CITY OF LaPORTE, Texas, Petitioner, v. William BARFIELD, Respondent. CITY OF LaPORTE, Texas, Petitioner, v. Allen Ray PRINCE, Respondent.
Nos. D-3733, D-3836.
Supreme Court of Texas.
April 27, 1995.
Rehearing Overruled June 8, 1995.
898 S.W.2d 288
Argued Nov. 4, 1993.
The trial court appointed an attorney ad litem for the minor child. The ad litem filed a claim for gross negligence on behalf of the child against her father‘s employer, Cedar Creek Fabricators. By the time the ad litem filed the claim, however, the statute of limitations had run for Graciela Sanchez to file her own gross negligence action against the employer.
The court held a hearing on May 1, 1990 to consider a settlement agreement with one of the defendants and Hastings’ motion to be designated lead counsel representing the minor child. During arguments before the bench, the attorneys discussed the fact that Hastings may have had a conflict of interest in representing both Sanchez and Cedar Creek Fabricators. Sanchez was present in the courtroom during the hearing.
The trial court rendered the final judgment against the defendants in the wrongful death lawsuit on August 29, 1990. In October 1990, Sanchez contacted the ad litem, who explained to her the possibility of a claim against her attorneys for malpractice. On August 28, 1992, Graciela Sanchez filed the present lawsuit against Hastings and his firm.
The defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that limitations ran from the May 1, 1990, and therefore barred Sanchez‘s cause of action. Sanchez‘s response asserted among other things that limitations should be tolled during the pendency of the wrongful death litigation, citing Hughes v. Mahaney & Higgins, 821 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. 1991). The trial court granted a summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the ground that the two-year statute of limitations had run.
In Hughes, we held that “when an attorney commits malpractice in the prosecution or defense of a claim that results in litigation, the statute of limitations on the malpractice claim against the attorney is tolled until all appeals on the underlying claim are exhausted.” Id. at 157. The holding in Hughes necessarily tolls limitations during the trial court proceedings.
Our holding in Hughes was based in part on the policy that a client should not be forced to take inconsistent positions in the underlying litigation and the malpractice action, thereby jeopardizing success in both. Id. The policy in Hughes applies here. A client such as Sanchez should not be forced to assert a claim against her lawyer for failure to add all tortfeasors prior to concluding the litigation against the defendants who were sued. A contrary rule would jeopardize the client‘s claims against the remaining defendants. Moreover, if the client must carefully scrutinize every stage of the case for possible missteps it would erode the trust between client and lawyer necessary for the successful prosecution of litigation.
We hold that the statute of limitations for malpractice for failure to sue a tortfeasor is tolled until litigation has concluded against other tortfeasors liable for the same indivisible injury. Accordingly, a majority of this Court grants Sanchez‘s application for writ of error and, without hearing oral argument, reverses the judgment of the court of appeals and remands this cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Dale W. Felton, Houston, Timothy Andrew Hootman, La Porte, for respondent.
HECHT, Justice, delivered the opinion of the Court, in which PHILLIPS, Chief Justice, HIGHTOWER, CORNYN, GAMMAGE, ENOCH, SPECTOR and OWEN, JJ., join.
By statute, a person may not discharge or discriminate against an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim in good faith or hiring legal representation in such a claim.
I
William Barfield was employed by the City of La Porte as a paint-and-body repairman. He was injured in 1983 and after several weeks returned to work, restricted to lifting no more than fifteen pounds. He filed for and received workers’ compensation benefits. His injury was aggravated in 1986, and he again claimed compensation. Fourteen months later, in early 1988, the City terminated his employment. Barfield sued the City for actual and punitive damages, alleg
Allen Ray Prince was employed by the City of La Porte as a sewer lift-station operator. He, too, was injured in 1983, undergoing hernia repair surgery as a result. Prince claimed compensation benefits, which the City‘s carrier denied. Before he was released to return to work, his department superintendent fired him. Later that year Prince sued the City, claiming he was discharged in retaliation for filing a compensation claim. The City contended that Prince was fired for incapacity and misconduct toward other employees. The case was tried in late 1991, nearly eight years after it was filed. The jury found in Prince‘s favor and assessed actual damages at $100,000. The jury also found that the City was grossly negligent, that such conduct was imputed directly to its governing body, and that punitive damages of $1 million should be assessed. The trial court rendered judgment against the City for damages and interest totaling $1,235,177.82. A divided court of appeals affirmed, holding as in Barfield that the City‘s immunity has been waived. City of La Porte v. Prince, 851 S.W.2d 876 (Tex.App.—Waco 1993).
