Pеtitioner seeks a writ of mandate to compel respondent, its city clerk, to proceed with the holding of an election on November 6, 1934, for the purpose of submitting to its electors two alternative bond issues. No conflict appears as to the facts. Within the city limits of Pasadena there is an area known as Carmelita Gardens, suitable for use as a public park. It consists of parсel “A”, nine and one-half acres, and parcel “B”, two and three-quarters acres. These proceedings concern parcel “B”, which petitioner desires for park purposes. To acquire it the board of directors of petitioner adopted an ordinance calling an election for November 6, 1934, and submitting two propositions : Number “1”, which calls for voting of $215,000 of bonds, and number “2”, which calls for $185,000 of bonds. Said ordinance requires respondent, as city clerk, to make appropriate arrangements for the holding of such election as provided by the city charter. Upon her refusal to proceed, assigning legal reasons therefor, petitioner has sought this writ.
On April 26, 1929, parcel “B” was sold to petitioner for nonpayment of taxes. It was and is part of an assessment district сreated under the Acquisition and Improvement Act of 1925 (Stats. 1925, p. 849, sometimes called the Mattoon Act) to improve Colorado Street. Bonds of that improvement district in the amount of $1,453,003.90 are *130 now outstanding. In 1928 the taxes against parcel “B” as a portion of such district were '$2,515.50. No taxes have been paid since- date of sale, and on May 21, 1934, said parcel was deeded to petitioner by the сity assessor, tax and license collector under said act and Ordinances 490 and 3108 of the City of Pasadena. Petitioner holds said tax deed to the parcel. Forty thousand three dollars and sixteen cents unpaid taxes levied against it because of said obligation under the improvement act are outstanding. On the basis of the ratio of the value of the parcel to the total bonded debt оf the district, such taxes for the future are estimated to be $136,404.18, not including any amount to cover nonpayment of such taxes by other property owners in said district. Parcel “B” is further obligated on a street bond by proceedings under the Improvement Act of 1911 (Stats. 1911, p. 730), the amount required to retire said bond being $8,970.15. County taxes of $8,483.84 and city taxes of $7,199.84 were levied against parcels “A” and “B” as a single parcel, and are unpaid.
If proposition No. 1 is adopted, the $215,000 bonds will pay all these charges against parcel “B”, with $14,000 remaining over. If as an alternative No. 2 is adopted, it is proposed to pay the charges accrued to date and invest the balance derived from the sale of the bonds with the expectation that the principal and estimated interest together will be sufficient to pay the remaining amounts charged against the property as they become due.
Bespondent bases her refusal to proceed with the election on the following grounds:.
1. That since petitioner holds tax title to parcel “B” such charges against it need not be paid, and any such payment out of bond proceeds would be unlawful as a gift of public funds.
2. That proposition 2 would not provide suffiсient money from sale of the bonds issued thereunder to pay the aggregate past due and estimated future charges against parcel “B”; that entry into possession and performance of other necessary acts by petitioner would constitute an incurring of debt in such amount as would exceed the income and revenue of the city for the current year and would violate article XI, sеction 18, of the Constitution of California.
*131 3. That if the other property in the acquisition and improvement district failed to pay the assessments when due, the total amount of nearly a million and a half dollars might under the act fall in its entirety upon parcel “B”, and would be an amount far in excess of the proceeds of bonds issued under either proposition.
Amici curiae on behalf of respondent have interposed further objections to the granting of the writ, summarized as follows: (1) The Municipal Bond Act of 1901 under which such bonds would be issued does not authorize such bonds to pay taxes and assessments. (2) The obligation to pay such taxes and assessments is one imposed by law and not one for which bonds can be issued under article XI, section 18, Constitution of California. (3) The assent of two-thirds of the electors to the propоsed bonds would not constitute an assent to the incurring of the obligation arising out of future acquisition and improvement district assessments. (4) That the former owners have the right to redeem even if petitioner enters the land and pays the charges as proposed. (5) That the proposed bond issues are ultra vires.
Passing to a consideration of the objections above outlined, it appears that neither, of said proposed bond issues involves a gift of public funds. Section 47 of Ordinance 3108 of the City of Pasadena, as amended, in effect at the time the tax deed to petitioner was executed, provides in part: “A redemption of property sold [for nonpayment of taxes] may be made by the owner or any person in interest within five years from the date' of the sale to the city or at any timе prior to the entry upon or sale of said property by the city.” This contemplates, as the first step toward perfecting of the title by the city in this case, the entry by it upon the property. Section 58 of that ordinance provides: “Whenever the city shall have become the owner of any property sold for taxes and the deed to the city has been filed with the city clerk and recordеd or registered as provided in section 53 hereof, the right of redemption may be terminated absolutely by the city by its entry thereon and the adoption thereof for municipal use and the performance by the city of any acts necessary in the perfection of title in the manner provided by law.” From these sec *132 tions it appears that the entry by petitioner on the property would cut оff the right of redemption.
Our attention is directed to section 15 of article 12, Pasadena City Charter, which provides in part: “The mode and manner of collecting such municipal taxes and enforcing such tax lien and the proceedings thereafter shall be prescribed by ordinance and shall conform as nearly as practicable to the general law governing county taxes.” It is suggested that this рortion of the charter applies to Ordinance 3108, and that when that ordinance requires the city to perform acts necessary in the perfection of title in the manner provided by law, it refers to and embodies in it the provisions of Political Code, sections 3897a and 3897b. Those sections require deposit by the city with the tax collector of sufficient funds to pay all delinquent taxes, speciаl assessments, penalties, charges and expenses.
