities Cities provisions ap provisions” authorize the Governor “special These PPA. governing board of the six new members to the point by Mayor contin original appointed members While terms, of no new out the remainder their ue to serve of by Mayor. The net effect appointed can be members Authority imme 5508.1 is to transfer control Section by the appointed from board members diately present ap Philadelphia to the six new board members Major of pro Additionally, Section 5508.1 pointed by the Governor. 2001,5 that, PPA during year the fiscal sometime vides of a school district of the general transfer “to the fund shall parent municipality [the with the first class coterminous of its retained Philadelphia] portion District of School $45,000,000, jeopard will not not to exceed which earnings, ability payments authority’s to meet debt service ize the ” outstanding bonds.... to retire action in the Court of Common filed the instant 29, on 2001. The com Philadelphia County June Pleas declaratory judgment, named sounding equity plaint, PPA itself newly-named appointees6 and the governor’s Respondents), to as (collectively referred as defendants counts, why Act alleging alternative reasons consists nine summarized, Briefly be declared invalid. should City of upon that Act 22 intrudes City’s arguments are thereby violates Philadelphia’s Home Rule Charter Constitution; 9, Pennsylvania 2 of the Article Section outstanding bonds issued impairs Act 22 indebtedness variety ways; that Act violates Article by the PPA in a relating impairment 17 of the Constitution Section contracts; subject single that Act violates the rule invalid 3 and that Act constitutes Article Section delegation municipal power special legislation and/or of Article Sections special commission contravention 31 and 32 of the Constitution.
451 hearing a on Pleas scheduled The Court Common 10, July injunction for preliminary motion for a Petitioner’s however, hearing, Respondents argued 2001. At that jurisdiction Court lacked because the Common Pleas alternative, or, in agency” PPA was a “Commonwealth party to the indispensable that the Governor was an the case with the thereby vesting jurisdiction over 10, 2001, July By Court.7 order dated was an agreed of Common Pleas the Governor matter to indispensable party and transferred the entire Following telephone call this Court. conference 2001, 12, Doyle July parties on with all Judge President to maintain the then participating, parties agreed all of the hearing on existing quo,8 status and we then scheduled expedited preliminary injunction motion for a Petitioner’s 2001, Friday, July parties, including and ordered the Governor, to brief the issue of before the hearing. scheduled
[2] is a home-rule municipality pursuant City Act, April 21, 1949, First Class Home Rule Act of P1. §~ as amended. 53 P.S. 13101-13157. [3] The Rittenhouse Square prqject, located approximately Philadelphia, joint at 19th and Walnut Streets in involves a developer garage venture between the and a to build a (Transcript 12-13). and movie theatre. at Revenue bonds $65,090,000 January 15, in the amount of were issued on (See 14.) Petitioner's Exhibit [4] Disney Quest Project is a proposal to build a mixed-use
development Philadelphia, at 8th and Market Streets in primary being Disney Quest, tenant with other tenants developer Zone, identified as ESPN Animal Forest spaces. (Transcript 35). and other retail at Revenue $47,390,000 May 1, bonds in the amount of were issued in project. (See 11.) for this Petitioner's Exhibit The PPA's 2001 fiscal year is from April 1, 2001, May 31, 2002. appointees Joseph Ashdale, T. Michael A. Cibik, Marshall, Taubenberger,
Catherine Alfred W. Russell R. Wagner Wrigley. and Karen M. 42 Pa.C.S. 701(a)(1). The status quo as of July 12, 2001was that the Governor appointees,
had named his who had been issued commis- newly-appoint- sions and sworn in as board members. The members, however, attempted ed had not to assume control agreed doing pending over the PPA and to refrain from so *19 hearing preliminary injunction the on Petitioner's motion for in the CommonwealthCourt.
