45 Iowa 196 | Iowa | 1876
Lead Opinion
I. The same question is presented in each of these cases, and involves the validity of the ordinances ,of the several cities, which are plaintiffs in the respective actions, under which wharfage dues are claimed of defendant. It is insisted that these ordinances are in conflict with several provisions of the Constitution of the United States, of the ordinance of 1787, and of the organic law of Wisconsin and Iowa, which forbid a State imposing imposts and duties on imports or exports and duties of tonnage; which forbid the states from regulating or levying taxes upon commerce, and which declare that the Mississsippi river shall be a common highway forever, free to all the citizens of the United States without any tax, duty, impost or toll therefor. Constitution U. S., Art. 1, § § 8, 9, 10, Ordinance 1787, Art. 4; Organic Law Wisconsin Territory, Act April 20, 1836, Sec. 12; Act admitting Iowa into the Union, March 3,1845, Sec. 3.
If the ordinances of the three cities which are brought in question in these actions are in contravention of any of these constitutional or statutory provisions of the United States, they are invalid, and no act or authority done or exercised under them can be supported.
It becomes necessary to inquire first as to the character and nature of the charges or fees called wharfage, which the respective plaintiffs seek in the several actions to recover.
II. It will be observed by an examination of the pleadings in the cases that each city has erected wharves or steamboat landings upon the margin of the- Mississipjji river, within its boundary, for the use of steamboats and other vessels receiving and discharging freight and passengers at such city. The pleadings show in each case that the charges, sought to be recovered under the name of. wharfage, are for the use of
It is very plain that the paved street at which defendant’s boats were landed comes within the designation of a wharf, which is constructed of stone and earth or 'timber, for the convenience of vessels in landing.
Where there is a tide, or where it is demanded by the motion of the water upon which the wharf is built, it extends into the bay or stream. Where there is little variation and sufficient depth of the water, and a smooth surface, the wharf is constructed of stone or timber upon the beach so that the vessel may lie broadside to the shore. As a matter of fact, of which we will take notice, all wharves upon the Mississippi river in this state are constructed in the manner last described. If it be constructed upon, or is an extension of the street into the river, it is none the less a wharf. The answer of defendant'
We are amply justified in holding that the pleadings in each case show that defendant used a wharf in each city constructed and owned by the city for the use and accommodation of steamboats and other vessels.
No objection to the judgments can be well founded on the ground that the petitions in these cases do not claim to recover for the reasonable and just value of the use of the wharves, but for the wharfage fees fixed by the ordinances.
The questions raised in the pleadings involve the validity of the ordinances. It is not claimed that, if confined in their
• It may be remarked in this connection that the danger of fees and charges being levied under ordinances of the character of those involved' in this action, whereby commerce may be affected, is purely imaginary, and does not in fact exist. If. fees be authorized amounting to a tax upon commerce, being beyond just compensation for the use of improved wharves, they cannot be collected. To be valid, they must be within the limits of just compensation.
IY. The question presented for our decision, under the pleadings in these cases, is this: Are the ordinances of the plaintiffs, providing for the collection of wharfage fees for the use of wharves built and owned by the respective cities, in conflict with the provisions of the Constitution and laws of the United States?
■ These provisions are all intended to prohibit the levying of taxes upon the commerce of the country in the way of duties upon exports and imports, and imposts upon "vessels engaged in commerce. The doctrines of the numerous cases,, cited by defendant’s counsel, interpreting these provisions are familiar. Whatever may be regarded as taxes of this character, or may abridge the free use of the Mississippi river by all the citizens of the United States is in conflict with the laws, constitutional and statutory, of the Union. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheaton, 1; Brown v. Maryland, 12 Wheat., 419; Smith v. Turner, 7 How., 283; Simnot v. Dmenport, 22 How., 227; Almy v. California, 24 How., 169; Steamship Co. v. Port Warden, 12 Wal., 204; Peete v. Morgan, 19 Wal., 581; Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wal., 577; Hockley v. Geiagity, 34 N. Y., 332; People v. Raymond, 34 Cal., 492.
"Wharves are necessary or. convenient for vessels engaged in commerce, and when provided, though proper and reasonable charges are required for their use, they aid the prosecution of commerce. A municipal ordinance, therefore, which provides for wharfage fees which are not excessive cannot be regarded as a regulation affecting prejudicially the interests of commerce or the freedom of the river upon which it is constructed.
