*1 believe trial court. I case to the applied properly should be affirmed. case Dudley, dissenting opinion. in this JJ., join
Smith and ROCK, CASH, Arkansas Ann LITTLE OF CITY WEBBER, ROBINSON, SMITH, Charles T. C. S. Wilson WATSON G. JOHNSON 644 S.W.2d 82-143 Arkansas Court of Supreme delivered December Opinion [Rehearing January denied 1983.] *5 III, R. Magruder, City Atty., Wright, Lindsey Jack Goss, ir by: Patrick for and cross- Jennings, appellant J. appellee. Duckett, ir P.
Henry David by: Henry, appellees cross-appellants. Robert H. case interesting This Dudley, Justice.
presents many questions exactions and an about attorney’s conflict interests. Ann.
Ark. Stat. through (Repl. 1980) 19-4201 19-4218 authorized cities to purchase or construct waterworks sys- *6 was 1980) (Repl. In Ark. Stat. Ann. 19-4219
terns. § to class cities first and second enacted which authorized their waterworks manage commissions to and operate create Little ordinance by That same Rock systems. year City which the Little Rock Commission created Waterworks and The Board of Directors system. operates manages 19-4208, to sell authority retained the to City, pursuant § to rates. The same well as set and encumber property statute, 19-4208, can authority the operating provides into only to after city taking funds over pay surplus maintenance, allowing the cost and account of operations in- for costs and providing replacement depreciation, all bonds. redemption outstanding terest purchasing 50, 1965, Act to the Assembly, by gave In the General system the discretion authority any waterworks operating to the fund of the general to make contributions voluntary in lieu of in return for fire police, taxes municipality Ann. 19- health Stat. 19-4273 protection. through §§ payments The cannot force 1980). (Repl. municipality to it in to be made this statute as pursuant payments authority. discretionary operating lieu of taxes with October, 1969, Rock, ordinance, Little In levied a tax on waterworks commission. privilege $10,417 tax was in the amount of for the of December period 1, $125,000 31, 1969,and for the year December through 1970. The ordinance contains the following provisions: shall hereby 3. The taxes levied be paid
SECTION in the Little Rock any addition to sums paid of Act 50 Water Works under the Municipal provisions of 1965. Municipal 4. The Rock Water
SECTION Little said taxes by Works authorized to on hereby pass an cents (25í) additional levying charge twenty-five month meter consumers. Water per upon resident may terminate consumer who Works the services fails such due. pay charge when years identical ordinance for the An was passed authorized the ordinances in Beginning and 1975. necessary in the amount levy charge the waterworks 1974; tax, $167,652 in was which the amount collect 1977; 1976; $146,500 in 1975; $145,000 $144,000 *7 1980; 1979; $322,500 in 1978; $156,822 $148,500 in in been $340,000 taxes have $339,066 in The in and 1982. 1981 of the at the rate of l/12th the on a basis monthly to city paid levy. yearly 25, who were 1981, city six residents August
On of the City court chancery against filed suit in the water users an illegal tax was the privilege Little Rock that alleging 16, 13 of the Arkansas Article prohibited by exaction § David by represented The six were taxpayers Constitution. who, the he at time attorney, a city former assistant Henry, defending city was the this suit also city, filed against a that asking fee. filed motion city case a The another for of his conflict because of be David Henry disqualified attorney, refused to disqualify interests. trial court The exaction, city an gave judgment against found illegal March, 1982, $1,264,761.30 through plus the amount of and paid, of annum until percent interest at the rate ten per of fee in the amount Henry an attorney’s awarded David $316,190.00. tax is affirm the holding privilege We exaction, and judgment an theamountof modify illegal attorney’s disallow the fee. those only Municipalities exaction. illegal by been them statutes or by that have
powers
delegated
Constitution,
the existence
doubt about
and
substantial
be resolved
must
of a
in a
power
municipal corporation
Williams,
155, 444
Ark.
it.
v.
against
Town
Dyess
247
Raines,
v.