Slip opinion (emphasis supplied). at 2-5 Doyle, Philadelphia Parking Judge President the
Before Authority appointees, its six who had been named Ridge Authority’s governing board former Governor the that legislation dispute, asserted the pursuant to the litigation jurisdiction had exclusive over Authority agency, was a Commonwealth because the an indispensable party. the Governor was President because assertions, rejected finding both that the Judge Doyle Authority gov- was not the Parking “Commonwealth original Court’s purposes ernment” for Commonwealth an indispensable and that the was not Governor The action was dismissed for lack of party litigation.1 jurisdiction. City Philadelphia asserts that the common appeal,
On original jurisdiction court has over this matter because pleas Parking Authority authority is a local not Philadelphia original jurisdiction of the subject to the Commonwealth Court (cid:127) indispensable party. is not an and because the Governor First, City original jurisdiction that asserts 761(a)(1) § Court is limited under Pa.C.S. to case and does not extend to local authorities. addition Doyle original jurisdiction Although Judge that 1. President concluded Court, proceeded he matter did not lie in the Commonwealth over this parties merits raised as to to address the substantive issues injunction. regarding preliminary The discussion the issuance of dicta, preliminary injunction was however. of local following definition law, City upon relies Act Statutory Construction forth authority set on or after Janu- finally enacted any statute used When body corpo- authority other municipal ary political subdivisions by one or more politic created rate and to statute. pursuant Pa.C.S. is not an the Governor City asserts
Secondly, the nature of the litigation given the to this indispensable party power granted to appointive that the City contends case. The of Act Legislature’s enactment by virtue of the the Governor challenges to to the substantive essential is not interest not power is one appointive Act 22 itself. The Governor’s Constitution, upon depends but Pennsylvania granted by the City argues 22. The the Governor’s lawfulness of Act lawful does render seeing a statute declared interest indispensable party. him an Doyle that Judge the Commonwealth agree
I President Although in this original jurisdiction case. Court did not have not all of the appeal, two issues on presented has of whether the have addressed the issue parties *20 agency subject to the a Parking Authority is Commonwealth argu- The of the Commonwealth Court. original jurisdiction Authority Philadelphia Parking relating to whether the ment determining purposes agency a is Commonwealth of this matter is Common- original jurisdiction whether parties. The by not all of the Court was addressed wealth by City Philadelphia and by issue was briefed gubernatorial Parking Authority and its new Philadelphia Authority appoin- Philadelphia Parking appointees. The had exclu- argue the Commonwealth Court tees thereof that authority a because the is jurisdiction over this case sive language They the clear agency. contend Commonwealth provides it is such an authority’s enabling statute municipality, stating instrumentality of a agency and not an must unambiguous, is courts statutory language [w]hen attempting law than divine rather follow the letter spirit meaning. its or hidden The letter of law in provides case that the Commonwealth Court must exercise lawsuit. over this Appellees Brief for at 3.
This issue was also not addressed the Brief for the Attorney Pennsylvania. Governor and the General his brief, Attorney General states that he appearance
entered his in this case before the had Governor (Attor- been named as a defendant. See Pa.R.Civ.Proc. 235 ney may General enter a in which constitutionality case of a question, statute is drawn into if no Commonwealth below, party). is a officer As we discuss one of the issues this case is whether the must party. Governor be made a has Attorney General remained in the case in therefore his own in order to right, defend, regardless the statute a the Governor’s status as party.
Brief for the Attorney Pennsyl- Governor General of added). vania at 6 n. 2 (emphasis Attorney General has not indicated in his brief whether agrees position by Philadelphia he taken Parking Authority appointees and the Governor’s Authority agency. Commonwealth His brief also does offer analysis of or insight position into the Governor’s on the issue. Instead, the brief addresses whether the Governor is an indispensable party extensively discusses the merits of the Court, i.e., issue addressed in dicta the Commonwealth Philadelphia whether the failed to right establish its a preliminary injunction.
