The issue before us is whether providing cell phone services 1 in the City of Springfield (“Springfield”) 2 makes a company subject to a local tax ordinance on businesses who engage in “supplying telephones, and telecommunications and telephonic service, and telecommunications services, within the city.” 3 Springfield Code § 70-452 (2000). The district court 4 granted Springfield’s request for declaratory judgment and held that the defendants, Alltel Communications, Inc. (“Alltel”), Cingular Wireless LLC, and Southwestern Bell Wireless, LLC (Cingu-lar and Southwestern Bell hereinafter referred to as “Cingular”), provide telephonic services within Springfield and are therefore subject to the tax. The district court dismissed Springfield’s tax collection claim under Missouri’s exclusive tax remedy doctrine because Springfield must follow its own tax assessment and collection procedures before bringing suit to collect the tax. Because we conclude that Springfield’s request for a declaratory judgment on the issue of liability was properly before the district court and that a cell phone is a telephone and cell phone services are telephonic services for purposes of Springfield’s tax ordinance, we affirm.
I. Background
Springfield has a long-standing ordinance that imposes a 6% tax on the gross receipts of any business that supplies telephone and telephonic service within Springfield. This ordinance was modified in 2000 as part of a recodification that changed section numbers, clarified existing language, and made the code electronically *598 searchable. The 2000 recodification of the tax ordinance added “telecommunications” and “telecommunications services” to the existing language in the ordinance. Springfield Code § 70-452.
In 2004, Springfield sent a demand letter to cell phone companies that did business within Springfield requesting payment of the tax for the past five years and indicating that if no action was taken, Springfield would pursue legal remedies. 5 The defendants did not comply, and Springfield brought this suit in federal district court to collect the past-due taxes.
Springfield’s complaint sought collection of the tax owed. Springfield filed a motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether the defendants were liable to pay the tax, which the district court and the parties treated as a request for a declaratory judgment on the issue of liability. The defendants argued that they provide “Commercial Mobile Radio Service” (“CMRS”), and therefore the tax does not apply to them. The defendants also challenged the validity of the ordinance. On June 9, 2005, the district court held that the term “telephone” in the tax ordinance encompasses CMRS and that the defendants offer these services within Springfield and are therefore subject to the tax.
City of Jefferson v. Cingular Wireless, LLC,
No. 04-4099,
On August 21, 2006, Alltel filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or, in the alternative, that the district court abstain from deciding the case. On October 17, 2006, the district court denied the motion to dismiss on the legal issue of liability, but dismissed Springfield’s claim for tax collection without prejudice, concluding that because Springfield had an exclusive administrative remedy for tax assessment and collection, it was required to follow that procedure.
City of Jefferson v. Cingular Wireless, LLC,
No. 04-4099,
Alltel then argued that it had not been given a fair opportunity to litigate the propriety of the request for declaratory judgment. The district court vacated
City of Jefferson I
and
City of Jefferson II
and allowed Springfield to amend its complaint to add a claim for declaratory judgment on the issue of liability.
6
Count I of the sec
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ond amended complaint requested past-due taxes from the defendants. Count III sought a declaratory judgment that the tax ordinance applies to the defendants. Alltel filed a motion to dismiss the second amended complaint. On July 3, 2007, the district court dismissed Count I without prejudice as to all defendants and denied the motion to dismiss Count III.
City of Jefferson v. Cingular Wireless, LLC,
No. 04-4099,
Also on July 3, 2007, the district court entered another order, which held that the tax is enforceable against the defendants because it applies to cell phone services provided within Springfield.
City of Jefferson v. Cingular Wireless, LLC,
No. 04-04099,
II. Jurisdiction, Exhaustion, and Abstention
Alltel asserts that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under Missouri’s exclusive tax remedy doctrine and exhaustion doctrine, that the constitutional justiciability requirements of ripeness and standing were not met, that Springfield failed to state a claim, and that even if the district court had jurisdiction, it should have abstained.
Our resolution of this case requires us to interpret Missouri law.
