120 N.Y.S. 776 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1909
The complaint alleges that the defendant is a gas corporation, formed by chapter 651 of the Laws of 1866, which provided among other things that “ The said corporation shall have full power and authority to manufacture, make and sell gas, * * * and to light any part of the city of New York, except such parts as any person, persons or corporation may now hold and possess the exclusive right to light, and the streets, buildings,.manufactories, in such places not so excepted; * * * provided that no public street or highway in the city of New York shall be dug into, injured or defaced without the permission of the municipal authority thereof first had and obtained; provided that such permission of the municipal authority shall not be required if the majority of the owners in interest of the property immediately adjoining the . part of the street or highway so dug into, injured or defaced shall give their consent thereto in writing; ” that the board of aldermen duly adopted April 27, 1868, and the mayor approved April 30, 1868, a resolution providing that “ Permission be and the same
For its first separate and complete defense the defendant alleges that since the year 1866, pursuant to and relying on chapter 651 of the Laws of 1866, and the various other laws amendatory thereof, and the resolution of the board of aldermen referred to in the complaint, and relying on the consents of the property owners to such' action thereinafter referred to, and on consents given to it by the municipal authority of said city authorized therefor, as thereinafter set forth, it has dug into and made certain openings in the streets and highways of said city and carried on its business of manufacturing and selling gas, and in such work has expended already many millions of dollars.; that since the formation of the company its operations have been carried on uninterruptedly since 1870 to the present time, for a period of almost forty years without hindrance or objection from the plaintiff, from the State of New York, or from any other person or public authority, and without objection of any kind from the public, but, on the contrary, with the express consent of said consumers and property owners (in writing and otherwise) and duly constituted authorities of the city and State • of New York in that regard; that the consent of the municipal authority, granting to defendant the right to dig into the city streets, has been in various forms, in addition to the form alleged
The. exhibit referred to is an application to the" company and reads as follows: “ The subscriber being the occupant or owner of the premises No.............New'York, occupied as a floor or store............requests the New York Mutual Gas Light Company to supply (her) (him .or) (them) with illuminating gas on said premises'; ” with further provisions in regard to meters and deposits, but with no reference whatever to digging.into the streets or occupation thereof:
The answer proceeds, the defendant alleges on information and belief that such consents in writing so filed with, it have been in each case signed by the owners of the property thereby affected or by the occupants of such property; and 'defendant alleges on information and belief that where such consents are signed by occupants,' who are not owners, such occupants were the duly constituted
To this separate and complete defense the city demurred on the ground that it was insufficient in law upon the face thereof and, said demurrer having been overruled, appeals.
Chapter 37 of the Laws of 1848, authorizing the formation of gaslight companies, provided in section 18 thereof
In considering the legal effect of the consent which the municipal. authorities are authorized to give by this provision of law, as re-enacted in section 61 of the Transportation Corporations Law-(Gen. Laws, chap. 40; Laws of 1890, chap. 566), the Court of Appeals said in Ghee v. Northern Union Gas Co. (158 N. Y. 510): “ It operates to create a franchise by which is vested in the corporation receiving it a perpetual and indefeasible interest in the land constituting the streets of a municipality. It is true that the franchise comes from the State, but the act of the local authorities, who represent the State by its permission and for that purpose, constitutes the act upon which the law operates to create the franchise. The State might grant the franchise directly'to the corporation without the consent of the local authorities, and has done so in many instances ; but the tendency of later years, which is well grounded in reason, is for the State to confer upon the local municipal authorities the right to
But the defendant corporation was not incorporated under the general act of 1848, but by special charter under the act of 1866, which provided (§ 1) that certain persons named therein “ and their associates and successors are hereby created a body politic and corporate, with perpetual succession, under, the name and style of ‘ The New York Mutual Gas Light Company,’ * * * and by the name and style aforesaid the said corporation shall have full power and authority to manufacture, make and sell gas * * * and to light any part of the city of New York * * * provided that no public street or highway in the city of New York shall be dug-into, injured or defaced without the permission of the municipal authority thereof first had and obtained ; provided that such permission of the municipal authority shall not be required if. the majority of the owners in interest of the property immediately adjoining the part of. the street or highway so dug into, injured or defaced shall give their consent thereto in writing; ” and section 5 of said act provides that “ The said company shall be subject to all the pro
We think that the proviso in the 1st section of the act, that no public street shall be dug into without the permission of the municipal authority, provided that such permission shall not be required if the majority of the owners in interest of the property immediately adjoining such street shall give their consent in writing, is inconsistent with that portion of section 18 of chapter 37 of the act of- 1848 which provides, “ And such corporation shall have power to lay conductors for conducting gas through the streets, lanes, alleys and squares in such city, village or town with the consent of the municipal authorities of said city, village or town and under such reasonable regulations as they may prescribe; ” and that, therefore, by section 5 of the act. of 1866 said provision was repealed and declared to be inoperative so far as the same is applicable to this act; that by the act of 1866 the franchise given by the State was perpetual and full and complete and required no secondary franchise from the city, by the consent of the legislative body to make it effective within the interpretation of the provisions of section 18 of the act of 1848, as declared in the Ghee Case (supra). Further that these provisions in regard to permission to' dig, either by the municipal authority or by the majority of adjoining property owners, was the administrative consent to the particular place, time or circumstances of such digging provided for in other provisions of law, under the cognizance and control of the administrative officers in charge of the streets, as also pointed out and decided by the same ease. The corporation having a perpetual franchise from the State, subject to no limitations thereof by the local legislative body, the permission given by the resolution of the common council hereinbefore quoted, with its limitation of thirty years to lay pipes, was ineffective as a limitation upon the power given by the Legislature under the franchise granted to the defendant.
As the answer alleges the obtaining of the necessary “ permission,” “ that it has not dug into, injured or defaced any street or highway * * * without the consent in .one or other of the forms hereto- ‘ fore alleged of some one of the municipal authorities' ■ duly authorized by law in respect thereto,” it is not insufficient in law, the demurrer was properly overruled and the judgment should be affirmed, with costs and disbursements to the respondent.
Ingraham, McLaughlin, Houghton and Soott, JJ., concurred..
• Judgment affirmed, with costs, with leave to plaintiff to withdraw demurrer on payment of costs.
This section was amended by chapter 95 of the Laws of 1871.— [Rep.