It is from unclear the briefs all Of appellees filed a unanimity opinion this case whether there is among them legal as to Authority status of the Parking as authority. or local Given the serious majority’s ramifications of the determination that the Com- *21 jurisdiction matter, original monwealth Court has of this Attorney of the reluctance General to address this issue is of great concern. of the legal status discussion of the Judge Doyle’s
President for un- a framework Authority provides Parking Philadelphia regarding conclusion his ultimate derstanding Court. of the Commonwealth of all original jurisdiction has Court
The Commonwealth gov- against the proceedings civil actions or official acting in an ernment, any thereof including officer presented that are except in limited instances capacity, 761(a)(1). defines The Judicial Code this case. Pa.C.S. government” as “Commonwealth commonwealth, courts including the government of the
[t]he system, judicial unified agencies or and other officers agencies, the Assembly and its officers and the General commissions, boards, au- departments, governor, and the Commonwealth, agencies of the and officers thorities subdivision, any political not include but the term does any agency officer or authority, local municipal or other authority. or local political such subdivision § 102. 42 Pa.C.S. Parking argument of the addressing the
Authority appointees and its that the Commonwealth Au- this lawsuit because the jurisdiction over had exclusive agency under thority was a Commonwealth Court itself statute, Judge Doyle enabling of its President language clear stated: language stating that Law contains it is true
While of the Commonwealth “public powers PPA shall exercise Commonwealth,” “shall not be as an it is instrumentality municipality,” deemed authority, which that it a local beyond peradventure remains fact, has, in powers.10 This Court exercises no statewide Parks, Larson, 91 Pa. in E-Z Inc. v. expressly so held (1985), 509 Pa. aff'd, 498 A.2d Cmwlth. (1986). Parks, in the In E-Z an action was filed
A.2d 931 naming both original jurisdiction, Commonwealth Court’s Respon PPA as Transportation and the Department objections, this Court held that the preliminary dents. On *22 456
claims against
Department
Transportation
of
were con
nature,
tractual
properly brought
and therefore were
against
before the Board of
As to
claims
Claims.
PPA,
expressly
we
concluded that
the PPA was a “local
agency,”
immunity
both for
as
purposes
jurisdiction.
well as
Accordingly,
remaining
claims
PPA
were
transferred to the Court of
Pleas of
Common
County.
also
v. Lancaster Parking Authority,
See
Rhoads
303,
(1987),
103
petition
Pa.Cmwlth.
Although E-Z Parks has not been overruled and remains
controlling
regarding
jurisdiction,
law
issue
Re
spondents
it
effectively
contend that
has been
modified
Supreme
opinion
our
Authority
Court’s
Marshall v. Port
1,
(1990).
Allegheny County, 524 Pa.
Slip opinion at 7-8 jurisdiction over Philadelphia argues common It pleas court. asserts properly belongs action authority Authority is a local Philadelphia Parking that the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth subject original *23 all civil jurisdiction over The Commonwealth Court’s Court. govern- against the Commonwealth proceedings actions and municipal or other specifically excludes actions ment gov- of “Commonwealth local authorities under the definition § 42 set forth at Pa.C.S. 102. ernment” Park- argues Philadelphia that the Philadelphia The the Statuto- ing Authority authority is a local as defined under finally in on Act. When used a statute enacted ry Construction 1975, 1, authority” by is January “local defined or after authority any or Statutory municipal Act as “a Construction by one or more body corporate politic and created other § 1 1991. pursuant to statute.” Pa.C.S. political subdivisions Parking Authority originally was created Philadelphia The Law, statute, i.e., formerly Parking Authority pursuant to precur- §§ at 53 341-356. This statute was the codified P.S. subject litigation. of this sor to Act of 2001 which is the authority” Statutory of “local in the Con- The definition Code, applies Act to the term as used the Judicial struction § Pa.C.S. authority,” Although Code does not define “local the Judicial provides It that Statutory Act does. Construction finally authority,” any “local used in statute phrase [w]hen 1, 1975, January municipal “a enacted on or after means authority body corporate politic other and created political pursuant one or more subdivisions to statute.” § and Tort Pa.C.S. 1991. Both the Judicial Code 1, 1975; hence, January both Claims Act were enacted after subject overarching to this definition. Works, Drake Insurance v. Gas 566 Pa. Sphere (2001) (citation omitted). 