City of Oswego v. New York State Board of Real Property ServicesCity of Oswego v. New York State Board of Real Property Services
OPINION OF THE COURT
Thе Oswego City School District (hereinafter the District) is comprised of the entire area of petitioner and portions of the Towns of Sterling, Minetto, Oswego, Scriba аnd Volney in Oswego County. Where, as in the case of the District, a school district is located in more than one city or town, the district superintendent must determine the full valuation of the real property of each part of a city or town included in the school district by dividing the taxable assessed valuation of the real property in that part of the city or town by the State equalization rate established for the entire city or town (RPTL 1314 [1] [a]). The equalization rate to be utilized is the rate established by respondent for the assessment roll on which school taxes are to be levied (RPTL 1314 [1] [b]), but if no State equalization rate has yet been established for that roll (whiсh is generally the case with school districts), the equalization rate established for the previous year’s roll may be utilized (RPTL 1314 [1] [b]).
Petitioner’s equalization rate for 1998 was 188.35% primarily because a Niagara Mohawk steam plant, which represented approximately 50% of the estimated market value of petitioner’s real рroperty, was assessed at nearly three times its fair market value: After the filing of the 1998 assessment roll, but prior to the filing of the 1999 assessment roll, respondent becamе aware that the steam plant was going to become wholly
In November 1999, petitioner cоmmenced a CPLR article 78 proceeding in Supreme Court (proceeding No. 1) seeking to annul respondent’s 1999 segment special equalization rate upon the grounds that respondent acted in excess of its statutory authority in establishing the rate and also failed to give petitioner adequate notice prior to establishing the rate. Proceeding No. 1 was ultimately dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and petitioner appeals. In the meantime, petitioner initiatеd an essentially identical proceeding in this Court (proceeding No. 2) pursuant to RPTL 1218, contending that the plain language, legislative history and long-standing construction оf RPTL 1314 (2) compel the conclusion that respondent acted in excess of its jurisdiction in establishing a segment special equalization rate of 100% for the entire area of petitioner. We agree.
RPTL 1314 (2) provides in pertinent part as follows:
“[1] If it is made to appear to [respondent] by a statement of the assessors of the city or town * * * that there has been a change in the level of assessment since the last state equalization rate for the city оr town was established, or,
“[2] if it is made to appear to [respondent] that the state equalization rate established by it for a city or town is inequitable as apрlied to real property within the school district in such city or town,
“[3] [respondent] shall determine a special equaliza*102 tion rate for such city or town or for such real property, as the case may be, which shall be used for the sole purpose of equalization under this section” (emphasis supplied).
As. can be seen, RPTL 1314 (2) provides recourse for two entirely different species оf inequity. The first, set forth in paragraph [1] .above, operates in cases where, due to an intervening change in the level of assessment, the last State equalization rate for the city or town is no longer accurate. Notably, the condition addressed in paragraph [1] would apply with equal force to an entire municipality or to a segment of a. municipality contained within a school district, and a specific triggering event is provided, i.e., a statement of the local аssessors concerning the change in the level of assessment. In contrast, the paragraph [2] scenario could apply only when a portion of a city or town is contained within a school district and the ratio of assessed value to full value of the properties contained in that portion is for some reason at variance with the State equalization rate for the entire municipality. Unlike paragraph [1], paragraph [2] provides no specific triggering mechanism, thereby permitting respondent to take action on its own initiative. In either event, the ultimate recourse, as provided for in paragraph [3], is respondеnt’s determination of a special equalization rate, for the entire city or town in the case of a paragraph [1] inequity or just the segment of the city or town contained within the subject school district, which could take place under either paragraph [1] or paragraph [2], as the case may be.
Interestingly, аlthough the present case would appear to fit squarely within the situation addressed in paragraph [1], respondent’s analysis ignores the existence of that portion of RPTL 1314 (2), assumably because the paragraph [1] triggering event did not occur. Instead, respondent attempts to force the present fact pattern within paragraph [2], which has no triggering mechanism. The law is well settled, however, that paragraph [2] “provides] a remedy only where the equalization rate for a city or town as a whole is not representative of the portion of the city or town located within a school district” (Matter of Wisseman v New York State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment,
Nor are we persuaded that we should annul the longstanding prior construction of RPTL 1314 (2), which we adopted at rеspondent’s urging in Matter of Wisseman v New York State Bd. of Equalization & Assessment (supra), and, once again recognizing respondent’s expertise in this intricate and complex area, adopt a diametrically opposing оne. Contrary to respondent’s contention, no reasonable reading of paragraph [2] permits its application to an entire municipality. Notably, the language “for such city or town or for such real property, as the case may be” of paragraph [3] merely recognizes that paragraph [1] will permit a special assessment rate in an entire city or town. Only when one ignores the existence of paragraph [1], as respondent has in this case, does that language appear to suggest that paragraph [2] may apply to an entire city or town.
Respondent’s remaining contentions have been considеred and found to be unavailing. In view of our determination to grant the petition in proceeding No. 2, we need not consider whether Supreme Court erred in dismissing proceeding No. 1 or whether petitioner was given adequate notice of respondent’s intention to establish a segment special equalization rate.
Cardona, P. J., Crew III, Peters and Rose, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the appeal in proceeding No. 1 is dismissed, as academic, without costs.
Ordered that the petition in proceeding No. 2 is granted, without costs, and pеtitioner is granted judgment annulling respondent’s determination establishing a segment special equalization rate of 100% for the purpose of apportioning petitioner’s share of the 1999-2000 Oswego City School District tax.
Notes
We have divided the critical language into three separate numbered paragraphs as an aid to our analysis.