Little Rock
241
(1969),
City
citing
S.W.2d 701
1071,
City
v.
Yancey
486
(1967)
Ark.
411 S.W.2d
673, 212
which
cityA
tax
(1948).
Ark.
S.W.2d 546
213
Searcy,
is an
of taxation
delegated power
is not authorized
a
46,
Ark.
County,
v. Ouachita
218
exaction. Schuman
Co. v. Little
Pierce Oil
citing Waters
(1950),
Appellant authority it the statutory authority delegating tutional or However, that, tax. it levy privilege argues although tax, its ordinance labeled the assessment it privilege fee, a tax. It contends that the terms franchise really franchise tax, rate, assessments, charges, privilege tax fee privilege and the use of one term interchangeable, instead necessarily another does not legislative invalidate a enact- McCuen, ment. See v. Eaton Ark. 617 S.W.2d Dierks, (1981); Holman 233 S.W.2d (1950). then city reasons inductively assessment or or rate by the charge imposed ordinances should be treated as part rate for water set validly municipality pursuant 19-4208.
The appellant’s fails for a argument number of reasons. First, the obviously assessment is not a charge services rendered to the waterworks. Those services are for in paid *8 statutes, 19-4275, lieu of taxes pursuant and 19-4274 §§ and are with the discretionary Con- operating authority. amount, versely, the tax before us is in a mandatory, set and the ordinances "the provide that taxes hereby levied shall be in addition paid sums the paid by Little Rock Waterworks under Municipal provisions the of 50Act of Second, 1965.” all other payments by the waterworks to the which come from municipality water rates must from come surplus accumulated in the operation fund after only taking into account the maintenance, cost of operations and allowing costs and replacement depreciation, providing for interest redemption the of purchasing all out- tax, bonds. standing Here 19-4208. at originally 25 § meter, cents per was levied on waterworks and on passed customer and then paid by customer and passed back to directly the city without to the of regard cost maintenance, operations, depreciation and debt as set out Thus, Third, above. it was not a of the part water rate. assessment was designated tax privilege by the ordinances. tax, tax, It was clearly a an unauthorized and therefore an illegal exaction. We affirm the chancellor in so holding.
Contrary appellant’s argument, Section of Act of 23 the 1981 Extraordinary Session of the General Assembly does not authorize the imposition tax privilege granting chancellor’s challenged We affirm in this case. injunctive relief. The to berecovered. exaction amount cross-appeal, limita- statute of argue, that no appellees on they applied be should and that been tions should illegally exacted, money over all to recover allowed following appellant $2,000,000. in the contends the year due, statute the three no refund alternative: year should applies, limitation that the five limitations accordingly. recovery limited applied should be be necessary the issues to decide it not find We do always concerning we have because of limitation statutes recovery prohibiting the law rule the common followed voluntarily paid Stephen e.g., Searcy County See, taxes. (1968); Thompson, son, Ark. 424 S.W.2d Lines, Inc., v. Continental Southern Comm’r. (1953). SW.2d 375 general supra, Thompson, rule stated this Court
In follows: voluntary payments Appellee made of recover seeks to Cooley in The Law be taxes. This can not done. gives Taxation, 20, 1282, “It is well this rule: Ch. voluntary a tax is a payment that if the settled except payment, back, it cannot be recovered where a *9 governing provisions recovery of a is authorized voluntary payment regardless is of whether statute p. 2561); compulsory.” (Vol. further: at or recoverable, voluntary payments it is are not “Where illegally has been that the tax or assessment immaterial laid, which it was laid even that the law under or was. principle is an ancient one unconstitutional. Every general application. law, the common and is of voluntarily law, supposed and if he to know the man makes a compel payment him which the law would ignorance assign make, his he cannot afterwards to the law why him should furnish as a reason the State Ignorance legal or back. remedies to recover it with voluntarily pays a tax of law one who mistake illegally ground recovery.” assessed no furnishes (Vol. page 2564). 3 at paragraph Court, later,
This one noted that Arkansas had no subject statute on the and that we follow the common law rule: In Brunson v. Board Directors of Crawford
County Dist., 24, Levee 828, 829, 104Ark. 153S.W. L.R.A., N.S., 293, Court, speaking Hart, Mr. for the Justice right said: “In some of the states the to recover illegal paid protest given by taxes under statute. In state, however, regulating there is no statute any recovery matter, and if is had it must be under the rules of the common law. The common-law rule governing cases of this kind is laid down following County cases: Commissioners, Lamborn v. 181, 926; 97 U.S. L.Ed. Union R. R. Co. v. Pacific Dodge County, 98 U.S. L.Ed. 196.These cases lay following party pays down the rule: ‘Where a an illegal knowledge demand, with full of all the facts illegal, which render such demand without an im- urgent necessity mediate therefor, or unless to (not avoid) person property release his or from prevent detention, or to an immediate seizure of his person property, payment such must be deemed voluntary, and cannot be recovered back. And the fact party, making that the payment, at the time of files protest, payment written does not make the invol- ” untary.’ Id. at at S.W.2d 379.