782 A.2d Philadelphia Parking Authority It further assert^ that type entity that Assembly the General intended original jurisdiction. include within the Commonwealth Court’s Philadelphia Parking Authority operates solely Because City of Philadelphia, and its functions have no statewide impact, there is no need to invoke the Commonwealth Court’s jurisdiction uniformity consistency ensure decisions involving authority. Philadelphia Parking Authority claims that the Com-
monwealth has exclusive over this matter authority agency. argues because the is Commonwealth It is compelled specific language such conclusion Authority Act which states that shall constitute a ‘[t]he public body corporate politic, exercising public powers of Commonwealth’, the Commonwealth as an Authority “[t]he shall not be deemed to be an instrumen- tality municipality.” language appeared Similar in the Law, repealed provision Parking Authority 53 P.S. 345(a), provided, part: which relevant act, Authority, incorporated under shall constitute *24 public body corporate politic, and exercising public powers thereof, agency of the Commonwealth as an and shall be Parking Authority known as city, borough, the of the or class, of in township way the first but shall no deemed instrumentality city, borough, be an of or of township the engage performance the first class or in the a municipal of function, except delegated such functions as are to it municipal passed pursuant ordinance resolution to this act. agree Doyle’s
I Judge President conclusion that the jurisdiction Commonwealth Court does not have exclusive over arguments this matter. The offered the Park- ing Authority support argument of its that it is a Common- agency subject jurisdiction wealth to the exclusive of the previously rejected by Commonwealth Court have been this Furthermore, Court. of such acceptance assertions has rami- fications for purposes determining jurisdiction other than over civil actions. argument Authority of Philadelphia Parking of Act language predecessor provisions and its of the Law,
Parking Authority
authority
“exercising pub-
that the
powers
agency
lic
of
as an
of
the Commonwealth
the Common-
instrumentality
wealth” and that it “shall not be deemed an
of
municipality” ignores
significance
the historical
of such
language and
it
meaning
imbues with a
that was never intend-
language
ed. The Commonwealth
has examined similar
Court
involving
in cases
and
lan-
authorities
concluded that such
guage
authority
is not
alone
determinative
the status of an
authority
a local
agency.
as
or Commonwealth
In Levine v.
New
Redevelopment Authority
City
Castle,
(1975),
17 Pa.Cmwlth.
On
the Redevelopment Authority
that it
asserted
agency
was an
language
Commonwealth because
used
authority’s enabling
statute described an urban redevel-
opment authority
public body,
as “a
corporate
politic,
exercising public powers
as an
thereof.”2 The
rejected
argument
Commonwealth Court
pleas
transferred the matter to the common
court for
*25
stated,
proceedings.
further
The court
Law,
provision
Redevelopment
2. The relevant
of the Urban
35 P.S.
seq.,
Authority
§ 1701 et
public body,
states “An
shall constitute a
corporate
politic, exercising public powers
and
of the Commonwealth
agency
provision
of an
thereof....”
35 P.S.
1709. This
remains
effect.
course,
“consistently held
true,
that the courts have
It is
pursuant
to the Munici-
municipal
[created
authorities
creatures, agents or
Act of
are not the
pal
1945]
Authorities
them,
municipalities
organize
which
representatives
Commonwealth,
‘independent agencies
but rather are
held, however,
”. It has also been
sovereignty’
of its
part
and
as local
purposes
are treated
some
that such authorities
in the
language
contrary
notwithstanding
authorities
Thus,
authority was held
housing
a local
enabling statute.
purview
within the
agent
to
of the Commonwealth
be
401(a)(1)
Act
Appellate
Court Jurisdiction
of Section
jurisdiction upon the Com-
original
1970 which confers
in civil actions
the Commonwealth
monwealth Court
It
to
a local
agents.