We review the district court’s interpretation of state law de novo. We are bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court of Missouri in interpreting Missouri law. Because the Supreme Court of Missouri has not yet addressed this precise issue, we must determine what that court would probably hold if it were called upon to decide the issue. In making this determination a federal court may consider relevant state precedents, analogous decisions, considered dicta, scholarly works, and any other reliable data tending convincingly to show how the highest court in the state would decide the issue.
Missouri v. City of Glasgow,
*600 A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
It is undisputed that the parties are diverse and that more than $75,000 is in controversy. Furthermore, we note that Cingular believes that the district court properly exercised its jurisdiction in this case. Alltel’s argument that the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction rests on the assertion that a Missouri state court would not have jurisdiction to hear this case under the Missouri exclusive tax remedy doctrine and the doctrine of administrative exhaustion, with the result that, pursuant to
Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins,
1. Missouri’s Exclusive Tax Remedy Doctrine
The Missouri exclusive tax remedy doctrine requires a taxing authority to follow its tax assessment and collection procedures before a tax collection claim can be brought in court.
City of St. Louis v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis,
Alltel’s assertion that a Missouri court would have to dismiss Springfield’s claim for declaratory judgment is unfounded because the doctrine does not apply to Springfield’s claim. Because there is no established precedent indicating that Springfield’s claim for declaratory judgment may not be heard until after the administrative procedures for tax assessment and collection have been completed, we conclude that the doctrine would not require a Missouri court to dismiss Springfield’s claim for declaratory judgment. This conclusion is supported by several cases in which Missouri courts have considered the legal issue of the validity or the applicability of a tax ordinance without requiring the exhaustion of administrative assessment and collection procedures.
See Council House Redev. Corp. v. Hill,
Alltel asserts that any case in which a taxpayer requested a declaratory judgment that it was not subject to a tax ordinance is inapposite because, in the case before us, Springfield is the entity seeking a declaratory judgment and is thereby attempting to avoid its own administrative procedures. We disagree. If, under the exclusive tax remedy doctrine, Missouri courts will address the pure legal issue of whether a tax applies in a particular situation before the parties complete the ad
*602
ministrative tax assessment and collection procedures, it should not matter which party is seeking the declaratory judgment. Furthermore, we note that completing the administrative procedures in this case would be time-consuming, expensive, and ultimately unnecessary if the ordinance is held to not apply to the defendants. Additionally, the pure legal issue involved in this case is more suited for judicial determination than for administrative determination.
See State Tax Comm’n v. Admin. Hearing Comm’n,
2. Administrative Exhaustion Doctrine
Alltel’s remaining arguments regarding subject matter jurisdiction, justici-ability,
9
failure to state a claim, and abstention all rest on the contention that Springfield failed to exhaust its administrative remedies.
See Premium Standard Farms, Inc. v. Lincoln Twp. of Putnam County,
Furthermore, in the absence of any tax collection claim, no factual disputes remained, nor was the district court required to make any classifications or value determinations.
11
Instead, Springfield’s request for a declaratory judgment presented the court with an issue of statutory interpretation. Such questions present pure legal issues and therefore satisfy an exception to the general exhaustion of remedies rule.
Premium Std. Farms,
3. Tax Injunction Act
Alltel raises the application of the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341, which presents a question of subject matter jurisdiction.
See Burris v. City of Little Rock,
(1) to eliminate disparities between taxpayers who could seek injunctive relief in federal court—usually out-of-state corporations asserting diversity jurisdiction—and taxpayers with recourse only to state courts, which generally required taxpayers to pay first and litigate later; and (2) to stop taxpayers, with the aid of a federal injunction, from withholding large sums, thereby disrupting state government finances.
Hibbs v. Winn,
Alltel’s citation to
Orange County v. Expedia, Inc.,
is neither controlling nor persuasive.
See
We find more persuasive the reasoning in
Mayor & City Council of Balt. v. Vonage Am. Inc.,
in which a district court was faced with a situation similar to the one before us today. See
B. Abstention
With regard to its abstention claim, Alltel cites
Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of Am.,
for the proposition that even if a district court has jurisdiction to enter a declaratory judgment, it is not required to exercise that jurisdiction.
See
Alltel also argues that the district court should have abstained under
Burford v. Sun Oil Co.
because timely and adequate state review was available and the case involves difficult questions of state law and public policy.