Appellees prohibit- contend that the common law rule ing recovery voluntarily paid taxes has never been applied illegal specifically to an exaction. While no casehas applicable stated that the common law rule is to recoveries pursuant language 16, 13, quoted to Article above clearly encompasses an exaction under the consti- provision. addition, tutional In several of our cases have applied the common law rule to unconstitutional and *10 illegal just illegally taxes rather than to taxes assessed or
505 Co., Trust & See, v. Bank Commerce e.g., Gates collected. of Thus, law the common (1931). 806 S.W.2d Ark. 47 185 taxes voluntarily paid of recovery the rule prohibiting 16, Article violate exactions which illegal applicable Constitution. of the Arkansas law rule but aware of this common was judge
The trial or- challenged the made under that the payments held ordinances pro- because the not voluntary were dinances the water could discontinue the waterworks vided that For the tax. failed to pay of customer who any service ordinance provided: the example, is hereby Works Municipal The Little Rock Water an addi- by on said taxes levying authorized pass a month (25Í) per cents charge twenty-five tional of may consumers. The Water Works meter resident upon fails pay consumer who terminate the services of due. charge such when v. Board & Land Co. Chapman Dewey case District, S.W. Francis Levee Ark.
Directors St. A on the voluntariness issue. (1926) dispositive part is as follows: opinion decisions, which will the coercion these Under involuntary of taxes must consist payment render of power possessed or threatened exercise some actual over payment or by party exacting receiving no the latter has from which person property, relief, reasonable means immediate except payment. making it is insisted counsel for the plaintiff
But in takes case at bar alleged complaint taxes in these out of the decided operation principle it within the rule announced cases and brings 259, 197 do We Dickinson S.W. 25. Housley, to accept think so. In that case the collector refused demanded, had less than the full amount any sum of the taxpayer to have sold the lands power This have constituted tax. would payment title, necessary it became upon cloud *11 pay prevent owner to sale. No such bar. If the the demand in order to the
power existed in the board in the case at plaintiff pay taxes, had refused to the the compelled board of directors would have been to proceedings against institute chancery the landowner in the plaintiff taxes,
court to collect the and the presented up could have the same matters as set in short, this case to defeat the collection of the taxes. In it upon could have defended a suit to collect the taxes ground right same that it bases its to recover the taxes voluntarily paid. which it 416, Id. at S.W. at 911. party receiving
Likewise, Rock, of Little payment, power had no to have the servicesof consumer discretionary power given That terminated. Rock was turn, Little Municipal adopted and, Waterworks in it never any policy to terminate service to a customer who refused to pay Significantly, person the tax. not one testified he paid Thus, she in fact the tax because of coercion. we hold failing apply that the chancellor erred the common law prohibiting recovery voluntarily paid rule taxes. The involuntarily only paid taxes were after the date this suit was August taxpayers, just filed, All 1981. not the six named plaintiffs, paid will be deemed to their taxes involun- tarily complaint taxpayers, from the date of the because all just plaintiffs, parties the named are the real in this action. McCarroll Farrar, S.W.2d (1939). enjoined appellant assessing
The chancellor from collecting privilege stayed us, taxes but then before result, the decree. As a the collection of these taxes has during pendency appeal. continued of this Wehold that privilege pursuant all taxescollected to the unconstitutional filing complaint ordinances from the date of the must refunded, be less reasonable costs of administration. Appellant contends interests. attorney’s conflict of refusing disqualify appellees’ that the trial court erred in remedy proper attorney. agree, is not the but reversal We this case. attorney appellees’ disqualify motion
