206 A.D. 228 | N.Y. App. Div. | 1923
The action is brought in ejectment to recover possession of certain real property consisting of lands under water and now occupied by pier No. 7, North river, between Rector and Morris streets, and also the pier erected thereon, now known as pier new No. 7, North river, together with the shed and structures on said pier. The lands of which the plaintiff claims possession are approximately 100 feet in width and extending from the present bulkhead line at the westerly line of West street in the borough of Manhattan, New York city, into the North river, a distance of approximately 655.55 feet. This pier is a modern structure erected upon piles, decked over, and is entirely covered by a steel shed. At the time of the commencement of this action the premises in suit were occupied by the defendants Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company and the United American Lines, Inc., under lease thereof from the present owner, the Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company.
On December 4, 1903, one Howard Carroll was the owner of all the rights of wharfage, cranage, advantages, emoluments and hereditaments appurtenant to the bulkhead then extending along the former westerly side of West street seventy feet west of the east line of said street, and extending from a point 31 feet south of Rector street southerly to a point 298 feet three inches. Carroll was at that time also the owner of two piers known as shedded piers old Nos. 6 and 7, which piers extended out from his said bulkhead. He also had the right to maintain said piers and the sheds erected thereon in perpetuity, and owned all the rights of wharfage, cranage, advantages, emoluments and hereditaments appurtenant thereto. The above stated facts of ownership of Carroll in said bulkhead and piers are conceded and stipulated by the parties to this action. At the time when Carroll purchased the said premises, the erections thereon, being piers old Nos. 6 and 7, with the bulkhead and sheds, were obsolete and out of repair; and the city in furtherance of a plan theretofore adopted, desired to have the premises and facilities for dockage in connection therewith improved. The city through its dock department had theretofore adopted a comprehensive plan for the improvement of its piers and dockage facilities. As a part of such plan, the rebuilding and improvement of the dockage facilities and piers between Rector and Morris streets was included. The city through its dock department prepared a detail map and plan of such general dockage improvements, which plan was approved October 16, 1903. Very soon after Carroll became the owner of the premises in suit, negotiations were entered into for the improve
After the lapse of eighteen years, during which time the city never questioned the validity of the title of either Carroll or his grantee to the premises, the city, without making any restitution of the valuable property which it received in exchange for the lands under water which it conveyed to Carroll in excess of that of which he' then had title, without offering to make reimbursement for the
The defendant, Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Eailroad Company, in its answer denies ownership, title or right of possession in the plaintiff, and alleges title in itself to the property in suit. The property owned by Carroll consisted not only of pier old No. 6, upon which the new pier is superimposed, but also of pier old No. 7, extending from the old bulkhead into the North river to the north of pier old No. 6. Pier old No. 7, as a part of said improvement, was entirely eliminated and removed. The answer further alleges, in support of said defendant’s title, ownership and right to possession, that on December 4, 1903, Howard Carroll had title to piers old Nos. 6 and 7, and the sheds and structures thereon, and the lands under water upon which said piers were constructed, together with the sheds and structures on the old bulkhead; that Carroll then had the right in perpetuity to the wharfage, cranage, advantages and emoluments arising from and accruing and appurtenant to said piers; and that he had the right in perpetuity to the wharfage, cranage, advantages and emoluments arising from, and accruing and appurtenant to, the bulkhead then existing on West street, and from which said piers extended into the North river. The said defendant also alleges in its answer the agreement between the city of New York and Carroll, executed December 4, 1903, under which Carroll acquired the right to construct the new bulkhead and seawall and the new pier, and to erect thereon sheds covering said pier and new bulkhead; and that he then acquired the wharfage, cranage, advantages and emoluments arising from, and accruing and appurtenant to, the new bulkhead and new pier No. 7. The defendant further alleges full performance of said agreement on the part of Carroll, and that thereby he became possessed in perpetuity of the rights with reference to the new bulkhead and pier, wharfage, cranage and other emoluments appurtenant thereto, and to the sheds erected thereon, and to the land under water upon which pier new No. 7 was erected, as he had in and to the former bulkhead and former piers old Nos. 6 and 7, with their sheds and the land
It seems to me that, in equity and in justice and under well-settled principles of law, Carroll became the owner and entitled to the possession of the premises in suit upon the execution and performance of the agreement entered into between the city of New York and himself and wife on December 4, 1903; and that the defendant Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company is, and ever since it acquired title thereto from said Carroll has been, entitled to the possession of said premises; and that the city has forfeited all right and claim thereto. Concededly on December 4, 1903, at the time of the execution of said agreement between the city and himself, Carroll was the lawful owner and proprietor of all rights of wharfage, cranage, emoluments and hereditaments appurtenant to the bulkhead as it then existed on West street between Rector and Morris streets; and he was the lawful owner of piers old Nos. 6 and 7 in the North river, extending into said river from said bulkhead; and he then owned exclusively all rights of wharfage, cranage and other rights appurtenant to said bulkhead and piers. The rights of Carroll in the premises and to the use thereof were in perpetuity. Carroll’s rights in the premises came in an unbroken chain of title from the time when said piers and bulkhead were originally erected. The right to construct said piers and to maintain and use them in perpetuity came directly from the State of New York through the agency of the city, and did not proceed by gift or otherwise from the city. Unquestionably the common council had power to permit, direct and control the erection of piers on land under water owned by the.city or the State. Such power was first conferred upon the mayor, aldermen and commonalty of the city of New York by chapter 80 of the Laws of 1798. Sections 1 to 4 of said act authorized the city to lay out streets or wharves at the expense of the upland owners. Section 5 of said act provided for building piers. Carroll’s right to maintain in perpetuity said piers old Nos. 6 and 7, and his perpetual right to receive the wharfage,
The appellant attacks the agreement of ■ December 4, 1903, between the city of New York and Carroll, defendant’s predecessor in title, upon the ground that it is ultra vires and in contravention of the provisions of section 71 of the Greater New York charter. Section 71 reads as follows: “ The rights of the city in and to its water front, ferries, wharf property, land under water, public landings, wharves, docks, streets, avenues, parks, and all other public places are hereby declared to be inalienable.” . (Laws of 1901, chap. 466, § 71.) I do not think the agreement between the city and Carroll contravenes the charter provision above quoted, when read in connection with other charter provisions hereinafter mentioned. I am of the opinion that the agreement of December 4, 1903, was in all respects valid and binding upon the parties.