The Texarkana Court of Appeals followed its Barfield decision in Vaughan v. Roy H. Laird Memorial Hospital, 856 S.W.2d 256 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1993, no writ). The Dallas Court of Appeals reached the opposite conclusion in Classen v. Irving Healthcare System, 868 S.W.2d 815 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1993), rev‘d, 898 S.W.2d 300 (Tex.1995) (per curiam). To the extent that Vaughan conflicts with our decision in this case, we disapprove that opinion.
II
A
A city is immune from liability for its governmental actions, unless that immunity is waived. City of Round Rock v. Smith, 687 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tex.1985); see City of Austin v. Daniels, 160 Tex. 628, 335 S.W.2d 753, 754 (1960). As Barfield and Prince concede, the hiring and firing of city employees is clearly a governmental function. See City of Dallas v. Moreau, 718 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1986, writ ref‘d n.r.e.); see also Town of S. Padre Island v. Jacobs, 736 S.W.2d 134, 144 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1987, writ denied) (quoting Moreau). Therefore, the City of La Porte is immune from liability for the retaliatory termination claims of Barfield and Prince unless that immunity has been waived.
“[T]he waiver of governmental immunity is a matter addressed to the Legislature.” Guillory v. Port of Houston Auth., 845 S.W.2d 812, 813 (Tex.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ---, 114 S.Ct. 75, 126 L.Ed.2d 43 (1993); Lowe v. Texas Tech Univ., 540 S.W.2d 297, 298 (Tex.1976). “It is a well-established rule that for the Legislature to waive the State‘s sovereign immunity, it must do so by clear and unambiguous language.” Duhart v. State, 610 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Tex. 1980); accord Welch v. State, 148 S.W.2d 876, 879 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1941, writ ref‘d); Texas Prison Bd. v. Cabeen, 159 S.W.2d 523, 527-528 (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont 1942, writ ref‘d). The same rule applies, of course, to the waiver of immunity for other governmental entities. See, e.g., Mount Pleasant Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Estate of Lindburg, 766 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tex.1989). Thus, we must determine whether the Legislature has by clear and unambiguous language waived municipal immunity for the retaliatory termination claims made in these cases. Unless it has done so, the City is entitled to prevail.
One might suppose that this determination would be a relatively easy matter, and it would be, of course, had the Legislature ever stated, to take one extreme, that
With these rules to guide, we examine the history of workers’ compensation as it applies to governmental entities.
B
A few months after the workers’ compensation act was first passed in 1913,1 Assistant Attorney General C.M. Cureton issued an opinion stating that “[t]he Employees’ Compensation Act is not applicable to municipal corporations, and municipal corporations can not become ‘subscribers’ under the act.” Op.Tex.Att‘y Gen. (to the Industrial Accident Board, Sept. 23, 1913), 1912-1914 Tex.Att‘y Gen.Biennial Rep. 437. This opinion was later confirmed by the Commission of Appeals in City of Tyler v. Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass‘n, 288 S.W. 409, 412-413 (Tex.Comm‘n App.1926, holding approved), and its recommendation was adopted by the Supreme Court, presided over by C.M. Cureton, who had by that time become Chief Justice.
In 1936, article III, section 59 was added to the Texas Constitution, authorizing the Legislature to provide workers’ compensation to state employees.2 This amendment did not affect other political subdivisions, however. Op.Tex.Att‘y Gen. No. O-779 (1939); Op.Tex.Att‘y Gen. No. O-5315 (1943); Op.Tex.Att‘y Gen. No. O-5360 (1943). In 1948, article III, section 60 of the Texas Constitution was adopted, authorizing the Legislature to enable counties to provide workers’ compensation,3 and in 1952, article III, section 61 was adopted, making similar provision for cities.4 Finally, in 1962, article III, section 60 was amended to include political subdivisions other than counties, so that it also now applies to cities.5 See generally 1
The Legislature first allowed cities to provide workers’ compensation benefits to their employees in 1969.6 Cities were not required to provide such benefits until 1973.7 This latter provision, which we refer to as the “Political Subdivisions Law“, is now codified as chapter 504 of the Texas Labor Code.8
C
In 1971, two years after cities were permitted to provide compensation benefits to their employees and two years before they were required to do so, the Legislature enacted what we will refer to as the “Anti-Retaliation Law“.9 The provision has never been amended but has since been recodified without substantive change as sections 451.001-.003 of the Texas Labor Code.10 Although the former codification was in effect at all times material to this litigation, since its provisions are substantively identical to the new Labor Code sections, we refer to the latter, which state:
Sec. 451.001. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST EMPLOYEES PROHIBITED. A person may not discharge or in any other manner discriminate against an employee because the employee has:
(1) filed a workers’ compensation claim in good faith;
(2) hired a lawyer to represent the employee in a claim;
(3) instituted or caused to be instituted in good faith a proceeding under Subtitle A [the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act]; or
(4) testified or is about to testify in a proceeding under Subtitle A.
