78 Mo. App. 8 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1899
The defendant was prosecuted and convicted on an information which charged him with violating section 1 of ordinance number 902 of plaintiff city by “then and there unlawfully and willfully carrying on and engaging in the occupation, business and trade of operating a foundry and selling miners’ supplies at a certain stand and place occupied by him for that purpose,” etc. The ordinance charged in the information to have been violated provided that, “an occupation tax should be collected on foundries and machine shops of forty dollars per annum, and on dealers in miners’ supplies of thirty-two dollars per annum.” It further provided a penalty for engaging in any business, trade or occupation without first having paid such occupation tax. The defendant assails the judgment on the ground that the charter of the plaintiff city did not
It is a well recognized rule of the law that the meaning of a word is or may be known by the accompanying words. There is also a further kindred rule that where several particulars are named, followed by a more generic term, it is considered, that the more generic term intends only other things ejusdem generis, or of the like kind. St. Louis v. Laughlin, 49 Mo. 559; Commonwealth v. Dejardin, 126 Mass. 46; Harlow v. Tufts, 4 Cush. 448. The words “manufacturing corporations” are general and not specific. No
It seems clear to us that the words of the grant do not authorize a city of the third class to levy a tax on natural persons engaged in the manufacturing business. They only authorize the imposition of such tax on corporate entities engaged in manufacturing. No good reason is seen for this discrimination, yet we are justified by the expression of the legislature in concluding that it was so intended.
The judgment must be reversed.