City of New Orleans v. StateCity of New Orleans v. State
Salvador Anzelmo, City Atty., Douglas P. Wilson, Chief Deputy City Atty., Galen S. Brown, Deputy City Atty., for plaintiff-appellee.
William J. Doran, Jr., and William T. Kivett, Baton Rouge, for Police Jury Association of La., intervenor-appellee.
R. Gordon Kean, Jr., Charles S. McCowan, Jr., Baton Rouge, Lydia Taylor, Shreveport, T. Allen Usry, New Orleans, for Mun. Ass‘n, intervenor-appellee.
WATSON, Justice.
The City of New Orleans brought this suit contending that various state statutes which mandate payments by the City for state services violate
“The legislature shall enact no law the effect of which changes or affects the structure and organization or the particular distribution and redistribution of the powers and functions of any local governmental subdivision which operates under a home rule charter.”
The trial court declared the following acts of the Louisiana legislature, or portions thereof, to be unconstitutional interferences with the home rule charter of the City of New Orleans and in violation of
Three other acts were declared to be not only in violation of the Constitution of 1974, but in violation of
The State has appealed from the declaration of unconstitutionality. The City argues that its home rule charter gives it the exclusive right to regulate matters of local concern, and the payments mandated by the legislature unconstitutionally affect the organization of its government.
Intervening on behalf of the City are the Louisiana Municipal Association and The Police Jury Association of Louisiana, Inc. Aligned with the State‘s position is the Orleans Parish Criminal Sheriff, intervenor-appellant.
“Subject to the limitations elsewhere contained in this Constitution, the City of New Orleans is hereby declared to have a home rule charter consisting of Act 159 of 1912 as amended through the Regular Legislative Session of 1950, which said home rule charter may be amended or replaced only as hereinafter provided. Reference in this Section of Act 159 of 1912, as amended through the Regular Legislative Session of 1950, shall not be construed as placing said Act into or making it a part of this Constitution.
“The City of New Orleans, in addition to the powers expressly conferred upon it by Act 159 of 1912, as amended through the Regular Legislative Session of 1950, shall have the right and authority to adopt and enforce local police, sanitary and similar regulations and to do and perform all of the acts pertaining to its local affairs, property and government, which are necessary or proper in the legitimate exercise of its corporate powers and municipal functions. The City of New Orleans shall, however, not exercise any power or authority which is inconsistent or in conflict with any general law.
“Nothing contained in this section shall be construed as giving to the City of New Orlaens any rights, powers, authority or jurisdiction over any constitutional officers, boards and commissions, their deputies, subordinates and employees, or over any State, district and parochial officers, boards, commissions and funds, their deputies, subordinates and employees. The amounts to be appropriated and paid by the City of New Orleans for the expenses, including salaries and maintenance, of constitutional officers, boards, commissions, their deputies, subordinates and employees and State, district and parochial officers, boards, commissions and funds, their deputies, subordinates and employees, shall not, without the approval and consent of said City, be increased beyond the amounts which at the date of the adoption of this constitutional amendment are required to be contributed by the City; nor shall such amounts be reduced by the City without the consent of the Legislature.”
It is clear in the above article that: (1) the New Orleans home rule charter itself was not a part of the 1921 Constitution; and (2) home rule is subject to other constitutional limitations. See Buras v. Orleans Parish Democratic Executive Com., 248 La. 203, 177 So.2d 576 (1965). The trial court erred in holding that three of the acts were in violation of the Louisiana Constitution of 1921.
City of Shreveport v. Kaufman, 353 So.2d 995 (La., 1977) considered the affect of the 1974 Constitution on local home rule governments. Justice Tate, a delegate to the constitutional convention, stated that the “... new constitution‘s approach thus represents a broad change in the philosophy of local government...” by granting local governmental subdivisions “broad residual powers“. 353 So.2d at 996 and 997. However, the residual powers are only those which are not:
“(a) inconsistent with the 1974 constitution or
“(b) denied them by general legislation. Art. 6, Sections 4, 5(E), 7(A).” 353 So.2d at 997.
