84 Pa. Commw. 645 | Pa. Commw. Ct. | 1984
Opinion by
The Philadelphia Board of Pensions and Retirement (Board) appeals from a decision of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County which reversed in part and affirmed in part the decision of the Board in this consolidated case.
The issue in this case is centered upon the disposition of the pension benefits of George Bordley, Jr. (decedent), a Philadelphia city employee who died on November 20, 1980. The two parties claiming eligibility for the benefits are George Bordley, the decedent’s son by his first wife, and Lila Bordley (Appel
No spouse shall be entitled to receive benefits pursuant to Section 210 unless such spouse:
(a) was married to the deceased employee for not less than two (2) full years prior to the death of such employee, and was living with or entitled to support from such employee, or
(b) was designated in writing as the beneficiary.
The application of George Bordley was also denied by the Board, pending the resolution of Appellee’s case on appeal.
Appellee had been living with the decedent for approximately twenty years without the benefit of marriage, because neither could afford to divorce their first spouse. During this time Appellee had two children by the decedent.
The Board denied Appellee’s application for benefits because she failed to meet either requirement of the ordinance. Appellee had only been married to the decedent for eight months, and the decedent had not designated her as his beneficiary.
The function of the Equal Protection Clause is to measure the validity of classifications created by state laws. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979). Where the classification does not discriminate against a suspect class or impinge upon a fundamental right, the level of equal protection analysis which a court must apply is the rational relationship test. That is, if the classification bears some rational relationship to a legitimate government end, then it is within the legislative power, and will be upheld. Martin v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 502 Pa. 282, 466 A.2d 107 (1983). “A classification does not offend the Equal Protection Clause merely because it £is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.’ ” Martin, 502 Pa. at 291, 466 A.2d at 111 (quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970)).
We recognize that a numerical classification will be arbitrary to some extent, but such classifications are peculiarly within the province of the legislature, and are entitled to a strong presumption of constitutional validity. Martin.
.The proper analysis of (Section 211.1 under the Equal Protection Clause is to determine .whether the classification delineated by the Philadelphia City Council has a rational relationship^ to a legitimate state purpose. The purpose of the ordinance, as found by the court below, is to ascertain those persons who are most entitled to benefits. When the decedent does not designate his spouse as beneficiary, .the durational requirement comes into play to prevent spurious claims by spouses who “perpetrate death bed marriages.” The court below held, and we agree, that this purpose is a legitimate one. The two year durational requirement, while perhaps lengthy, is rationally related to the purpose of the ordinance. Therefore, (Section 211.1 does not deny equal protection to persons who fall within the class of spouses not designated as beneficiary and not married for two or more years.
Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County is reversed.
Order in 941 O.D. 1983
And Now, September 4, 1984, the decision of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County in the
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Order in 942 C.D. 1983
And Now, September 4, 1984, the decision of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County in the above-captioned case is reversed.
Under Section 214 of the ordinance, if the application of the surviving spouse Is denied, the decedent’s children then become eligible to receive the pension benefits.
Appellee’s two children by decedent would share equally in the pension benefits with George Bordley.
Decedent did not designate anyone as his pension beneficiary. The court below noted that the decedent had designated Appellee as his life insurance beneficiary.