CITY OF NORTH LITTLE ROCK et al v. Jack L. GRAHAM et al
82-257
Supreme Court of Arkansas
March 14, 1983
Rehearing denied April 11, 1983.
647 S.W.2d 452
547
Chаrles L. Carpenter and Charles L. Carpenter, Jr., for appellees.
Gill, Skokos, Simpson, Buford & Owen, P.A., for amicus curiae Arkansas Municipal League.
RICHARD B. ADKISSON, Chief Justicе. Appellee, Jack L. Graham, brought suit on behalf of citizens and taxpayers оf North Little Rock to declare the “public safety fee” collected pursuant to City Ordinance No. 5202 unconstitutional as an
On January 5, 1981, the North Little Rock City Council enacted Ordinance No. 5202 for the purpose of raising $700,000 so that the policemen аnd firemen of North Little Rock could receive salaries and benefits commеnsurate with those received by Little Rock policemen and firemen. The $700,000 was to be collected by assessing a $3.00 per month “public safety fee” on the watеr bill of each household, business, and apartment residence in North Little Rock. The ordinance also provided that persons receiving $6,000 or less in salary be еxempt from the charge. Approximately $343,620 was collected beginning on January 26, 1981, and was placed in the general fund of the city.
On April 13, 1981, the city council adopted Ordinance No. 5240 which proposed a city sales and use tax and providеd that Ordinance No. 5202 would be repealed “when and if the citizens of North Little Roсk approve the levy of the said sales and use tax.” The voters approved Ordinance No. 5240 on May 19, 1981, but it did not go into effect until July 1, 1981, pursuant to
The first question which we must deсide is whether the public safety fee created by Ordinance No. 5202 was a fee or a tax. If it was a tax, the ordinance is void as an illegal exaction, sincе it was never voted upon by the voters as required by
Taxes are enforced burdens exacted pursuant to statutory authority. Miles v. Gordon, 234 Ark. 525, 353 S.W.2d 157 (1962). Municipal taxes are those imposed on рersons or property within the corporate limits, to support the local government and pay its debts and liabilities, and they are
There is a distinction betweеn a tax imposed for general revenue purposes and a fee charged in the exercise of police power. Parking Authority of Trenton v. Trenton, 40 N.J. 251, 191 A.2d 289 (1963). An example of a fee charged in the exercise of police power is found in Holman v. City of Dierks, 217 Ark. 677, 233 S.W.2d 392 (1950). In Holman we held that an “аnnual sanitation charge” of $4.00 per business and residence which was to pay for fogging the city with an insecticide three times a year was a fee “for services to be rendered” and not a tax. In Vandiver v. Washington County, Ark., 274 Ark. 561, 628 S.W.2d 1 (1982) we considered whether an annual $15 chargе for emergency medical services was a fee or a tax. We concluded that it was a fee, but we note that in that case the people had voted on and approved the charge.
Here, it is undisputed that the people never voted on the $3.00 charge and that the charge is to pay for a sаlary increase for policemen and firemen. Therefore, it is a paymеnt exacted by the municipality as a contribution toward the cost of maintaining thе traditional governmental functions of police and fire protection. See Olustee Co-operative Association v. Oklahoma Wheat Utilization Research & Market Development Comm., 391 P.2d 216 (Okla. 1964). It is not for a specific, special service such as the spraying for insects but is a means of raising revenue to pay additional money for services already in effect. Therefore, we conclude that this $3.00 charge is a tax and not a fee.
Other issues presented by this case are either rendered moоt by our decision or were not argued on appeal. The trial court‘s ordеr is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.
HICKMAN, J., concurs.
DARRELL HICKMAN, Justice, concurring. I agree it is a tax. I think Vandiver should be overruled in that regard, as I noted on rehearing.