Sec. 451.002. REMEDIES; BURDEN OF PROOF. (a) A person who violates Section 451.001 is liable for reasonable damages incurred by the employee as a result of the violation.
(b) An employee discharged in violation of Section 451.001 is entitled to reinstatement in the former position of employment.
(c) The burden of proof in a proceeding under this section is on the employee.
Sec. 451.003. INJUNCTION. A district court may restrain, for cause shown, a violation of Section 451.001.
Barfield and Prince argue that this statute waives governmental immunity because the word “person” includes governmental entities. Barfield and Prince cite no authority that would directly support their argument as of 1971, when the statute was first adopted. Forbidding retaliation against an employee for seeking monetary benefits under the Worker‘s Compensation Law presupposes that the employer is a subscriber. In 1971, providing compensation to city employees was permitted but not required, and in those circumstances we think it unlikely that the Legislature would have intended to include governmental entities within the scope of the Anti-Retaliation Law. Two other courts have reached this same conclusion, Vaughan, 856 S.W.2d at 258, and Gates v. City of Fort Worth, 567 S.W.2d 871, 873 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1978, writ ref‘d n.r.e.), and no court, including the courts of appeals in the cases before us, has reached a contrary conclusion. While the argument against including political subdivisions as “persons” within the meaning of the 1971 Anti-Retaliation Law is not conclusive, the argument for doing so does not approach the standard that a waiver of governmental immunity be clear and unambiguous.
D
In 1969, a few months before cities were permitted to provide compensation benefits to their employees, the Legislature passed the Texas Tort Claims Act.12 Section 19 of the Act provided: “Any governmental unit carrying Workmen‘s Compensation Insurance or accepting the provisions of the Workmen‘s Compensation Act of the State of Texas shall be entitled to all of the privileges and immunities granted by the Workmen‘s Compensation Act of the State of Texas to private persons and corporations.”13 The provision has since been recodified, without substantive change, as section 101.028 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code.14
The court of appeals in Prince concluded that this provision waives governmental immunity from liability for violations of the Anti-Retaliation Law. The court reasoned that the provision gives governmental entities only those immunities granted by the Workers’ Compensation Act to private persons and corporations, and since the latter are not immune from liability under the Anti-Retaliation Law, neither are governmental entities. The court of appeals in Barfield rejected this argument, and so do we. The flaw in the logic is that the plain language of the provision is a grant of additional privileges and immunities to governmental entities, not a waiver by limitation of those already held. At best, the waiver found by the court in Prince is implicit in section 101.028; it is too tenuous to be clear and unambiguous, as the law requires.
E
As noted above, the Political Subdivisions Law, first enacted in 1973, required governmental entities to provide compensation benefits to their employees. Section 7(a) of the statute authorized local appropriations to pay “all costs, administrative expenses, charges, benefits, insurance, attorney fees, and awards authorized by this article.”15 Section 8 provided that “[t]he political subdivision attorney, his assistants, or outside counsel may represent the political subdivision in the bringing of defense or suits and proceedings in connection with workmen‘s compensation benefits“.16 Expressly contemplating that political subdivisions would be liable for compensation benefits and could be sued on compensation claims, the Political Subdivisions Law clearly and unambiguously waived governmental immunity for such claims.
The 1973 statute “adopted” various provisions of the Workers’ Compensation Act and other statutes, but did not include the Anti-Retaliation Law among them. There is no indication whatever in the statute that immunity from such claims was waived, and we therefore conclude that it was not. As noted above, two other courts have reached this same conclusion. Vaughan, 856 S.W.2d at 258; Gates, 567 S.W.2d at 873.