In its pleaded appellant as follows: Henry, Counsel, filed has David P. Plaintiffs’ *12 by challenging enacted the a of ordinances series
cause year City thereafter. each Rock in 1969and of Little City employed Little the was Said Counsel Attorney, beginning City on or as an Assistant Rock employment September 6, 1971, con- said with about August Further, tinuing said Counsel until 1978. City time represented since that of Little Rock has attorney for of record remains the on matters and other Judge Phillips before case v. Weeks Eisele. attorney appellees’ proved appellant had that
The city representing at the same he interests as was adverse testimony, city. pertinent suing taken he time was appellees’ appellant’s prior to on the motion trial attorney disqualified, is as follows: City Attorney] Magruder,
Q. [Mr. attorney currently you you deny that Do Phillips v. Weekslawsuit? in the record Henry, Attorney] Appellees’ A. [Mr.
No. pending, deny you even is still Do that lawsuit
Q. though Court? it’s submitted back been standpoint anything pending A. from the It’s attorneys of record. be done my point. pending, is, nevertheless, still Q. That’s It it not? — Well, narrow A. I have with such a trouble (Interposing) little Let me seeif I can confine Q. identify you. you this Defend- bit more Would ant’s Exhibit Number Two? ques- respond your (Witness continuing) I can
A. yes tion, I do or a no. but can’t it with you me has been identified as show what Q. Let Defendant’s Exhibit Two and to be a certified purports from the copy United District States Clerk stating the case is pending are the of record. you attorney you Would with disagree that?
A. I don’t know what the U.S. District Clerk knows about the case or what his certification has to do with it. In my most opinion, ninety-nine percent resolved, issues in that case has been and there is one unresolved issue to the pertaining police department practice holding under people investigation. That issue is Q. unresolved? me,
A. That one issue. To Phillips Weeks the case of Now, is a dead horse. I wouldn’t call that pending. Honor, Mr. Magruder. Your I would offer at this point for Defendant’s Exhibit Two the certified from copy Clerk, the U.S. District Court It’ll Court. go objection. without
# # # Q. Magruder Let me show cont.) you what has [Mr. been identified as Defendant’s Exhibit Four which to be a purports series of statements or bills sent the firm of and Henry Duckett to the City Little Rock on Weeks, the Phillips v. if I ask you recognize those. them, A. I but one recognize doesn’t have anything to Phillips Weeks. Two of them don’t. do with v.
[*] # [*] clear, Honor, Mr. To make the record Your Magruder. Ten, I’d like of offer Defendant’s which is a copy Resolution the Board office directing my pursue disqualification Henry. of Mr. we
Though do not faith of question good attorney, both conflict the appearance of interest and it are too strong ignore. representation conflicting adverse interests will most often constitute professional misconduct. A with a lawyer charged high is degree his client. the same loyalty Suing defending client at is, best, time at the very unseemly the same that regard. attorney high professional holds an to a standard The law obligation to avoid even which includes the conduct appearance Responsi- impropriety. of Professional Code attorney Certainly, bility has not succeeded Canon 9. avoiding appearance in the instant case. such an city attorney Henry assured had
Mr. testified that the Phillips never serve him that the case of v. Weekswould City, by disqualify. However, the the basis for a motion to September 1, on resolution of its Board of Directors formal disqualifi- attorney city 1981, to move for authorized though city attorney may assured cation. Even appellees’ attorney conflicting representation would disqualification, useless it was a vain and not be a basis adroitly Supreme Jersey aptly and act. The of New Court addressed the issue as follows: representation particularly troublesome
Dual
body.
governmental
So, an
where one of the clients is a
attorney may
body
governmental
represent both a
not
merely
private
made
client
becausedisclosure was
and a
they
agreeable
represent
he
both interests.
and
As Mr.