It cannot be doubted that wharves are not only convenient but necessary for the transaction of business with vessels navigating the river. They are necessary to enable consignees to receive and remove their goods and protect them from loss. The banks and margins of the river are in most cases of clay and alluvion. Goods delivered from vessels upon them in their natural state could not be handled and would be subject to injury on account of their muddy and swampy character. ' We have seen that cities may build wharves and charge for .their use a sum that would be a just compensation. Now unless they have power to compel vessels to land at the wharves, the masters of vessels, in order to escape payment of wharfage fees, may discharge and receive cargoes on the natural banks of the river, to the inconvenience and loss of shippers and consignees. This power is necessary to enable the cities
V. Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wal., 577, is confidently relied upon by defendant to support its claim of exemption from wharfag'e fees provided for by the ordinances of the cities brought in question in these actions. It was decided upon the following facts: The city of New Orleans made an ordinance providing that, “from and after the first day of January, 1853, the levee and wharf dues on all steamboats which moor or land in any part of the city of New Orleans shall be fixed as follows: ten'cents per ton if in port not exceeding five days, and five dollars per day after said five days shall have expired.”
Under this ordinance the action was brought to recover, back money paid by the owner of a steamboat and to enjoin further collection under the ordinance. The United States Supreme Court held the ordinance invalid, regarding the dues collectible under it as a tax, not as compensation for the use of the wharf. This language is used: “ A tax which, by its terms, is due from all vessels arriving and stopping in a port without regard to the place where they may stop, whether it be in the channel of the stream, or out in a bay, or landed at a natural river bank, cannot be treated as a compensation for the use of a wharf.”
In the cases before us- the wharfage fee is charged only against vessels landing or mooring to the wharves or to any vessels at the wharves, or, as in the last case, mooring within one hundred feet of the wharves.
But the controlling point of difference between that case and these now before us, is this: In these it appears that defendant did use the wharves erected by the cities, and there is no claim thatthe wharfage fees sought to be recovered are unreasonable. It does not appear that, in Cannon v. New Orleans,
There are two answers to this objection. The first is that under The City of Diobuque v. Stout, 32 Iowa, 80, the city may control the landing of vessels, fixing places by ordinance or otherwise where they shall receive and discharge freight and passengers. The ordinances in these cases are intended to have the effect of preventing boats, in order to escape charges lawfully made for the use of a wharf, from discharging and' receiving freight at places where no wharves have been constructed,, which would be to the inconvenience and loss of shippers and consignees. ¡
VII. The other answer is this. Statutes which are partly in conflict with the constitution will be held void no farther than as to those parts which are unconstitutional; provisions which are within the limits of legislative authority will be enforced. Santo v. The State, 2 Iowa; 165; Walters v. Steamboat Mollie Dozier, 24 Iowa, 192; The City of Des Moines v. Layman, 21 Iowa, 153; Childs v. Shower, 18 Iowa, 261; High School v. County of Clayton, 9 Iowa, 175; The County of Louisa v. Davison 8 Iowa, 517; The Dist. Tp. of Dubuque v. Dubuque, 7 Iowa, 262; Duncan v. Sigler, Morris, 39.
Oity ordinances, like statutes, will be upheld to the extent of provisions authorizing the exercise of power clearly within the scope of the municipal authority, while other provisions in excess of such authority will be held void. Dillon’s Municipal Corporations, § 354, and notes. But if the parts of the statute or ordinance be necessarily connected and dependent, the whole must fall with the void part.
-The rule must be extended to the case of a statute or ordin
The several ordinances of the respective cities, it is insisted by defendant, authorize the collection of wharfage fees from boats that do not land at the wharves of the cities. This, for the purpose of the argument, may be admitted. They authorize the collection of the fees in cases where boats' use the wharves owned by the cities. The collection of the fees in the first case, it may be here conceded, is not within municipal authority; in'the second case it is not forbidden by the constitution and laws of the United States; it maybe done in the last, but is forbidden in the first.
The doctrines presented in. these views are not infrequently applied to taxation. Where taxes are levied by the same ordinance or act of a corporation, some of.which are not authorized by its charter, these would be void; those within the corporate powers would be valid.
VIII. The point upon which we base our decision in these cases, namely, that the cities under the ordinances may recover for the actual use of improved wharves, was not made nor decided in Cannon v. New Orleans. The question discussed and decided in that case was whether the ordinance of New Orleans, in its full breadth, was valid. The Supreme Court of Louisiana held it valid in its every provision and to its full extent. It was not claimed in the United States Supreme Court that it would be valid against vessels using improved wharves, and void as to vessels landing at the natural bank of the river. We may not inquire why the point raised in these cases was not presented and discussed in that. It is sufficient to know that it was not, and of course no discussion was made thereon. The case is, therefore, not authority against the conclusion we reach, but as we have pointed out is in harmony therewith.
It must be admitted that this constitutional inhibition is directed against taxation and is intended to protect therefrom the cargoes of vessels engaged in commerce. Imports and exports may be subjected to duties by charges levied upon vessels engaged in commerce. This js simply a form of taxation. The constitution, in the clause inhibiting duties upon tonnage, in terms forbids taxes levied in that manner; the word duty means a tax, toll, impost, or custom.