In 1981, the Legislature amended the Political Subdivisions Law to “adopt” the Anti-Retaliation Law.17 Specifically, section 3 of the amended statute provided in pertinent part:
(a) The following laws as amended or as they may hereafter be amended are adopted except to the extent that they are inconsistent with this article: ...
(5) [the Anti-Retaliation Law], except that if the city provides by Charter or ordinance for ultimate access to the district court for wrongful discharge, [the Anti-Retaliation Law] is not applicable;
...
(b) Provided that whenever in the above adopted laws the words “association,” “subscriber,” or “employer,” or their equivalents appear, they shall be construed to and shall mean “a political subdivision.”
Barfield and Prince argue that these provisions clearly evidence the Legislature‘s intent to waive governmental immunity for claims under the Anti-Retaliation Law.
The intent of Section 3, as amended in 1981, is not crystal clear. Section 3 does not expressly authorize, as it might, actions against governmental entities for violations of the Anti-Retaliation Law. Rather, it “adopts” the Law with a proviso in section 3(b) that certain words shall be construed to include political subdivisions. None of those words, however, appears in the Anti-Retaliation Law, and the operative word “person” in that Law is not defined by section 3(b) to include political subdivisions. Nor is “person” an “equivalent” of “association,” “subscriber,” or “employer“; the latter terms are all persons, but “person” is broader than they are, including, for example, fellow employees as well as the employer and compensation carrier. In sum, the adoption of the Anti-Retaliation Law accompanied by the definitions in section 3(b) does not express a clear intent to waive immunity.
Nevertheless, Barfield and Prince argue that section 3 could have no other purpose but to waive immunity. This, however, is the very sort of putative purpose argument we rejected in Duhart v. State, 610 S.W.2d 740 (Tex.1980). There we construed a statute providing compensation benefits to state highway department employees,18 which “adopted” a provision of the Workers’ Compensation Law preserving a cause of action for exemplary damages for the death of an employee caused by the employer‘s gross negligence or by his intentional act or omission.19 We held that this adoption of a provision of one statute into another did not clearly and unambiguously waive the State‘s immunity from liability for the alleged wrongful death of one of its employees. We reasoned that the exemplary damages provision did not create a cause of action in any event, but only preserved any existing action from preclusion by the Workers’ Compensation Law. As for why the Legislature would have “adopted” the exemplary damages provision in a statute which has as its sole purpose the authorization of compensation claims against the State if it did not also intend to allow such an action against the State, we could only surmise that “[i]t may be that a future Legislature will waive the governmental immunity of the State for exemplary damages.” Id. at 743. Whatever the reason may have been, adoption of the exemplary damages provision was not a clear and unambiguous waiver of immunity.
Barfield and Prince argue that two other statutes construed to waive governmental immunity—specifically, the Wrongful Death Act and the Whistleblower Act—display no clearer intent than the Political Subdivisions Law. Actually, these statutes demonstrate the clarity of intent missing in the Political Subdivisions Law. Under the Wrongful Death Act, a “person” is liable for damages arising from an injury that causes death.
While Duhart forecloses the argument that the adoption of the Anti-Retaliation Law in the Political Subdivisions Law waives immunity, the exception in section 3(a)(5)—“if the city provides by Charter or ordinance for ultimate access to the district court for wrongful discharge“—is a further indication of legislative intent not presented in Duhart. While the relief available by “ultimate access to the district court for wrongful discharge” is not specified, it must be something. The Legislature surely contemplated by this phrase that city employees would have at least a minimal remedy for wrongful discharge. That minimal remedy, we think, must be reinstatement and back pay (subject, of course, to mitigation), for any lesser relief would altogether fail to address the harm of wrongful discharge. Thus it follows that the Legislature conditioned adoption of the Anti-Retaliation Law with respect to a city on its failure to provide for judicial relief of reinstatement and back pay for wrongful retaliation. Now assuming that the Legislature did not waive governmental immunity in the Anti-Retaliation Law, as we have already concluded, it is inconceivable that the Legislature intended to afford cities the option of either voluntarily waiving immunity by making a minimal remedy available by charter or ordinance, or suffering adoption of the Anti-Retaliation Law with no waiver of immunity. Otherwise, a city which chose not to provide “ultimate access to the district court” could thereby escape liability altogether. Why would the Legislature give cities the option of voluntarily waiving immunity or being forced not to waive it? It therefore follows that the Legislature must have intended by the Anti-Retaliation Law
While we can discern no other sensible construction of section 3(a)(5), this reasoning does not require the conclusion that the Legislature intended to waive immunity for all liability by the Anti-Retaliation Law. The Legislature could have intended, of course, to give cities the choice of waiving immunity for minimal relief or suffer a broader waiver, but it could also have intended that the voluntary and forced waivers be coextensive. The rule that a waiver of immunity must be clear and unambiguous applies to both the existence and the extent of the waiver. Absent a clear expression of intent to waive immunity completely, we do not construe section 3(a)(5) to waive immunity for relief other than what cities might themselves elect to provide to avoid application of the Anti-Retaliation Law. We therefore conclude that the Legislature intended by section 3 to waive cities’ immunity from liability for reinstatement and back pay for violations of the Anti-Retaliation Law.