and
was held instead
and its officers
therefore,
and,
jurisdiction of
authority
original
within the
pleas.
court
common
We must reach the
appropriate
hand,
case at
for to reach
other
same conclusion
and
result
would lead to the absurd
unreasonable
conclusion
required
pursue
right
gain
his
that a citizen would be
Harrisburg
though
information in
even
the records
access to
community
involved had
were located
city
county and
issues
by an individual
been created
of a
strictly within the concern
involved were matters
than
locality rather
a concern of the Common-
particular
course,
Assembly,
could
generally.
wealth
General
such a result.
not have intended
added).
omitted)
(citations
(emphasis
Id. at 192
and footnotes
Authority v.
Pennsylvania Transportation
Southeastern
(1975),
Kohn,
consol-
The jurisdiction within the of its purposes for agency wealth Appellate Court Jurisdiction provision meaning of the § 211.401.3The court forth at 17 P.S. formerly set Act of 1970 multi-county opera- structure and that the concluded further agency it to the level of a state not raise of did tion SEPTA jurisdiction purposes for Court is court statewide as the
Just Commonwealth defining jurisdictional its role legislature, jurisdiction, the agencies, local intended the Com- to state and respect with original jurisdiction in its concern itself monwealth Court instrumentalities of agencies statewide with statewide appellate jurisdiction in its to con- government, state gov- of local agencies instrumentalities cern itself governments. ernment or
Id. at 906.
(1975),
another SEPTA. matter brought an action before Commonwealth Court SEPTA initiating proceed- from criminal enjoin newspaper reporter court alleged violation of the Sunshine Law. The ings for jurisdiction. parties to brief the issue The directed the expanded that the Sunshine Law had board members claimed beyond provided agencies under scope state 1970, by stating Act of that “[t]he Jurisdiction Appellate Court original jurisdiction of actions shall have Commonwealth Court involving agencies.” State proceedings jurisdiction, for lack of
The court dismissed the Kohn, supra, that SEPTA was not a upon analysis its based jurisdiction. The court found agency purposes state Law did not indicate that language of the Sunshine that the governing original jurisdiction provision of the Com- 3. The current Court, is derived from the 1970 ac1. 42 Pa.C.S. monwealth agency jurisdiction had parameters of state been extended by its enactment. avail- concept designed to insure the
ability practical competent of the most forum for the airing particular grievance. legislature’s grant of a powers of a State to SEPTA has no relation to *27 concept. grant only by a broad is necessitated the Such autonomy practical imperative providing gov- of from local operations agency. ernmental interference the of the in judicial scrutiny agency Local exists another practicality desirability Its and must be deter- dimension. mined, powers not on the basis of the exercisable involved, rather, of agency but on the basis whether the local, agency opposed to activities said as state- wide, in interest. While SEPTA is not “local” the tradition- sense, encompasses multicounty al in that it and affects a area, certainly its not of activities are statewide concern. They to particular geographical are restricted one area Commonwealth, judicial within ac- review of said may provided by tions courts of that best be area. A.2d at 339 municipal authority entity
“A is an distinct from both the subdivision; political municipal and a it is a Commonwealth ” al., corporation.... Metropolitan Greer v. et Hospital, 520, 266, (1975), Pa.Super. citing 341 A.2d Auth., 345, 882, v. Erie Met. Transit 444 Pa. 281 A.2d (1971). of an unique authority provides expla status why Legislature nation for language referring uses to “exercising public powers authorities as of the Commonwealth enabling legislation creating as an thereof’ authori ' ties. municipal The function of authorities reflects that such independent corporate agents authorities are the Com- governmental, private monwealth which exercise as as well corporate power, assisting meeting the Commonwealth in Additionally, the needs of its citizens. such authorities must . separate municipalities and distinct from entities public policy form for reasons of and conve- which them making municipal nience. But the reason authorities from which form them is municipalities distinct entities 3, legislature’s intent not to Article Section [31] violate delegation Pennsylvania prohibiting Constitution (such supervise as powers power certain to make and taxes, municipal improvements, levy perform to or to munic- function) ipal commission, special private corporation to association, municipalities join together allow reap financing, the benefits economics of scale operation construction and of large public pro- scale works jects. v. Parking
Rhoads
Lancaster
Authority,
Pa.Cmwlth.