The wharfage fee charged under the city ordinances in question is in no sense a tax. It is a charge made as compensation for the use of the wharves built and maintained for the benefit of vessels engaged in commerce. The distinctions between such a charge and a tax, toll, impost, or custom is too obvious to admit of discussion.
The fact that the wharfage fee is graduated by the tonnage of the vessel does not require' us to regard it as a “duty on tonnage.” The tonnage of the vessels using the wharves of the cities affords a convenient and just measure of the fees charged, which should be varied according to the size of the boats, the larger occupying -more space at the wharves than those of less capacity.
The foregoing discussion disposes of all points presented in the several cases. The judgment in each is
Affirmed.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. — My reasons for dissenting from the foregoing opinion are:
I. The right to recover a reasonable compensation is based on the fact that the boats of the defendant landed at the constructed wharves. There is no count in the petitions basing the right to recover on a quantum, meruit. The theory upon which a recovery is sought is, that the plaintiffs possessed the power to establish and construct wharves; that by ordinance such have been established and constructed, and a compensa
The compulsory use of anything can never be the basis of a reasonable compensation for its use. Under the ordinances the defendant was compelled tó pay just as much if the vessels-were landed anywhere in the city' limits, or anchored in' the stream,- as at the constructed wharf. Whatever might be the rule under proper pleadings as to the recovery of a reasonable compensation, no such question is presented in the record in these cases. '
II. I am unable to distinguish the ordinances in question from that in Cannon v. New Orleans, 20 Wal., 577. The port of New Orleans was twenty miles in length, and the constructed wharf only two; but this fact was not deemed material by the court. If, however, it was of importance, the proportion qf established to constructed wharf in, the Fort Madison case is fully ás great as in the New Orleans case — the established wharf being about two miles and the constructed about six hundred feet.
The ordinances in all the cases constitute the whole city front a wharf, and in one case the wharf extends to the middle of the main channel- of the river, and in another to one hundred feet in front of any public landing. It is not shown in either of these cases along how much of the city front wharves have been constructed. If such wharves extend the whole length of the city front, the plaintiff should have so averred.
The burden was on the plaintiffs to establish such- fact. It does not appear whether the vessel landed at the constructed wharf or not in the New Orleans case. It follows, however, that this circumstance, in the opinion of the court, made no difference, or it would have been alluded to. If the vessel landed, in -the New Orleans case, at the constructed wharf, then, according to the opinion of the majority of this court, the judgment should have been in favor of the city. Evidently this fact, in the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, was not deemed material. It is intimated as the city
I do not impugn the correctness of the rule laid down in Dubuque v. Stout, 32 Iowa, 80; but I do deny that any such consequence as compensation for the use of the wharf follows. That case has nothing whatever to do with the subject under consideration. The decision is based solely on the police power, and has no bearing on the question whether these ordinances are void because in conflict with the Constitution of the United States. Even if wrong in this, I recognize the principle that in this class of questions the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States are conclusive in this court. As I have said, these cases caimot be distinguished from the New Orleans case, and this court is bound thereby.
It.is said in that case “the tax is therefore collectible for vessels which land at any point on the banks of the river, without regard to the existence of wharves.” The same result must follow in the cases at bar, for the facts and purport of the ordinances are identical.
It is also said in that case: “ The tax is also the same for a vessel which is moored in any part of the port of New Orleans, whether she ties up to a wharf or not, or is located at the shore or in the middle of the river.” Here, again, the same result must follow, for the ordinances in this respect are identical.
It is further said in that case: “ A tax which by its terms is due from all vessels arriving and stopping in a port, without regard to the place where they may stop, whether it be in the channel pf the stream, or out in the bay, or landed at a natural river bank, cannot be treated as a compensation for the use of a wharf.” Here, again, the cases at bar fulfill exactly all the conditions and limitations above stated. In the opinion of the majority of the court stress is laid on that portion of the opinion in the New Orleans case which intimates that a reasonable compensation may be recovered for the use of a con
If, under the police power, vessels may be required to land at the constructed wharf, and the right to compensation follows because of this compulsory use, then the Constitution of the United States is but a rope of sand, and vessels engaged in commerce on the navigable waters of the country are at the mercy of every municipality located on the borders of the stream. Such power might be so exercised as to annihilate and destroy the commerce of the Mississippi river.
It is maintained that one part of the ordinances may be held valid even though another portion be void. While I concede there is such a rule, I deny its application to the ordinances in question, for the reason that there is but a single subject matter contemplated thereby. There is- nothing said as to constructed wharves or any charge made for landing vessels thereat. Nor do they contain two separate prohibitions relating to dilferent acts with distinct penalties for each. I am, therefore, unable to see how one part can be held valid when another part is void, or rather how the subject matter can be separated or divided by judicial construction, when the ordinances detine and contemplate but a single subject matter as a distinct whole: The length of this dissent forbids that I should further enlarge on this subject. In my opinion the judgment of the court below should be reversed.