169 Ind. 645 | Ind. | 1908
Appellee instituted this suit against appellants, to enjoin the collection of certain taxes based on an assessment made against said company by the State Board of Tax Commissioners. Appellants appeal from an order granting a temporary injunction.
We shall attempt to give only an abstract of such of the facts -which the verified complaint discloses as appear pertinent in disposing of the case. In 1887 a corporation was organized in this State to construct and own a bridge and approaches thereto between the city of Louisville, Kentucky, and the city of Jeffersonville, Indiana. A corporation was also organized in Kentucky with authority .to construct a bridge between said cities, and subsequently, by virtue of an act of the legislature of the latter state, the franchises, interests and properties of the two companies were consolidated under the corporate name of the Louisville & Jeffersonville Bridge Company, the appellee herein. After 'the consolidation appellee became the owner of an iron or steel bridge located across the Ohio river at the point aforesaid, forty-eight-hundredths of a mile in length, of which forty-four-hundredths of a mile is in Kentucky and four-hundredths of a mile is in Indiana. The approaches to said bridge consist of iron or steel viaducts; the approach from
Upon the hearing appellee introduced in evidence, in addition to the verified complaint, the affidavit of an officer of said company. The portions of said affidavit which it is material to set out are as follows: “Affiant states that the city of Louisville had a population at the census of 1900 of 205,000. The properties of the Louisville & Jeffersonville Bridge Company are, and have been since affiant’s connection /therewith, used by two railroads, to wit, the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Company, and the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company. The traffic of the first company, which is familiarly known as the Big Pour, comes into Louisville across the bridge. The traffic of the other company, commonly called the C. & O., comes into Louisville over .the tracks of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company, between Louisville and Lexington, and does not-pass over the bridge at all, but, as will be noted from the maps herein referred to, connects with the terminals of the Louisville & Jeffersonville Bridge Company at their west end, which is far remote'from the connection of the bridge approach with the aforesaid terminals at their east end. Both the Big Pour and the C. & O. use a freight-house, which is in Louisville, on the north side of Main street between
It appears that the consolidated corporation, the Louisville & Jeffersonville Bridge Company, is not only the owner of a bridge and the approaches thereto, together with a railroad track across said bridge and approaches, but also that it is in fact the owner of a terminal' railroad, having its own rolling stock, furnishing terminal facilities for two lines of railroad in the city of Louisville, and, in the nature of things, affording facilities for the interchange of traffic between said railroads. Section 10236, supra, requires ‘ ‘ every person, company or corporation owning, managing, operating or constructing a railroad” to make return to the State Board of Tax Commissioners for the purposes of taxation. Considering appellee’s enterprise as a whole, it was in fact the owner and operator of a railroad, and was therefore within the scope of the statute which requires every person, company and corporation owning or operating a railroad to make return of its property to the State Board of Tax' Commissioners. No question of corporate power is involved in this proceeding. As this bridge company was in fact the owner of and operating a railroad, it was its duty so to return its property. Notwithstanding the character of appellee’s corporate organization, its enterprise was such as to bring it fully within the term “railroad;” its bridge holding was but an adjunct of its railroad property. The proposition we
Counsel for appellee claim that §10167, supra, contains an apposite provision for the making of the assessment by the local authorities, and that therefore the provisions of said section should be regarded as controlling. That section may
The trial court is directed to dissolve the temporary injunction heretofore granted. .
The interlocutory order granting a temporary injunction is reversed, and the court directed to overrule the motion therefor, and for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.