(1987) (citations
omitted).
520 A.2d
126-27
emphasis
underpinning
The historical
language
the use of that
was
explained
further
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transporta-
Inc.,
tion Authority v. Union
Signal,
Switch &
161 Pa.
(1994).
Cmwlth.
The court held that the Board of Claims did not have jurisdiction over contract brought against claims SEPTA. The court reasoned that Assembly the General did not intend SEPTA to purposes Commonwealth for of the Board of Claims Act financially independent because SEPTA was operations Commonwealth and its were not statewide. reaching conclusion, length the court at addressed au- determining whether an
analytical difficulties involved government. agency or the Commonwealth thority is a local stated, court or, for determining the status SEPTA difficulty to the reasons matter, authority, directly related and authorization the General creation behind their owe their existence Assembly. Although authorities boards are governing and their government units of various entities, part not considered they are by those appointed municipal cor- Unlike governmental structure. the normal func- “proprietary” “governmental” that have porations Authorities are tions, engage only in the latter. authorities agencies, engaged being corporate “public corporations, Generally, authori- government.” of civil the administration financing manag- purpose of are established for the ties nature or public of a producing projects ing various revenue of core part to be that are considered other activities activities; business they governmental are a governmental venture, The circumstances quasi-privatization. a form usually for one more their creations prompting following reasons:
(cid:127) agency manage public an administrative the need for [sic], which, commercial case h'ave
enterprises certain characteristics, Transportation Authori- e.g., Metropolitan Authorities; (SEPTA); Parking ties (cid:127) govermnental can cross for an which the need handling of intercommuni-
boundary for the effective lines SEPTA; e.g., ty problems, (cid:127) that are carry out activities for a method to the need such as the need statutorily proscribed
constitutionally or running afoul of without public improvements *29 to finance limits on debt constitutional the very similar creation are first two reasons for the the While a subsid- would create why private corporation a to reasons reason, ..., the need the last carry enterprise out an iary to causes is the one that impediments, to avoid constitutional the part are as to whether authorities the confusion so, Because and, purposes. what Commonwealth if for impediments, need to around these constitutional get con- the creation authorities authorizing legislation an authority agency is not language tains that it, an unit(s) is considered that creates but governmental the Commonwealth. agency of omitted) (citations (emphasis add- and footnotes
Id. at 664-65 ‘instrumentality ed). an may be considered “While authorities Commonwealth’, they that that does not mean of the for all ‘the automatically considered Commonwealth’ Id. purposes.” at the issue of the
This Court also addressed
Co., Inc. v. Philadel-
Painting
in T R
&
Commonwealth
(1976).
Pa.
relied issue. *30 left, then, with task determining legisla-
We gave ture’s intent when it original Commonwealth Court jurisdiction and exclusive of “civil or proceedings actions against the and sought Commonwealth” to exclude from jurisdiction against that actions agencies. local The Com- provide judicial monwealth Court is intended to a forum for uniform and questions consistent resolution of of state- impact. example, Department wide For of Environmen- tal powers Resources must have a clear what idea its duties are and would severely handicapped if those powers county county and duties varied from until an appellate court could rule on the issues involved. Converse- ly, particular there is no need such uniform statewide involving resolution of powers issues of local duties operate authorities which within a single “county, city or ” municipality other of the State....
