294 N.W. 544 | Wis. | 1940
Action commenced December 8, 1939 by the city of Madison against Dane county to recover indigent school tuition certain children of legal school age who resided in the city of Madison's school district and who were maintained as public charges while they attended Madison schools. Dane county denied liability as to each of the six causes of action set out in the complaint. Jury trial was waived, and the case *147 was tried to the court upon stipulated facts. The court found in favor of the city on the facts and the law, and judgment was accordingly entered. Defendant appeals.
Only such material facts as are necessary for an understanding of the issues involved will be stated in the opinion.
The parties have stipulated that the rates of tuition and the method of computation are correct, and that the children named in the six separate causes of action attended the plaintiff's schools in the different grades and for the periods of time alleged. It is further stipulated that the county system of poor relief as provided for in sec.
Appellant county contends that the court erred, (1) in holding that a child whose father is employed on WPA is a "person of school age maintained as a public charge;" (2) in holding that a child whose father is employed on WERA work program is a "person of school age, maintained as a public charge;" (3) in holding that a child whose father is employed on either WPA or WERA and also receives supplementary direct relief is a "person of school age maintained as a public charge;" (4) in holding that Dane county should be charged for tuition for a child having a legal settlement in the city of Madison while the county was on the "county system" of relief; (5) in holding that the plaintiff city could collect tuition costs from Dane county for attendance in Madison schools in any grade other than the first eight grades or the so-called common school grades; and (6) in holding that a child is a person "maintained as a public charge" when his father applies for and receives relief for himself and his family which is charged to the father.
Plaintiff's action is based upon sec.
Sec.
"Indigent pupils, tuition. Every person of school age maintained as a public charge shall, for school purposes, be deemed a resident of the district in which he lives, and if maintained by the county the county board shall annually allow to the district in which such person attended school, apro rata share of the year's expense of maintaining the school, such share to be computed upon the basis of the total enrollment, and in case such person be maintained by the town, such town board shall allow a like amount to such district." *149
Sec.
"Indigent pupils, tuition. Every person of school age maintained as a public charge shall for school purposes be deemed a resident of the school district in which he resides, except that such school district shall be compensated by the municipality or by the county in case the county system of poor relief is in effect in such municipality in which such person of legal school age had a legal settlement as defined in section
Sec.
The stipulated facts in each cause of action show that the children in question and their parents were on relief for some period of time prior to the time for which tuition is claimed. They further show that during the period for which tuition is claimed, application was made by the head of the family, the father, in each instant, to the Dane county outdoor relief department for public aid. The father of the children, in each instant, stated that said children were totally dependent upon him, and that he had no property, real or personal, of any kind, character, or description. The public assistance granted was based upon the needs of, and for the use and support the children and their parents.
To obtain work relief under the WPA (except the administrative and supervisory force). the applicant was required to show that he or she, as the case might be, was without other means of support, that is, that the applicant was not certified for work relief until he was a public indigent in actual need of relief. All of the children in question who resided in the city of Madison's school district for the period for which tuition is claimed, were supported by direct poor relief entirely *150 or by a combination of WPA work relief supplemented by direct poor relief by Dane county. Since the facts as to the nature and the extent of the relief in each instance are stipulated, we need only consider the application of the law to the agreed statement of facts which are embodied in the court's findings.
The city contends that a child or children so supported is maintained as a public charge within the meaning of sec.
"Moreover, the work which he [Nelson] was employed to do was not mere `made-work' or a purely relief project. Regardless of relief, the county had to obtain and cut wood for its use in heating its buildings and provide fuel for indigents supported by it under sec.
The facts in the instant case are quite similar to those in the case of West Milwaukee v. Industrial Comm.
At page 32 the court said:
"So far as the county is concerned, he remained a public charge and was not taken off of the relief list. He could have refrained from working and could have continued to receive his budgeted necessaries, which the county was still bound by law to furnish, instead of receiving part of his relief in cash upon voluntarily doing `made-work.'"
And at page 33 the court said:
"So far as the county is concerned, Yunker was merely one of the recipients of its public charity and, under those circumstances, liability to be paid by the county is wholly foreign to the spirit, as well as the letter of the compensation act."
The court held that he was not entitled to compensation from either the county or the village of West Milwaukee under the compensation act. If Yunker and his family *153
remained public charges on Milwaukee county, we think it clear that the children in the instant case, during the periods for which tuition is claimed, as well as the parents of said children, were maintained as public charges within the meaning of sec.