“The [constitutional] convention used the principle [of plenary legislative power] as its basic starting point, and a narrow construction of legislative power under the document would thwart its purpose of giving more flexibility to the legislature.” Professor W. Lee Hargrave, 36 La.L.Rev. 533.
“Notwithstanding any provision of this Article, the police power of the state shall never be abridged.”
This provision must be considered in connection with Section 6 of that Article, relied upon by the City. The autonomy of local governmental subdivisions with home rule charters is limited by general legislation enacted under the State‘s police power.
The only restriction on the State‘s power to enact legislation requiring the expenditure of funds by local political subdivisions is found in
“No law requiring increased expenditures for wages, hours, working conditions, pension and retirement benefits, vacation, or sick leave benefits of political subdivision employees, except a law providing for civil service, minimum wages, working conditions, and retirement benefits for firemen and municipal policemen, shall become effective until approved by ordinance enacted by the governing authority of the affected political subdivision or until the legislature appropriates funds for the purpose to the affected political subdivision and only to the extent and amount that such funds are provided. This Section shall not apply to a school board.”
The salaries involved here are being paid to State employees and not to City employees. Since the increased expenditures by the City are not for its “political subdivision employees“, the above limitation is inapplicable.
“... [I]n the absence of a particular constitutional provision that limits the power of the legislature to act in the respects assailed, a legislative action cannot be invalidated as contrary to the state‘s constitution.” Hainkel v. Henry, 313 So.2d 577 at 579 (La., 1975). “Complete legislative power, except as limited by the Constitution, lies within the state legislature....” State ex rel Guste v. Legislative Budget Com., 347 So.2d 160 at 164 (La., 1977). The legislative acts mandating these payments by the City to the State‘s employees and offices constitute a valid exercise of the State‘s police power. The State functions which are partially funded by the City under the challenged acts provide significant
The trial court erred in declaring the legislative acts unconstitutional.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court herein is reversed and vacated.
REVERSED AND VACATED.
DIXON, C.J., and MARCUS and BLANCHE, JJ., concur.
DENNIS, J., concurs with reasons.
LEMMON, J., dissents.
CALOGERO, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
DENNIS, Justice, concurring.
I respectfully concur.
The City of New Orleans is a “local governmental subdivision which operates under a home rule charter,” and the legislature is prohibited from enacting a “law the effect of which changes or affects the structure and organization or the particular distribution or redistribution of the powers and functions” of its government.
I respectfully disagree, however, with the majority‘s analysis of
The clear thrust of the local government sections in the new constitution is to expand the autonomy of local government. There is an express rejection of the “creature of the state” theory in favor of one which favors an emphasis on decentralized local control. There is no evidence in the debates which surrounded
CALOGERO, Justice, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent, being of the opinion that the various state statutes which
As Justice Dennis notes in his concurrence, the 1974 Louisiana Constitution, and particularly the local government section therein, sought to expand rather than retract local autonomy. Specifically,
The legislature shall enact no law the effect of which changes or affects the structure and organization or the particular distribution and redistribution of the powers and functions of any local government subdivision which operates under a home rule charter. (Emphasis provided.)
I can perceive of no more odious form of “affect[ing] the structure and organization or the particular distribution and redistribution of the powers and functions of any local governmental subdivision ...” than legislatively saddling local governments with financial obligations that are not of their own making.
The power to raise and spend municipal taxes and revenues of the City of New Orleans is a local power within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City. The home rule charter provides for the adoption of an annual budget, for the budgeting of revenues for financial administrative procedures, for the acquisition and management of City immovable properties, for the control over the structure and organization of city government and for distribution of its powers and functions. When the City is obligated to subsidize state functions instead of funding municipal services, the structure and organization of City government is altered by diverting funds from local municipal needs to meet those state functions and dictates.
The statutes in this case set unfunded mandates upon the City of New Orleans to provide revenues or property for state functions. Those mandates interfere impermissibly with the City‘s fiscal affairs, a matter at the very heart of the structure and organization of the City.
Accordingly, I find the statutes in question unconstitutional and respectfully dissent.