Id. at 802. clearly
These jurisdiction cases establish that over this involving Philadelphia matter Parking Authority belongs pleas the common court. In reversing the Common- order, majority wealth Court’s implicitly has overruled longstanding precedent generated great uncertainty as to basis for its analysis. When this Court abandons the well- interpretation provisions settled of the Judicial Code courts, that define the of our at a minimum it explain why. should
Having determined that the Parking Authority did not fall within the Judicial Code’s definition Common- government, wealth Judge Doyle President also addressed the argument indispensable the Governor was an party to this litigation. He concluded the Governor’s interest protecting newly his appointive power created was not suffi- cient to render him an indispensable party. litigation,
In this question while there is no that the relief i.e., sought, unconstitutional, declaration that Act 22 is would, necessity, void the appointment, Governor’s never- theless, has not requested any relief himself, Governor and the Governor is not to a essential Governor, fact, has of the merits. The determination duty appoint- his own under Act that of already executed authority. entity, parking to an ing members here local a multitude statutes The Governor authorized appointments appointments, to various bodies. Those make *31 more, allow “yeast” so as to nothing provide do not the litigation loaf of to rise to this Court. The jurisdictional sought granted in this case can be the absence relief not, therefore, an as a is party, the Governor he Accordingly, this Court is not vested indispensable party. jurisdictional authority to hear and decide this with the case. at
Slip opinion
10-11.
parties recognize
determining
party
that in
whether
The
(1)
parties
indispensable,
is
we must consider:
whether absent
(2)
claim;
right
have a
or interest related to the
the nature
(3)
interest;
right
right
or interest
is
whether
(4)
issue;
justice
essential to the merits
whether
violating
process rights of
can be afforded without
the due
CRY,
Service, Inc.,
Inc.
536 Pa.
parties.
absent
v. Mill
(1994).
analysis
is
Parking Authority appointees and its that new President test, Judge Doyle “ignored including the other factors of the (that perhaps important most factor—that an individual’s is, Governor’s) right necessarily by would be affected adjudication Appellees of the Brief for at 5. The case.” direct, majority seems to that the Governor has a conclude City of litigation concrete interest in this because the Philadel- declaratory injunctive would phia’s requests relief necessarily implicate appointive power the Governor’s under Act 22. however, find, appointive power
I that the is not Governor’s disposition to a of the merits issues essential substantive presented litigation. appointive pow- To find granted indispensable ers to the Governor render him an
party litigation light in this would be troublesome of the gubernatorial appointments to made. sheer number of be IV, Pennsylvania gov- 8 of the Constitution Article Section general appointing power erns of the Governor. appoint Secretary a' of Education and The Governor shall such other officers as he shall be authorized law to appoint. appointment Secretary of Education law, may specified by and of such other officers as shall be subject majority to the consent of two-thirds or specified by as is law. members elected Senate 8(a). IV, Art. Pa. Const. Section expounds guberna- on The Administrative Code appointive power, providing torial (a) section, Except provided as hereinafter in this the Gov- may appoint obtaining ernor without the advice and consent public of the Senate such officers which he is authorized limitation, appoint including, law to without' members *32 commissions, independent administrative boards and mem- bodies, departmental bers of administrative boards and officers, departmental commissions administrative of advisory members boards and commissions. @
(b) 2(a)[1097], Repealed.1978, April P.L. No. 27,1978. effective June
(c) shall nominate in The Governor accordance the provisions the Constitution of of the Commonwealth .of and, Pennsylvania by and with advice and of the consent Senate, appoint two-thirds of the members elected to the fill persons following positions: the (1) of Auditor Vacancies the offices General and State and in which Treasurer other elective office he is fill requires authorized law to when said law confirma- tion.