Weaver,
Hall said in Ahto
N.J.
Justice
431,
Bar,” N.J.L.J. stated: to its atten- matters called
“Because of some *14 publicize Supreme tion, its to Court wishes responsibility of the Bar a member view of the when municipality attorney other or he a private agency represents public clients also and by it. In affected whose beforeor are interests come Coujrt Supreme considers such circumstances the attorney re- affirmative ethical that the sponsibility has
immediately fully his disclose and to completely interest, from withdraw to conflict of representing agency municipality and both the matter, to such respect client with the private that or agency to the municipality to recommend Where the public counsel. it retain independent involved, alone suffi- is not interest is disclosure conflict- represent the attorney may cient since consent of all con- with the interests even ing added.) cerned. (Emphasis 101, 102-03, B., A. and ALR 3d Re 209 A.2d N.J. (1965). The trial court was in error in to clearly refusing but we do not disqualify appellees’ attorney, consider reversal to be the in remedy this case. proper particular However, we cannot allow the from the attorney profit we refuse to an impropriety. Accordingly, approve attor- fee, an award of fees in ney’s although attorney’s tax refund cases is authorized Ark. Stat. Ann. 84-4601 1980). (Repl. of other issues. asserts number city
Other Appellant we agree and asks reversal on each of them. While points errors, are not they prejudi- trial court committed other cial errors and do not reversal. require erred in the trial court contends that
The appellant with ARCP Rule refusing comply require appellees seeking were not rule. agree. Appellees the class action We had been illegally of their which property the return just exacted, for over in their asked complaint but instead $2,000,000, injunction fees and a attorney’s permanent conflict with the consti- the tax. Rule does not against in class rule of procedure it sérves as a tutional provision: Garner, As stated Sloan case of this nature. action in Exactions Illegal Suits to Prevent Taxpayers Haley Arkansas, at 135: (1954) 8 Ark.L.Rev. 129
Unlike certain other in the Arkansas provisions Constitution, XVI, self-executing. Article Section 13 is But even declaration is legislative no though required for its there is to the effect that the efficacy, authority so as the legislature may regulate long procedure it Certainly is not guarantee abridged. Constitutional the statute of limitations agreed applies other actions under provision, just *15 certainly litigious equally stat- circumstance. But scope of, with, or restricts the that conflicts ute provision .... [footnotes omitted.] is void judge appellees comply with should made the The trial prejudice. 23, is no common law makes Rule but there Our requires complete type of action a class action and a fully adjudication adversary case. In McCarroll v. of a (1939), Farrar, Ark. this Court 134 S.W.2d Rigsby quoted from v. Ruraldale Consolidated School (1929) 64, 180 122, 20 Ark. follows: District No. S.W.2d624 brings taxpayer action in behalf an a citizen and Where against municipality taxpayers of himself and other every regarded proceedings, party as a to the citizen is by judgment In entered therein. such and is bound parties. regarded people For as the real cases the example brought by taxpayers judgment in a suit company, against and a railroad a town enjoin the town by company, of bonds to the the issue town adjudged issue, is which it that such bonds should binding taxpayers though town, of the on all the other parties questions suit, involved to the and the judicata therein are taxpayer in a second suit another res payment on the to restrain the of interest judgment however, cases, first bonds. In all such must be bona fide. adjudication fully developed
Here there was a final of a adversary was a case. As a matter of law this class action. prejudice by appellant no has been suffered as result Thus ruling. of the requiring that the in not