Our analysis is consistent with our opinion in Texas Education Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432 (Tex.1994). There we held that because the Declaratory Judgments Act,
G
In 1989, the Legislature amended section 3 of the Political Subdivisions Law to read in pertinent part as follows:
(a) The following provisions of the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act ... are adopted except to the extent that they are inconsistent with this article: ... [The Anti-Retaliation Law is not listed.]
(b) Provided that whenever in the above adopted law the word “employer” appears, it shall be construed to and shall mean “a political subdivision.”
(c) [The Anti-Retaliation Law] is adopted except to the extent it is inconsistent with this article.
(d) A person may not bring an action for wrongful discharge under both [the Anti-Retaliation Law] and [the Whistleblower Act].
(e) Nothing in this Act or the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act ... shall be construed to authorize causes of action or damages against a political subdivision or employee of a political subdivision beyond the actions and damages authorized by the Texas Tort Claims Act....20
As recodified in the Labor Code in 1993, the Law now states in pertinent part:
Sec. 504.002. APPLICATION OF GENERAL WORKERS’ COMPENSATION LAWS; LIMIT ON ACTIONS AND DAMAGES.
(a) The following provisions ... apply to and are included in this chapter except to the extent that they are inconsistent with this chapter:
...
(8) Chapter 451 [the Anti-Retaliation Law].
(b) For purpose of applying the provisions listed by Subsection (a) to this chapter, “employer” means “political subdivision.”
(c) Neither this chapter nor [the Workers’ Compensation Act] authorizes a cause of action or damages against a political subdivision or an employee of a political subdivision beyond the actions and damages authorized by [the Tort Claims Act].
Sec. 504.003. ELECTION OF REMEDIES. A person may not bring an action for wrongful discharge under both [the
Anti-Retaliation Law] and [the Whistleblower Act].21
As noted above, the recodification of the Labor Code was intended by the Legislature to be “without substantive change.”
The court of appeals in Barfield concluded that these provisions of the Political Subdivisions Law are internally conflicting, and we agree.
In the first place, section 504.002(a)(8) of the Labor Code provides that the Anti-Retaliation Law applies to and is included in the Political Subdivisions Law, but section 504.002(b) states that in applying the Anti-Retaliation Law, “employer” means “political subdivision“. As with the 1981 version of the Political Subdivisions Law, “political subdivision” is not equated with “person“, which has always been the operative word of the Anti-Retaliation Law. Absent this equation, it is not entirely clear whether the Legislature intended to prohibit political subdivisions from retaliatory discharge. To complicate matters further, the intended nonsubstantive recodification of these sections in the Labor Code applies section 504.002(b) equating “employer” and “political subdivision” to all provisions in section (a), which include the Anti-Retaliation Law, while the corresponding provision in the 1989 version of the Political Subdivisions Law, section 3(b), does not apply to the Anti-Retaliation Law referenced in section 3(c).
Even more troubling, both the 1989 and 1993 versions of the Political Subdivisions Law provide that neither it nor the Workers’ Compensation Act authorizes actions or damages against governmental entities except to the extent allowed by the Tort Claims Act. The Tort Claims Act would not allow an action for violation of the Anti-Retaliation Law, but it also would not allow a claim for workers’ compensation unless the claim were based on a government employee‘s wrongful or negligent use of a motor-driven vehicle or motor-driven equipment, or on the condition or use of real or tangible personal property.