It would appear that the above charter provisions would not have the suggested effect. The charter is subject to the rule of legislative interpretation that “the state and its agencies are not bound by general words limiting the rights and interests of its citizens” unless included expressly or by necessary implication.
(Kubach Co.
v.
McGuire,
It is suggested that the holders of other land in the district would be deprived of their property without due process of law, contrary to amendment XIV, Constitution of *133 the United States, if the city by its mere entry upon such a parcel of land were to absolve it of assessments theretofore levied against it, by shifting that burden onto other property in the district, or thаt such a course would impair the obligation of the contract of the holders of such improvement bonds by reducing the security for their bonds, contrary to article I, section 10, Constitution of the United States. The true and fundamental reason why the property remains subject to the assessments levied against it until paid, even though the city enters and devotes the land to public use, lies in the fact that the improvement acts cited expressly subject the land within the district to the assessments levied to pay installments due on improvement bonds. Where there is legislative authority therefor, property owned by a municipality and devoted to public use may be liable for special assessments for public improvements. This was pointed out by the court in City of Inglewood v. County of Los Angeles, supra.
It is not contrary to article XI, section 12, of the Constitution of California for the legislature to make such provision, since it is not the imposition of a tax on the city by the legislature but a provision whereby such improvement district may be created.
(American Co.
v.
City of Lakeport,
With reference to the city and county taxes past due on the property, it is urged that under Political Code, section 3804a, such taxes would be discharged and canceled upon application to the body imposing thеm.
(City of Los Angeles
v.
Board of Supervisors,
The money derived from the sale of the proposed' bonds, far from being an unlawful gift of public funds, would be a proper use of public money for a public purpose, to wit, the payment of an obligation or burden imposed upon the land which the law requires to be paid before the city can perfect its title to the same. The fact thаt incidental thereto a private benefit may result is no sufficient obstacle to the course outlined. It is well understood that public improvements, such as streets, parks, etc., for which public funds are properly expended, result in private benefits to individual citizens.
(Sacramento etc. Drainage Dist.
v.
Riley,
The suggestion that the bonded indebtedness cannot be incurred by the propositions in issue here for the purpose of paying taxes and assessments on parcel “B” because the law does not authorize such bonds for such purpose (Municipal Bond Act of 1901, Stats. 1901, p. 27), confuses the payment of such obligations on property already held by the city with such a payment on property like the parcel under discussion, to which the city received a deed after the obligation to pay such charges had accrued. The tax title held by the city is defeasible, that is, the owner has a right of redemption unless the city enters upon the land. To complete its title the city must (1) enter upon the land, (2) pay uncanceled past taxes and past assessments and (3) assume the future assessments to pay its share of the improvement bonds. The proposed bonds are to enable the city to perform acts in the future to acquirе complete title to the land, *135 which is precisely what section 58 of Ordinance 3108 requires when it provides that the city after entry shall perform ‘ ‘ any acts necessary in the perfection of title in the manner provided by law”.
In
City of Pasadena
v.
McAllaster,
The further contention that proposition No. 2 would be contrary to section 18, article XI, of the Constitution of California does not find support in that section. Respondent reasons that since thе proceeds of bonds sold under proposition 2 would not equal the total of past taxes and assessments plus the total future liability under the Acquisition and Improvement Act of 1925 above set out, it would be an obligation in excess of the amount for which money was provided in the current year. That section does not require that money be available this year to pay assessments in future years. While the assumption of such past due and future assessments on land used in the performance of a public function is the incurring of a debt or obligation within the meaning of that section of the Constitution
(City of Pasadena
v.
McAllaster, supra;
see, also,
Southlands Co.
v.
City of San Diego,
Respondent is apprehensive lest the anticipated interest earnings of the unused proceeds of bonds issued if proposition 2 is adopted be insufficient, when added to the principal, to pay the future assessments. The law only requires reasonable foresight and prudence, based on past experience and present conditions, and the fact that such expectation might not be fully realized would not foreclose petitioner from -the course proposed.
(Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.
v.
Corry,
197 Pa. St. 41 [
The second contention advanced by counsel as amici curiae as above cited is to the effect that the adoption of propositions 1 or 2 by two-thirds of the electors would not constitute an assent by that number of electors to incurring the obligation for which the proceeds of the bonds would be paid. Considered in the light of the language already quoted from the case of City of Pasadena v. McAllaster, supra, it would seem unreasonable to hold that when two-thirds of the electоrs vote to obligate themselves for the cost of a project a separate vote is required to ascertain whether they desire its accomplishment. The voting of the bonds by the adoption of either proposition will constitute an effectual assent by the voters which will fully comply with the constitutional requirements.
It is not questioned that the laws in force at the time the property is sold for delinquent taxes are applicable to the redemption of said property from said taxes.
(San Diego County
v.
Childs,
The objection that the proposed bond issue is ultra vires, in so far as it requires discussion, is covered by the foregoing views.
*138 The writ is granted and respondent is directed to proceed with the performance of her official duties as prayed for in the petition herein.
Stephens, P. J., and Desmond, J., concurred.
An application by petitioner to have the cause heard in the Supreme Court, after judgment in the District Court of Appeal, was denied by the Supreme Court on October 4, 1934, and the following opinion then rendered thereon:
Judgment in this case was entered in the District Court of Appeal on September 27, 1934. The Constitution, article VI, section 4c, grants power to the Supreme Court to order any cause pending before a District Court of Appeal to be heard and determined by the Supreme Court. Such order may be made before judgment has been pronounced by the District Court of Appeal or, in civil cases, within thirty days after judgment in the appellate tribunal shall have become final.