The chancellor also erred proceeding Attorney General be served with notice required by given opportunity Ark. to be heard as and be an Judge e.g., County Roberts, See, Ann. Stat. 34-2510. (1978). County Watts, Clerk, S.W.2d applicable Appellees argue is not to this case that § 34-2510 judgment declaratory action but rather because this not a self-executing pursuant simply constitutional is provision a suit to a money. argu- illegally That to recover exacted seeking is a class action ment overlooks the fact that this *16 512 invalid and and ordinances past present
declare thirteen collections future against injunction seeking permanent on the service requires the statute Since tax. the privilege or to be him to appear but does not require General Attorney is not jurisdic- of service the requirement a party, made Therefore, with the even though noncompliance tional. error, reversal is reversible is generally notice requirement of the notice The purpose the statute. by not mandated being statute from an ordinance or is to prevent requirement not in a which might proceeding declared unconstitutional adjudication. Frequently, complete fully adversary be a this in cases of chooses not to appear General Attorney for the City case the attorneys particular nature. In this trial and in both the exhaustive briefs Little Rock prepared disclose any own research fails to and our courts appellate as to we find no prejudice appellant not Thus argued. points limited to the facts This holding a result of this error. case. particular that the trial court The contends similarly appellant in not requiring operating erred procedurally be pursuant and its made authority parties commissioners The levied the tax Ark. Ann. ordinances Stat. 34-2510. § it is a necessary and technically waterworks against However, on the tax to the the same ordinance passed party. a conduit for merely and thus the waterworks was consumer result, As a the matter is one form of Little Rock. Hence, there is no prejudice and not substance. point. and we do not reverse on this
parties from court. chancery to us on appeal This case comes on the record made we hear cases de novo equity On appeal all issues and below and will resolve generally attempt 556, 587 Green, of them. v. Ark. Ferguson S.W.2d dispose always The court enter such may 18 (1979). appellate court should have entered chancery upon judgment Comm’r. Larey, facts in the record. the undisputed 278, Lines, Southern S.W.2d Continental and that are still collected being taxes (1967). that, addition, as a we are satisfied to be In ought stopped. matter, resources judicial it would be a waste practical discussed above. on the basis of the errors reverse and remand and, because rec- extensively litigated This has been case these tifying procedural matters would not out- affect the merits, come on no would be served purpose reversal. contends no refund be had
Appellant may because Article 13 of the Arkansas Constitution provides only injunctive relief. constitutional provision has been so As narrowly construed. stated correctly concisely in 8 Ark.L.Rev. at supra: Injunctive relief far the most frequent remedy *17 sought by suing when under the auth- complainants XVI, 13; ority Article but it is Section not the only allowed, Suits have been and remedy. to brought, deed; cancel a recover to sums of to have an money; void; ordinance declared to set aside a default judg- ment; action; a appeal quorum court to have an for; accounting of taxes collected not but accounted and so forth. Also it has been that held lies mandamus at the a instance of officers to taxpayer compel with an comply initiated act their and fixing salaries compensation. [Footnotes omitted.] also Appellant contends that the chancellor erred in awarding post-judgment interest. find no The We error. award of interest post-judgment was correct. Ark. Stat. Ann. (Repl. 1979) 29-124 provides judgments shall bear § interest at the rate of 10percent per annum. In this applying statute, this in Shofner, Court Jones, Administrator v. Ark. 350 (1940), S.W.2d stated:
The intent legislative seems been that all judgments should bear interest those except expressly excluded; and since claims estates con- against when verted into are not judgments the rule in- excepted, clusio unius est exlusio alterius . . . applies.