See
III. Springfield’s Tax Ordinance
Alltel and Cingular argue that the district court erred in granting Springfield’s motion for summary judgment because cell phone services are not telephonic services. Alltel contends that the district court erred by not strictly construing Springfield’s authority to tax “telephone companies” and by not strictly construing the terms “telephones” and “telephonic services” in the tax ordinance itself. Cingular asserts that it provides telecommunications services, not telephonic services, and that the district court erred by ignoring the 2000 modification of the tax ordinance and applying the language of the pre-2000 version. Defendants further argue that they are not subject to the tax on “telecommunications services” because Springfield’s Charter grants it the authority to tax “telephone companies,” not “telecommunications companies,” and the 2000 re-codification of the tax ordinance violated the Hancock Amendment. In the alternative, the defendants argue that the tax ordinance is ambiguous and therefore must be construed in favor of the defendants.
We review
de novo
a district court’s grant of summary judgment.
Med. Liab. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Alan Curtis LLC,
A. The Plain Language of Springfield’s Tax Ordinance
Section 70-452 of the Springfield Code states that “[e]very person
*606
engaged in the business of supplying telephones, and telecommunications and telephonic service, and telecommunications services, within the city shall pay as a license tax a sum equal to six (6) percent of the gross receipts from such business.” The ordinance does not define the terms “telephones,” “telecommunications,” “telephonic services,” or “telecommunications services.” To ascertain the meaning of a city ordinance, we utilize the same rules of construction applied to statutes.
Neske v. City of St. Louis,
The Springfield Code does not explicitly define the term “telephone.” The use of the term throughout the Code, however, provides some insight into its intended meaning.
See Crum v. Vincent,
It is also true that some provisions in the Springfield Code refer to telephones and their accompanying wires or cables. For instance, section 98-46(b) specifies the proper placement of “underground telephone cables, junction boxes and appurtenances thereto.” See also Springfield, Mo., Code §§ 70-481, 70-482. It does not necessarily follow, however, that because some telephones have wires or cables, certain aspects of which are regulated by Springfield, those devices that do not have wires or cables are not telephones.
The word “telephonic” appears in only two Articles of the Code. Once in Article XI, which contains the tax ordinance at issue in this case, and secondly in Article Y related to underground facility safety and damage prevention. Neither use suggests *607 that the definition of the term is limited to land-line telephones.
Because the Springfield Code does not explicitly define the terms “telephone” or “telephonic services,” we also look to the dictionary definition of these statutory terms to determine their ordinary meanings.
See Schumacher v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp.,
The 1999 edition of Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines “telephonic” as “of, relating to, or conveyed by a telephone.” Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1211 (10th ed.1999). The definition of “telephonic” in other dictionaries is substantially the same. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, for instance, defines “telephonic” as “conveying sound to a distance,” or “of or relating to the telephone,” or “carried or conveyed by telephone.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2350 (1981).
Applying Missouri’s rules of statutory construction, we conclude that the plain language of the tax ordinance makes it clear that the ordinance was intended to cover all telephonic services, regardless of the type of technology used to provide the services. Cell phones are commonly described as telephones and are used to accomplish the same function and purpose as a land-line telephone. 12 Both devices convert voice and other sound signals into a form that can be transmitted to remote locations, both devices receive and reconvert waves into sound signals, and a cell phone resembles a telephone.
Admittedly, cell phones have newer and more advanced features than the telephones commonly used when the tax ordinance was first enacted. Nevertheless,
*608
nothing about the term “telephonic” in the tax ordinance is limited to the technology generally used to operate telephones in 1944. In fact, cases dating back to pre-1944 which discuss telephones and telephone systems describe them in terms of their purpose and not with regard to the type of technology used to operate them.
See Gilpin v. Savage,
B. Extrinsic Evidence
Even if we believed the tax ordinance was ambiguous, however, we would conclude that extrinsic evidence supports the conclusion that Springfield intended the original language of the ordinance to cover services such as cell phone services, that the ordinary meaning of the term “telephone” includes cell phones, and that cell phone services are telephonic services.