Finally, both the 1989 and 1993 versions of the Political Subdivisions Law require an election between an action for a violation of the Anti-Retaliation Law and an action for a violation of the Whistleblower Act. Since immunity has clearly been waived for the latter statute, as we noted above, the requirement of an election suggests that immunity is also waived for the former, just as the exception in section 3(a)(5) of the 1981 version suggested a similar waiver. The Anti-Retaliation Law and the Whistleblower Act are not, of course, coextensive, but to the extent they might both apply in a situation, it would make little sense to require an employee to elect between an action barred by immunity and one not barred.
This election-of-remedies provision added to the 1989 version of the Political Subdivisions Law persuades us, in the end, that the Legislature must have intended to waive political subdivisions’ immunity for liability imposed by the Anti-Retaliation Law. For essentially the same reasons that cause us to conclude that the 1981 version of the statute intended a waiver of immunity, we find the same inference equally inescapable in the 1989 version of the statute. Lacking in the later provision, however, is any indication that the waiver should be limited. Unlike the minimal relief cities might afford in section 3(a)(5) of the 1981 statute, the Whistleblower Act alternative in the 1989 statute authorizes actual and punitive damages in addition to reinstatement and back pay.
We conclude that the 1989 Political Subdivisions Law, recodified in 1993, waives immunity from liability for actual damages, as well as for reinstatement and back pay, subject to the limitations of the Tort Claims Act.
H
Finally, as the waiver of immunity is different in the 1981 and 1989 versions of the Political Subdivisions Law, we must decide which applies in the cases before us. Barfield and Prince were both injured on the job and terminated before 1989, but the trial courts in both cases did not render judgment until after 1989. The 1989 statute provides: “The change in law made by this Act applies only to an injury for which the date of injury is on or after the effective date of this Act.”23 With respect to the Anti-Retaliation Law, “injury” is termination or other discriminatory conduct. Accordingly, both cases before us are governed by the 1981 Political Subdivisions Law, which permitted only reinstatement and back pay, but did not limit an award of back pay.
III
In Barfield, the court of appeals reversed the summary judgment rendered for the City and remanded the case for trial. We agree that this is the correct result in the case and thus affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
In Prince, the court of appeals affirmed a judgment awarding $100,000 actual and $1 million punitive damages against the City. For the reasons we have explained, the City is immune from liability for punitive damages and for any actual damages except back pay, subject to mitigation. Prince introduced evidence of damages other than back pay, and the jury was not instructed to confine its consideration to back pay. The City‘s insistence on immunity was, in this case, sufficient to preserve error. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. As the case must be retried, we need not address the other complaints raised by the City concerning the exclusion of deposition testimony and the award of prejudgment interest.
GONZALEZ, Justice, dissenting.
As the Court recognizes, the City of La Porte is immune from liability for the retaliatory discharge of its employees unless that immunity has been waived by the legislature. It may be good public policy to subject governmental entities to liability for retaliating against their employees who file workers compensation claims, but this decision rests solely with the legislature. For the legislature to waive sovereign immunity, it must affirmatively do so by clear and unambiguous language. See Texas Educ. Agency v. Leeper, 893 S.W.2d 432, 447 (Tex.1995) (Gonzalez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Guillory v. Port of Houston Auth., 845 S.W.2d 812, 813 (Tex.1993); Mount Pleasant Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Lindburg, 766 S.W.2d 208, 211 (Tex.1989); Duhart v. State, 610 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Tex.1980). Because the legislature has not met this standard, I would reverse the judgment of the court of appeals
No. D-4597.
Supreme Court of Texas.
April 27, 1995.
Rehearing Overruled June 15, 1995.
Steven J. Williams, Steven J. Williams, P.C., Irving, for petitioner.
Jeff W. Ryan, Charles T. Frazier, and B. Michael Bennett, Cowles & Thompson, Dallas, for respondent.
PER CURIAM.
Carol Classen sued her former employer, Irving Healthcare System, alleging that it discharged her in retaliation for pursuing a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. Such retaliation, if it occurred, would be prohibited by what was then article 8307c,
Today we have decided in City of La Porte v. Barfield, 898 S.W.2d 288 (Tex.1995), that governmental immunity has been waived in part in wrongful discharge cases. For the reasons we have there explained, a majority of this Court grants Classen‘s application for writ of error and without hearing oral argument, reverses the judgment of the court of appeals and remands this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with Barfield.