98 Ala. 594 | Ala. | 1893
In view of the principle, that the power of a municipal corporation to tax must' be clearly and unequivocally conferred by the State, and that all doubts whether the power has been conferred, in a given instance, must be resolved against the municipality, we perceive the force of the argument that the act to create the Port of Mobile, approved Dec. 10, 1886, (Acts 1886-7, p. 24) which, while in general terms authorizing the general council to impose license taxes upon all businesses, trades and professions carried on in the city, yet further provides that 'the license tax so authorized shall not exceed seventy-five per centum of the amount fixed for license by the last ordinance on the subject enacted by the mayor, aldermen and common council of the city of Mobile, should be construed to mean that the au
Under the said last ordinance of the city, prior to the grant of the new charter of December 10, 1886, a license tax of $75.00 was imposed upon wholesale grocers, but none upon the selling of liquor by wholesale, whether such business was carriéd on as a separate and distinct pursuit, or as a part of, or element in the business of a wholesale grocer. Appellees then carried on the business of wholesale grocers and paid for and obtained the required license therefor; and as one of the elements in their general trade as wholesale grocers they carried on the business of wholesale liquor dealers, without being required to pay any additional license tax. In this connection, their counsel, in argument, emphasize the statement in the plea, which is embodied, in terms, in the special finding of facts by the City Court, that “under such general license they were permitted by the corporation to carry on, as a part of said wholesale business, the business of selling liquor by wholesale without any special license whatever.” If, from this averment and finding, it could properly be concluded that, by the terms of the said ordinance, one license tax was prescribed and required to be paid by wholesale grocers, who also engaged in selling liquor at wholesale as an element in the business of grocers, referring the charter of 1886, with its peculiar provisions to which we have alluded, to that ordinance, it might be deemed a just interpretation of the charter to hold that the legislative intent was that only one license tax should be imposed upon persons so engaged. But the language of the finding does not justify that conclusion. We construe it to mean, merely, that the ordinance was silent upon the subject of wholesale liquor licenses, and that appellees simply carried on the business, as they did, unmolested. We, therefore, attach no significance to that feature of the case. The question then is whether the business of selling liquor is such a customarily inseparable and necessary part of, or element in, the business of a wholesale grocer, as that legislation can not legitimately separate them, when united, and
Beversed and rendered.