3 Shan. Cas. 463 | Tenn. | 1875
delivered tbe opinion of tbe court:
This was an agreed case to test tbe right of tbe city of Memphis to assess a tax in tbe nature of a privilege tax,
The legislature passed an act on the 24th. March, 1875 [Acts 1875, ch. 109], entitled, “an act to regulate the business of fire and all other, except life, insurance companies.” The 8th section enacts that, “each any every company organized for any of the purposes named in this act not incorporated by or organized under the laws of this state, shall, on the 30th of June and December, in each year, report, under oath of the president and secretary or other chief officer of such company, the total amount of premiums received from policies issued in this state within the six months next preceding or since the last returns of such premiums were made by such company, and shall at the same time pay into the treasury of this state the sum of two dollars and fifty cents upon each one hundred dollars of said premiums so ascertained, which shall be in lieu of all other taxes,” etc.
The question as to whether the last clause quoted precludes the city of Memphis from imposing the present tax for corporation purposes. In the case of the city of Memphis against Hernando Insurance Company, and other companies [6 Bax., 527], this court held that similar language in the charter of the several companies would preclude the city from imposing any other license tax on the companies. The only difference is, that in the present case the; act in question is not a part of the defendant’s charter. The act is therefore repealable at the will of the legislature [See Home Insurance Co. v. Taxing District, 4 Lea, 644; Memphis v. Carrington, 7 Pickle, 515], and in this respect the case is different from the one referred to. It is clear, however, that the city imposes its tax under the power conferred by the legislature, and cannot impose a tax where the legislature has denied the right. So the simple question is what was meant by the above clause? It is argued by the city that it was-only meant that the tax imposed by
In this view, the decree of the chancellor denying the power of the city to impose the tax is correct, and must be affirmed, with costs.