Since judgments against are ex- municipalities not 29-124, cluded in Ark. Stat. Ann. holding requires entered judgment bear interest paid until at the of 10 rate percent annum. per
The in appellant is correct its contention that the full amount the refund should not be personally awarded 446, 100 Moore, appellees. Aswe stated in Laman original plaintiff (1937): nor the “Neither the S.W.2d 971 against judgment personal could recover intervenor taxpayers except appellees benefit of all for the representatives City.” appellees appearing of a as Accordingly, judgment modified to reflect must be class. taxpayers. all for the benefit of that the refund is points not but we do Numerous other are raised disposi- necessary it to decide them because consider tion of the case. designate point appeal appellant did not refunding
system the trial court. which was ordered part part, modified The case is affirmed proceedings which for refund to the trial court remanded opinion. be consistent with shall C.J., Purtle, Adkisson, dissent. J., participating. J., Hays, dissenting. I Justice, Richard B. Chief Adkisson, attorney fee. The sanction denial of the from the *18 dissent applied impropriety. con- No this far exceeds the in case by performed given public this to the service sideration illegal attorney stopping exaction. in the dissenting concurring part, in Justice, Purtle, I. John part. majority opinion for The sets out sufficient facts understanding exception of this the of that clear case with portion relating relationship of the of the record to t^ie appellees’ attorney appellant feel and the in this case. I the majority quoted part the record where should that attorney appellees present the for the in the case offered give city attorney Phillips the v. file back to the Weeks might subject because he feared it become the of a motion Henry’s testimony disqualify. Part of Mr. was: Phillips Magruder the he didn’t want Mr. told us keep it, it would file back and that if we would Weeks disqualify. any motion to never serve as a basis for pbinted which the the ordinances be out all of It should the approval attorney claims were enacted with appellant being than the same ordinances were more Henry nothing the decided to city times. when Every reenacted several year the ante and required larger this tax levy illegal they upped Commission, is a tool in the which Water Works payment by Rock, of Little City the hands of the Directors of City Also, it in mind that the ultimate Arkansas. should be kept this tax were parties responsible payment of Little Rock City the customers Water Works Commission. in the private for the attorney engaged
The appellant and consent of with the full knowledge of law practice Rock. He later of Little of Directors for Board had they refund monies suit to force the city instituted a contend it is unfair They from the public. collected illegally while he was an assistant knowledge he such gained because an adverse interest. which now constitutes city attorney and are The ordinances records public Nonsense! in order that the newspapers actually published them. become aware of might public I have no doubt for the present attorney feels that he appellant has misled attorney because he Henry has been forced by the board back of directors to down on his word that the v. Weeks case Phillips would never be used to him. disqualify board’s of the is that it is none of the truth matter $500,000 to whether David receives Henry
business as $5 city. is not from the pockets in this case. It coming have been ordered they for the refund city only respnsible Therefore, standing have no they argue to make. allowed the chancellor is a part The fee point. and his associates. Henry made efforts of Mr. recovery concerned, has acted David attorney Henry So far as I am *19 in this entire matter. with the and frankness honesty utmost he backed down on cannot be said of him that Certainly, it with the recover are satisfied his word. If those who the funds allowed, should be allowed. amount fee then it attorney’s of these rights to defeat Certainly, city attempted Now it whatsoever. anything same from people collecting looks to me like a case sour grapes. in the same fee proportion the attorney’s would reduce
I him the and allow is reduced of the recovery the amount court, his clients do the trial provided authorized 25% object. Rehearing on Denial
Dissenting Opinion 17, 1983 January delivered I would dissenting. grant Purtle, I. Justice, John attor- matter of the appellant’s in the for rehearing petition of interest. no conflict absolutely had attorney fee. The ney of honor. broke its word obviously Rock of Little City deny this court majority persuaded further City work, his whatsoever compensation attorney any and retalia- spite pure smacks which action chill majority the intent of it were tion. If class actions against undertaking from attorneys discourage successful. eminently unit then the opinion governmental in the which we committed the wrong We should right the rehearing. I would grant initial opinion. & FORD LIFE COMPANY
FORD INSURANCE v. Hon. Olan MOTOR CREDIT COMPANY PARKER, Judge Circuit Jr., S.W.2d 82-147 Arkansas Court Supreme December delivered Opinion