As before stated, pursuant to the terms of said agreement, pier new No. 7 and the shed thereon were erected at the expense of Howard Carroll. In entering into the aforesaid agreement with Carroll the city acted through its commissioner of docks and with the approval of the commissioners of the sinking fund. The agreement was also approved by the corporation counsel for the city of New York. The agreement recites that Carroll “ is the owner and proprietor of all rights of wharfage and cranage, advantages, emoluments, hereditaments, appurtenant ”■ to the then existing bulkhead on West street. The agreement further recites that “ the Commissioner of Docks is desirous of having the above described property improved in accordance with the plan heretofore adopted by the Department of Docks and Ferries and approved by the Commissioners of the Sinking Fund, and the said party of the second part is willing to have the said work done at his expense in consideration of the rights and privileges hereinafter given him.” In said agreement the city gave license and permission to Carroll to extend the line of the old bulkhead into the river, and build a seawall upon a line 250 feet westerly from the easterly line of West street, and to fill with solid filling behind said new bulkhead or seawall, the work to be done in accordance with the new plan adopted by the dock department at the cost and expense of said Carroll. Carroll agreed that the work, labor and materials therefor in the first instance should be done and furnished by the department of docks and ferries, he to reimburse said department for such
That the said agreement was authorized by the provisions of section 822 of the Greater New York charter seems to me reasonably clear. So far as material section 822 provides as follows: “ Provided that said commissioner of docks, with the approval of the commissioners of the sinking fund, hereby is empowered to agree, license and permit private owners of any bulkheads, piers or water rights, to make the necessary improvements upon their bulkheads, piers or water rights, so as to conform to the plan
Section 876 of the charter provides as follows: “ No grants of land under water shall be made by the board of aldermen of The City of New York, or by any officer, board, or department thereof, beyond the exterior lines of The City of New York, as fixed by an act of the Legislature, passed April seventeenth, eighteen hundred and fifty-seven, entitled ‘ An act to establish bulkhead and pier lines for the port of New York/ as amended by subsequent act, unless as expressly authorized by acts passed subsequent thereto.” (Since re-enacted by Laws of 1910, chap. 269, amdg. said section.)
Reading sections 822 and 876 in connection with section 71, as I think we must, it clearly appears that the Legislature, in enacting sections 822 and 876, intended to except from the operation of section 71 the provision forbidding the city to alienate its wharf property and land under water whenever it should enter into an agreement of the nature specified in section 822. The act of the Legislature referred to in section 876, being chapter 763 of the Laws of 1857, is entitled “ An act to establish bulkhead and pier lines for the port of New-York.” By section 1 of the act of 1857 the Legislature established the bulkhead and pier lines recommended by the harbor commissioners appointed by the Governor pursuant to chapter 121 of the Laws of 1855, “ except that the exterior or pier head line from Ninth street extended to Forty-ninth street, on the New York side of East river, shall be the same as in the line recommended by the committee of commerce and navigation of the
It seems to me that the provisions of section 822 of the charter, expressly authorizing the commissioner of docks to “ agree, license and permit private owners of any bulkheads, piers or water rights ” which shall not conform to the plan adopted, and to agree with such owners “as to wharfage and other riparian rights thereon and therefrom,” must prevail over the general inhibition of section 71 of the charter, particularly when taken in connection with the ample authority vested in the city under section 876 of the charter to grant land under water between the bulkhead and pierhead lines; and that section 822 of the charter gave to the city full power to transfer to the owner of the old property, as a consideration or compensation for the expense falling upon him and for the relinquishment of valuable rights on his part, the land under water to the
Section 822 of the charter authorized the city, by an agreement in the nature of that entered into by the parties, to transfer and set over to Carroll, who was to make the improvement upon his property, such rights of property in the new improvement as those with which he would have been vested had the agreement contained no provision setting over to him such rights of wharfage, cranage, etc. (Bedlow v. Stillwell, supra; Bell v. City of New York, supra.)