The defendants describe their products as telephones and their services as telephonic services.
See City of St. Louis v. Miss. River Fuel Corp.,
Although there is no case law specifically addressing Springfield’s tax ordinance, the Missouri courts have recently discussed issues related to the question before us today. In
City of Sunset Hills v. Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc.,
the Missouri Court of Appeals concluded that Southwestern Bell, a provider of cellular communication services, is a telephone company for purposes of the Sunset Hills’ Charter authorizing it to tax telephone companies.
Cases from other jurisdictions also support the conclusion that the ordinary definition of “telephone” includes cell phones and that a cell phone company is a telephone company.
See Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n,
The cases cited by the defendants in which cell phone companies have been
*610
found to be something other than telephone companies are distinguishable. For example, Alltel’s citation to an order from the Administrative Law Court in South Carolina for the proposition that Alltel is not a “telephone company” is not instructive.
See Alltel Commc’ns, Inc. v. S.C. Dep’t of Revenue,
Nos. 07-ALJ-17-0299-CC through 07-ALJ-17-0304-CC (Apr. 22, 2008) (order granting Petitioners’ motion for summary judgment). In that case, the parties stipulated that “[tjelephones and telephone companies transmit intelligence over a vast network of wires located in public rights of way and in easements over private property.”
Id.
at 10, ¶ 50. The parties also stipulated that Alltel did not have any facilities located in public rights of way.
Id.
at 10, ¶ 51. As a result, the court’s conclusion that Alltel did not meet the definition of a telephone company does not compel a similar conclusion in the present case because that definition is of no binding effect here. The citation to a Missouri Administrative Hearing Commission decision from 1982 is also unhelpful.
See Mobile Radio Commc’ns, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue,
No. RS-79-0199,
Likewise, Cingular’s citation to a Massachusetts case does not further its position.
See Bell Atl. Mobile of Mass. Corp., Ltd. v. Comm’r of Revenue,
We acknowledge that tax ordinances are to be strictly construed and that if there is any doubt about the applicability of the tax, it must be resolved in favor of the taxpayer.
See Morton v. Brenner,
Alltel contends that the appropriate standard is not whether “telephonic services” is broad enough to cover CMRS but whether reasonable minds can differ on the question of whether CMRS constitutes telephonic services. Springfield’s authority to tax “telephones” and “telephonic services” is not at issue, however, and we conclude that the application of the tax to the defendants is clear. The fact that Alltel can present an argument that the ordinance is susceptible to more than one interpretation does not mean that the ordinance is ambiguous.
See J.B. Vending Co., Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue,
C. The 2000 Recodification of the Springfield Code
The defendants argue that the 2000 modification of the tax ordinance must be given some effect. Cingular contends that it provides “telecommunications” services and that the definitions of telephonic services and telecommunications services are mutually exclusive. Furthermore, both defendants argue that they are not subject to the tax under the telecommunications language in the ordinance because Springfield’s Charter authorized it to tax only telephone companies, and not telecommunications companies, and the 2000 modification of the ordinance violated the Hancock Amendment.
When the legislature amends a statute, we presume its intent was to change the existing law or to accomplish some legislative purpose.
Hagan v. Dir. of Revenue,
The Code contains several references to “telecommunications” and “telecommunications services.” Section 100-2.43 defines “telecommunications” as “the transmission, between or among points specified by the user, of information of the user’s choosing (e.g. data, video, and voice), without change in the form or content of the information sent and received regardless of the technology used.” See also The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 153(43) (using substantially the same definition).
The 1999 edition of Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary defines “telecommunication” as “communication at a distance (as by telephone).” Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 1211 (10th ed.1999). “Telecommunication” has also been defined as “communication at a distance (as by cable, radio, telegraph, telephone, or television).” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2349 (1981).
Given these definitions, we conclude that cell phone services could be considered both telephonic services and telecommunications services. Cell phones are telephonic, as discussed above. Cell phones may also be telecommunications devices under the definition in the Springfield Code and the ordinary definition of the term because they transmit information, including voice, data, and in the case of some newer cell phones, video. Thus, the terms used in the tax ordinance are not necessarily mutually exclusive and there is no merit to the argument that cell phones are telecommunications devices and therefore cannot be taxed as telephonic devices.
