86 N.Y.S. 659 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1904
This action was brought to collect the. amount of a personal tax for the year 1899, alleged to have been duly assessed upon the defendant by the city of Hew York. The complaint sets up the usual allegations in an action for the collection of a personal property tax, the due assessment of the defendant as a resident of the borough of Brooklyn in the city of Hew York, the preparation of the annual record and the opening of the books for examination and correction, the delivery of the assessment rolls to" the municipal assembly, the extension of the tax on the rolls, with the proper warrant by the municipal assembly, to the receiver of taxes, and the publication of notice thereof. The defendant, in his answer, admits that he was a resident of the borough of Brooklyn in the year 1899, but denies knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth of any off the other allegations of the complaint.
The answer of the defendant constitutes a good denial within the provisions of section 500 of the Code, and, as such, it put in issue all of the essential averments of the complaint, and the plaintiff became bound to prove its cause of action in order • to entitle it to recover. Such case required it to establish a valid assessment roll, imposing a liability upon the defendant which can be enforced.
In levying the assessment the assessors act judicially, and their action has all the force and effect of a judgment. (United States Trust Co. v. Mayor, 144 N. Y. 488.) A judgment regular upon its face imports absolute verity, and in an action thereon the record forms the basis for it, and it is neither to be increased nor diminished in the obligation created thereby. (Dimick v. Brooks, 21 Vt. 569.) Such'judgment is not open to attack, nor can it be questioned collaterally. In this respect there is no distinction between
It is claimed by the appellant that the plaintiff failed to establish that the annual record of the assessment was kept open for examination and correction from the second Monday of January, 1899, until the 1st day of May, 1899, as required by section 892 of the
Up to this point we have treated this record as though it had been brought into court from the proper officers having its custody and proveí^ by such officers. Such, however, was not the fact. A copy of that part of the record containing an assessment against the defendant and the certificates of the proper officers were all that were produced, and attached thereto is the affidavit and certificate of Richard N. Arnow, chief clerk of the department of taxes, taken before a notary public, in which he states that the foregoing is a true copy taken from the annual record of assessed valuation of real and personal estates in the borough of Brooklyn, residents, 1897, on file in the main office of the department of taxes and assessments in the city of New York and that the indorsement thereon is a true copy ot the oath annexed to the record. This proof is fatally defective in the establishment of a valid assessment roll, unless some statute interposes to make Arnow’s certificate evidence of the facts con
The provisions of the Code are to be strictly complied with, as only in the manner and form therein prescribed can a transcript be received in evidence. Either the books and officers themselves, who have knowledge of the subject, must be produced, or the certificate must be evidenced by a proper officer with the proper seal of the officer attached. The records themselves purport to be evidenced by seals of the respective officers, except in the case of the commissioners of taxes and assessments and of the city clerk, and it is quite possible that a proper certificate could be made. It has not, however, been done in the present case.
It is claimed that the defendant is estopped from questioning
It is evident within the rules we have announced that the plaintiff *can make proof of a valid assessment, and if so, it will be entitled to judgment. In the present case we are constrained to hold that this has not been done.
The judgment should, therefore, be reversed and a new trial granted, with costs to the appellant to abide the event.
Van Brunt, P. J., Patterson and Ingraham, JJ., concurred; Laughlin, J., concurred in result.
Judgment reversed, new trial granted, costs to appellant to abide event. .