10 So. 548 | Miss. | 1906
delivered the opinion of the court.
The bill in this case ivas filed by Mrs. Ehoda Poole to enjoin the city of Meridian from entering upon and attempting to use as a street a-certain piece of land claimed by Mrs. Poole to be her property. She deraigned her title from a deed made by J. W. ITarvey and wife to C. O. Chalk, who was then the
Dillehay bought the property owned by Harvey south of the .line A, O. He testified that this street was open, and that the space between Eorty-Eifth and Eorty-Sixth avenues was planked and used as a public sidewalk, and that it was a regu
Again, admitting that there were corn and cotton ridges in Pacific street, which had been an old field for a number of years, and that there might possibly be some there now, he nevertheless testified that the street had been worked at one time, or partly worked, by the city. J. H. Williams, who was a witness for the complainant, stated there was a footwalk along Pacific street, and that the city built a footbridge, and that there was a street west from the Cox building, and that there had never been any obstruction of the footway prior to the erection of this Cox house in 1900, and that there was a foot- ' way running from his store in a southwesterly direction, which was kept up by the city, and that the bridge, where the footway intersected Forty-Fifth avenue, was kept up by the city, and that the footway was for the benefit of school children and people traveling that way. No claim was ever made by O. C. Chalk during his life time against the dedication of Pacific street to the city. It is immaterial that Pacific street was outside the city limits at the time the Harvey deed was made. The principles of law applicable in this case are to be found in Briel v. City of Natchez, 48 Miss., 435, approved in the case of Indianola Light, etc., Co. v. Montgomery, 85 Miss., 312 (37 South. Rep., 958). We quote from the Briel case, and approve and reaffirm the following: “Nor is it necessary, in order to manifest a ratification or acceptance of the dedica
The strongest proposition urged by counsel for appellee is that all this land was an old field, which had been planted in corn and cotton at the time of the deed from Harvey to Chalk in 1886, and that it was then outside the city limits, 'and that all in effect that the transaction amounted do was to create a private agreement between Harvey and Chalk, and not a dedication to the city of Meridian as a street; and it is said that the case of Sanford v. Meridian, 52 Miss., 383, is the authority which should control this case. But an examination of that case will show plainly that it is a wholly different case on its facts from the case at bar. There the testimony on all material points was in hopeless conflict, complainants and their witnesses claiming that the street was and ever had been 80 feet wide, and defendant’s witnesses averring with equal positiveness that the street was and ever had been 60 feet wide. And it is a noteworthy fact that the witnesses were not cross-examined, but each party seemed content to let the other prove
It follows that the decree must be reversed, and the cause remanded for a decree granting the relief prayed for in accordance with the principles announced in this opinion.