This brings us to Cingular’s argument that the 2000 modification must have had some purpose, to which we must give effect.
See Schoemehl v. Treasurer of Mo.,
The record indicates that Springfield’s recodification of § 70-452 in 2000 was not intended to be a substantive change to the scope of the ordinance. The modification occurred as part of a complete update of the Springfield Code, the purpose of which was to create an electronically searchable version thereof, eliminate inconsistencies or unclear provisions of the Code, and to identify ordinances of questionable enforceability, expired language, duplications and conflicts with state or federal law. The modification process was conducted by a private company and was specifically *613 intended to create “non-substantive” changes in the Code unless needed to be internally consistent or consistent with state or federal law. Mary Mannix, Springfield’s Assistant Director of Finance and Comptroller, testified in her deposition that “We viewed [the recodification] as a modernization of the language.” She testified further that “Anything that was a substantial change to what the ordinances that existed at the time that this was codified would have been covered by a separate city council ordinance at that time.” Nancy Yendes, a Springfield city attorney, testified that the tax ordinance was not brought before the Council separately and that no one working for Springfield was aware of the updated language in the tax ordinance until after the Council approved the recodification of the entire Code. In sum, this evidence reveals that the modification of the tax ordinance was not intended to be, and was not viewed as, a substantive change to the scope of the ordinance.
The record also indicates that prior to the 2000 modification, Springfield interpreted the tax ordinance as applying to cell phone services. The original ordinance, enacted in 1944, included the phrase “telephonic services,” a phrase that, despite Cingular’s argument to the contrary, is broader than the term “telephone.” As indicated by the definitions of these terms analyzed above, “telephonic” means something that is related to a telephone, which necessarily includes items or services that are not the physical telephone itself. The record also indicates that Springfield interpreted the tax ordinance to apply to cell phones before 2000. Yendes testified that she believed the term “telephonic” is broader than “telecommunications,” and that the new language in the tax ordinance was only included to update the ordinance with the new phraseology and clarify the scope of the ordinance.
13
Yendes also testified that she had discussions with cell phone companies, including Alltel, in the mid-to-late 90s regarding their need to comply with the tax ordinance. The fact that Springfield did not send the cell phone companies a demand letter prior to 2004 does not establish that Springfield believed that the ordinance did not apply to the defendants and, in any event, does not relieve the defendants of their obligation to pay the tax.
See Med. House, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue,
The defendants argue that because Springfield referred to them as telecommunications companies in the original pleadings, it cannot succeed in taxing them under the original language of the ordinance. Springfield’s pleadings do not, however, change the scope of the question before us. Springfield has always asserted its authority to tax the defendants as telephone companies. Furthermore, Count III of the Complaint seeks a declaratory judgment that “the Springfield Ordinance, which includes the terms ‘telephone’ and ‘telephonic’ applies to the Wireless Defendants’ services;” and that “the Wireless Defendants [are] liable to pay taxes under the Ordinance.” Springfield’s motion for summary judgment clearly argued that CMRS is subject to taxes applicable to *614 telephones and telephonic services. Additionally, the record indicates that the district court and the parties treated the declaratory judgment as an issue of whether the defendants provide telephones and telephonic services.
The defendants also argue that Springfield’s attempt to tax them exceeds the scope of Springfield’s Charter. Section 18.1(3) of Springfield’s Charter authorizes it to tax telephone companies. A company that provides telephones and telephonic services is a telephone company. Thus, a tax on the defendant’s cell phone services, which are telephonic services, is authorized by the Charter. We need not reach the question whether the City’s Charter grants it the authority to tax telecommunications companies, but we note that Springfield has the authority to tax a business and occupation that, although not specifically listed as subject to a license tax, “clearly comes within the definition and meaning of the enumerated subjects or is in fact a genus of one of the named occupations.”
See City of St. Charles v. St. Charles Gas Co.,
The defendants’ final argument is that the 2000 recodification of the tax ordinance violated the Hancock Amendment to the Missouri Constitution, with the result that they cannot be taxed under the language added in 2000 or under the original language of the ordinance.