(2) appoint Those members which he is authorized to to the Commission, Board, Marketing Pennsylvania Milk the Fish Commission, Li- Pennsylvania Pennsylvania the Game the Board, Pennsylvania Utility quor Control the Public Com- Pennsylvania Turnpike mission and the Commission. with the in accordance (d) shall nominate The Governor of of the Commonwealth of the Constitution provisions of a and, advice and consent by and with the Pennsylvania appoint to the Senate the members elected majority of following positions: fill the persons Education, (1) Secretary the of the Com- Secretary of General, monwealth, the Insurance Commis- Adjutant the Secretary Agricul- of sioner, Secretary Banking, of the the Secretary of ture, Transportation, the Secretary of the Police, Secretary Health, of the State the the Commissioner Corrections, Industry, the Secretary of Labor and the Welfare, Secretary of Public the Secretary Aging, the Revenue, Services, Secretary of the Secretary of General Commerce, Secretary Community Secretary of the Resources. Secretary of Environmental Affairs (2) appoint which he is authorized Those members Parole, Pardons, Probation and the Board of Board Commission, Racing the State Horse State Civil Service Commission, Commission, Racing the State Harness Claims, Pennsylvania Securities Board of Arbitration Commission, Development Au- Pennsylvania Industrial Education, thority, Board of the Board of State the State Directors, University Board of Trustees of College and University, the Board of Pennsylvania State Trustees University Pittsburgh, Temple the Board of Trustees of University, of Lincoln University, the Board of Trustees Board, Hearing Pennsylvania Crime Environmental Board, Commission, Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board, Unemployment Compensation Board Industrial Board, Review, Compensation Appeals the Workmen’s *33 Commission, Commission, Lottery Art the State the State Pennsylvania Transportation Commission the the State Human Relations Commission. @ 53,
(3) 2(a)[1097], P.L. No. Repealed.1978, April June effective
(4) appoint is authorized to to the Those members which he Commission, Planning the Penn- Valley Regional Delaware Commission, the Public Television Network State sylvania Commission, Fi- Pennsylvania Housing Farm the Products College Board of Trustees of each State Agency, nance the University, the Board of Trustees of Scotland School Children, of of for Veterans’ the Board Trustees Thaddeus Technology, of the Conservation College Stevens State Commission, Pennsylvania of Council the Commonwealth Arts, Board, Planning Pennsylvania on the the State the Board, County As- Drug, Device and Cosmetic the Board of Welfare, county, the Board of Public sistance each State Centers, Boards of Trustees of the Board of Trustees of Center, Board of each Restoration Trustees' each Hospital, General the Board of Trustees each State State Hospital, the Board of of each School Trustees State Board, Hospital, Examining Dental Council and State Commission, Registration Estate the State Real State Engineers, Board for Professional the State Boards of Architects, Auctioneers, Nursing Ad- Examiners Home Accountants, Public ministrators and the State Boards Examiners, Examiners, Chiropractic Cosmetology, Barber Directors, Licensure, Education and Funeral Medical Examiners, Examiners, Optometrical Osteopathic Nurse Examiners, Examiners, Pharmacy, Physical Podia- Therapy Examiners, Examiners, try Veterinary Landscape Medical Manufacturers, and Motor Vehicle Dealers and Architects Salesmen, Pennsylvania Psychologist Examin- Board ers, Commission, High- Pennsylvania the State Athletic Agency, Pennsylvania er Education Assistance Histori- Commission, Equalization cal and Museum Tax State Board, Board, Employees’ Public School Retirement Board, Employees’ Municipal the State Retirement Po- Commission, Training lice Education and Officers’ Con- Advocate, Pennsylvania Minority sumer and the Business Authority. Development 67.1(a)-(d)(2).
71 P.S. provisions Administrative do not Even the Code appointive powers, list of the reflect exhaustive Governor’s specifically many legislative for the does not enumerate Code Governor, grants appointing power including those *34 authorities, I such Act 22 of 2001. involving municipal as hold, do, majority appears to would not as the appointive power relating Philadelphia Park- Governor’s indispensable party. him an It ing Authority renders Instead, I find that the inter- simply unworkable. Governor’s Act 22 is protecting appointive power his under ade- est General, quately Attorney defended appointees. Parking Authority itself and the Governor’s own I dissent. joins dissenting
Justice CAPPY statement.
v. MAZALESKI, Appellant.
Edward R.
Supreme Pennsylvania.
Argued Dec. 2000. May Decided