Dane county, in granting relief to the families involved in the several causes of action, did so under sec.
"Adoption of county system. The county board of any county may, at an annual meeting or at a special meeting called for that purpose, by a resolution adopted by an affirmative vote of a majority of all the supervisors entitled to a seat in such board, abolish all distinction between county poor and town, village and city poor in such county and have the expense of maintaining all the poor therein a county charge; and thereupon the county shall relieve and support the poor in said county. . . ."
We think it clear that the words "indigent pupils" and the phrase "maintained as a public charge" as used in sec.
"It is our opinion that the subsection in question comprehends relief furnished to a family of which a child is a member and in which the child participates. It is not limited to any form of public support extended directly to a child, if there be any such form of support. The subsection specifically refers to local and county systems of `poor relief.' It refers as well to the provisions of sec.
Under assignment of errors (1), (2), and (3), appellant contends that the children in question were not maintained as public charges because the father in each instance was employed on WPA or WERA, or some other form of work relief project. In this connection, it is important to, note that sec. 6 of ch. 363, Laws of 1933, provides:
"Relief shall include such money, food, housing, clothing, fuel, light, water, medicines, medical and other treatment, nursing, and such other care, service, household equipment and commodities as shall be reasonable and necessary under the circumstances. It shall also include wages paid in cashor in kind for public work provided to dependent personswhere the amounts paid are determined upon the basis ofactual need and where the conditions prescribed in subsection (2) of this section are observed."
Work relief, though wages therefor be paid in cash and are determined upon the basis of the family's actual need, constitutes maintenance of the family as a public charge.West Milwaukee v. Industrial Comm., supra. Wages paid by a city, town, or county, from money specifically appropriated for the purpose of relief, or from money provided by the federal government or any agency thereof, to persons unemployed or whose employment is inadequate to provide the necessities of life, constitutes work relief. Manning v.State (1937),
It is next claimed that the court erred in holding that Dane county could be charged for tuition for a child having a legal settlement in the city of Madison while the county was on the "county system" of relief. As to this assignment of error, the applicable statute is sub. (2) of sec.
It is next asserted that the court erred in holding that the city could collect tuition costs from the county for attendance in Madison schools in any grades other than the first eight grades — the so-called common-school grades. It appears from the stipulated facts and the findings that some of the indigent pupils attended high school, one or two others attended kindergarten, and they were all between the ages of four and twenty years of age. Sec.
"The legislature shall provide by law for the establishment of district schools, which shall be as nearly uniform as practicable; and such schools shall be free and without charge for tuition to all children between the ages of four and twentyyears. . . ."
A district school may maintain both kindergarten and high-school grades. The age limit implies both kindergarten and high-school pupils. Sec.
"(1) The district clerk shall during each July, make and transmit to the county superintendent, a verified report as of the thirtieth day of June of such year, showing:
"(a) The names and ages of children over the age of four and under the age of twenty years residing in the district. . . .
"(b) The whole number of children between said ages taught in the district school during the last year.
"(c) The number attending school during that year under the age of four and the number over the age of twenty years. . . ."
Sec.
"The elementary and high-school tuition of every person of school age, excepting county charges, as provided in subsection (2) of this section, residing in a county institution shall be paid by the county. . . ."
This subsection is under the general heading "Conduct of Common Schools." None of the children involved in this action resided at a county institution. The subsection includes both elementary and high school, and provides that the tuition shall be paid by the county for every person of school age. It refers to indigent pupils. We think the only limitation under sec.
It is next contended that the court erred in holding that a child is the person "maintained as a public charge" when his father applies for and receives relief for himself and his family which is charged to the father. What has been said with *157
reference to the first three assignments of error is applicable here. Both the children and their parents were on relief. The public assistance granted was based upon the needs of, and for the use and support of, the children and their parents. It is clear that the children were maintained as public charges within the letter and spirit of sec.
The application for relief, made in each instance by the father, shows the respective families involved in this action were in destitute circumstances. They had all been on public relief for some time prior to the time for which tuition is claimed. None of the children had any property or means of their own. They were totally dependent upon their fathers. They were all dependent upon public relief. Whether the assistance rendered to the respective families was through work relief, direct relief, or a combination of both, it provided those in question with maintenance as public charges. It follows that the judgment must be affirmed.
By the Court. — Judgment affirmed.