See
Mo. Const. art. X, § 22(a). Because we are not applying the language of the ordinance that was added in 2000 to the facts of this case, we do not need to reach the question whether the 2000 recodification violated the Hancock Amendment.
14
Even if the language added in 2000 was unconstitutional, a question we do not decide, we see no reason why the original language of the ordinance cannot be severed.
See
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 1.140 (allowing unconstitutional language to be severed from a statute unless “the valid provisions of the statute are so essentially and inseparably connected with, and so dependent upon, the void provision that it cannot be presumed the legislature would have enacted the valid provisions without the void one; or unless the court finds that the valid provisions, standing alone, are incomplete and are incapable of being executed in accordance with the legislative intent”). The 2000 modification merely added language to the ordinance and did not affect the validity of the original decades-old language.
15
See Mo. Ass’n of Club Executives v. Missouri,
The judgment is affirmed.
Notes
. The defendants in this case describe their services as wireless, telecommunications, or “Commercial Mobile Radio Services.” We will refer to the services generally as "cell phone services,” as that is how the services are marketed to the public and generally recognized.
. The City of Jefferson’s claims were dismissed by stipulation.
. It is undisputed that the defendants engage in providing services within Springfield. Whether these services are telephones and telephonic services is the issue in this case. The quantity of services provided "within the city,” and the resulting amount of taxes owed is an issue of fact not before us today.
. The Honorable Nanette K. Laughrey, United States District Judge for the Western District of Missouri.
. The letter stated that the five-year time frame was chosen because of the relevant statute of limitations.
. During a teleconference on January 29, 2007, the district court discussed with the parties the prospect of allowing Springfield the opportunity to amend its complaint to add a claim for declaratory judgment. The district court noted that it was allowing the amendment for Alltel’s benefit because Alltel argued that it was unfair that it did not have a chance to raise its abstention argument in a timely fashion. In the July 3, 2007, order, the district court further noted that it believed
*599
Springfield’s claim for declaratory judgment, while not originally pleaded, was properly before the court, even before the second amended complaint, pursuant to Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
City of Jefferson IV,
. The district court dismissed Springfield's tax collection claim for failure to state a claim, not for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
City of Jefferson II,
No. 04-4099,
.
See City of Jefferson IV,
. We note that, although justiciability requirements cannot be waived by the parties, Alltel’s Answer to Springfield's Complaint and First Amended Complaint conceded that it believed a justiciable controversy existed. Even without this concession, we conclude that Springfield's claim for declaratory judgment raises a case or controversy and meets the constitutional justiciability requirements.
See Arsenal Credit Union v. Giles,
. Springfield’s Second Amended Complaint, filed on February 7, 2007, states that Alltel has made a recent payment of taxes without waiving its position in this litigation but further notes that the defendants have refused to pay their full tax liability despite opportunities to do so under protest.
. Alltel repeatedly argues that the issue before the district court was not a pure legal issue and that it was at least a mixed question of fact and law. This argument ignores the fact that the district court dismissed Springfield’s tax collection claim. Without the collection claim, there are no facts to determine. The sole issue before the court is whether the defendants’ business activity falls within the statutory language of providing telephones and telephonic services.
. The Oxford English Dictionary defines a cell phone as a type of telephone. Oxford English Dictionary Additions Series OED Online (1993), available at http://dictionary.oed. com (defining "cellphone” as “[a] hand-held or mobile radio-telephone providing access to a cellular radio network; a cellular telephone”).
. Yendes testified that one way in which the 2000 modification clarified the ordinance was to draw peoples' attention to the ordinance regardless of whether they searched the Springfield Code for provisions related to telephones, telephonic services, telecommunications, or telecommunications services.
. We do note, however, that the Hancock Amendment provides for a reduction in the levy of a tax if the tax base is broadened without voter approval; it does not result in the abolition of the tax altogether. Mo. Const. art. X, § 22(a).
. The language enacted in 1944 was "telephones and telephonic services.” In 1968, the Code was updated and the "s” on "telephones” was omitted. It is unclear whether this change was intentional, but in any event, the parties have not argued that this change affects the issue before us today.