30 Iowa 526 | Iowa | 1870
First. The penalties of section 158 of the act of June 30, 1864, apply only to instruments issued with intent to emade the provisions of that act.
This precise question was before this court in Hugus v. Strickler, 19 Iowa, 413, and it was there held adversely to the position of appellant. That ruling has been followed and- approved in O'Hare v. Leonard, id. 515; Miller v. Bone, id. 571; Botkins v. Spurgeon, 20 id. 598, and other cases.
Whatever doubts might exist as to the correctness of these rulings, were the question an open one, we must regard it as settled in this State. We are aware that a contrary rule has been laid down by the courts of several other States.
That the act referred to does apply to and govern the State courts, with respect to the admissibility and inadmissibility of documentary evidence, has been so frequently recognized by this court that it cannot be regarded as an open question. See the following cases: Musselman v.
Tbe stamp, in tbe case before us, was affixed by L. H. "Washburn, who signs tbe certificate as follows: Geo. W. Ells, collector 2d district, Iowa. By L. H. Washburn, deputy 1st division, 2d district, Iowa.
Tbe seal of the collector is not affixed, nor is there any thing to show tbat tbe deputy was authorized to affix the stamp. His act, therefore, was null and void, and. tbe instrument was to be treated as unstamped.
which bonds are given for tbe protection and safety of tbe public.” Tbe great case of McCullough v. The State of Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, is cited in support of tbis point. Tbe opinion in tbat case was delivered by Chief Justice
The appellant argues, therefore, that congress, on the other handj cannot taje the constitutional means employed by the legislature of the State, wherewith to execute its constitutional powers. This may be readily admitted, and yet it is difficult to perceive how a law of congress, requiring every man elected or appointed to any office where he is required to give a bond for the faithful discharge of his duties, that he should stamp such bond, is “taxing the constitutional means employed by a State to execute and carry out its constitutional powers.”
* If an act of congress required the warrants issued by the State auditor, or bonds issued by authority of the State, to be stamped, then we could readily see that such an act would fall within the principle of the case of McCullough v. The State of Maryland, supra. But the requirement of the act in the case before us is, that the person taking upon himself the office to which he is appointed shall affix a stamp to his bond. Affixing the stamp is not an official act. He is required to do that as an individual, and befoi-e he is an officer. The duty is imposed on him individually, not officially, nor upon the corporation whose officer he becomes. '
The appellant asks that, if we should feel ourselves compelled to affirm the judgment of the district court, the cause be remanded to that court with leave to the plaintiff
This is asking us to grant a new trial, that the plaintiff may create evidence which did not exist at the time of the trial below, and this without a motion for a new trial in the court below. We think this would be an exercise of a power without precedent, and in this case unwarrantable.
The judgment of the court below is
Affirmed.