The respondents urge with much force that the court should indine toward the rule of such a construction as will work in the present case neither injustice nor hardship to any of the parties before the court. Such rale is well stated in Hayden v. Pierce (144 N. Y. 512, 516) as follows: “ It is a familiar rale that a construction of a statute is to be avoided which is liable to produce a public mischief or to promote injustice. Language, however strong, must yield to what appears to be the intention, and that is to be found, not in the words of the particular section alone, but by comparing it with other parts or provisions of the general scheme of which it is a part.” (See, also, Hoey v. Gilroy, 129 N. Y. 132.)
The practical construction of section 822 of the charter of the city of New York given by the parties to said agreement is of importance. The Court of Appeals held in Matter of City of New York (217 N. Y. 1) that there was a manifest ambiguity in chapter 763 of the Laws of 1857 relating to harbor lines in front of property between Thirteenth and Seventeenth streets; and as the statute was not clear, it was proper to consider the contemporary and practical construction of the act by the city and the owners of the property affected; and that such practical construction of the statute should be given effect. (Duryee v. Mayor, etc., 96 N. Y. 477, 494; Grimmer v. Tenement House Department, 205 id. 549, 550.) Section 822 of the Greater New York charter (as amd. supra), in substantially its present form, so far as here material, was first enacted as chapter 397 of the Laws of 1893 (amdg. Consolidation Act [Laws of 1882, chap. 410], § 715. See Greater New York Charter [Laws of 1897, chap. 378], § 822.)
Other agreements similar to the Carroll agreement have been entered into between the mayor, aldermen and commonalty of the city of New York and private owners. On March 22, 1897, a similar agreement to that involved in the present case was entered into by the mayor, aldermen and commonalty of the city and
The department of docks of the city of New York was created by sections 30 and 99 of the City Charter of 1870 and, subject to the jurisdiction of the commissioners of the sinking fund, was given the exclusive control of all wharf property belonging to the city and the waters adjacent thereto by section 32 et seq. of chapter 383 of the Laws of 1870, and by section 99 of chapter 137 of the Laws of 1870 (City Charter), as amended by chapter 574 of the Laws of 1871. Said department of docks by said statutes was given exclusive charge and control of repairing, building, maintaining, altering, strengthening, leasing and protecting the city wharves, docks and water fronts and the appurtenances thereto. Said department was vested with the exclusive government and regulation of all wharves, piers, bulkheads and structures thereon and the waters adjacent thereto in the city, not owned by the city, and was empowered to determine upon a new plan for the whole or any part of the water front of the city of New York, which plan, when approved by the commissioners of the sinking fund, should constitute the sole plan according to which any wharf, pier, bulkhead, basin, dock or slip, or any appurtenant structure or superstructure should thereafter be laid out or constructed within the territory or district embraced in and specified by said plan. Said plan was to be the sole authority for solid filling in the waters surrounding the city, and with reference to the extension of piers into said waters and the erection of bulkheads around the city. It was provided by said statutes that upon the adoption of such new plan, the department of docks should proceed with the construction of wharves,
In this case the equities are all with the defendants. The agreement between Carroll and the city was at the time entered o into in entire good faith by both parties. The agreement itself was prepared by able corporation counsel representing the city, was approved by the commissioners of the sinking fund, and under it the city acquired valuable property rights without expense to it. Not only that, but it effectuated and carried out an important plan theretofore adopted for the improvement of its docks, piers and water front. The city was at no expense whatever for making said improvements. The only thing that the city surrendered was a small amount of land under water adjacent to the new pier to be erected under the city plan. This land was received by the city by gift from the State for the benefit of the commerce of the port of New York. Carroll agreed with the department of docks at his own expense to make the necessary improvements. The work was done and the expenditure made in the first instance by the city, and the city received full reimbursement therefor from Carroll. It is urged by the city that Carroll and his successor
The plaintiff also seeks to review the order making an extra allowance to the defendant Delaware, Lackawanna and Western Railroad Company of $2,000 for costs. I do not think such allowance was unreasonable. The case was a difficult one, involving the examination of a large number of statutes and a vast amount of documentary evidence. Expert witnesses were required, and a great amount of labor was performed by counsel in the preparation and trial of the case. I think the case is one where the court properly made an additional and extra allowance, to reimburse the successful party for the difficulties encountered in this litigation. (See Civ. Prac. Act, §§ 1513, 1514.)
The judgment and order appealed from should be affirmed, with costs to the defendants, respondents, separately against the plaintiff, appellant.
Clarke, P. J., Smith, Finch and Martin, JJ., concur.
Judgment and order affirmed, with costs to the respondents separately appearing and filing briefs.