[¶ 1] Brenda Jerome appealed from a judgment of conviction and an order of the district court denying her motion to suppress evidence in a prosecution for driving while under the influence of intoxicating beverages. 1 We hold the arresting police officer’s request to talk with Jerome was not а stop and did not implicate Jerome’s Fourth Amendment rights, and we affirm.
I
[¶ 2] On June 18, 2000, Jamestown Police Officer Russ Shahin received a dispatch about 9:00 p.m. relaying аn anony *480 mous tip that Brenda Jerome had been drinking since morning, was intoxicated, and was driving her vehicle. The informant identified Jerome’s vehicle by its white color and license plate number. Shahin located Jerome’s vehicle traveling on a Jamestown street, and he followed it in his patrol car for about six blocks. Shahin observed the vehicle drift slightly within its own lane, but he did not observe any other driving abnormalities or law violations. After driving through an alley, Jerome parked her vehicle on her driveway. Shahin parked his car to the side of the street, and Jerome and Shahin exited their vehicles at about the same time. As Shahin stepped out of his patrol car he asked, “hey Brenda, can I speak to you for a minute?” Jerome turned, recognized Shahin as a Jamеstown police officer, and responded, “yes.” During the conversation, Shahin arrested Jerome, and she was later formally charged with class B misdemеanor DUI in violation of Jamestown City Ordinance § 21-04-06.
[¶ 3] Jerome filed a motion to suppress evidence against her “based upon a lack of articulable facts leading to a reasonable conclusion for a legal stop of the defendant’s person.” The trial court concluded Shahin’s aрproach to talk to Jerome constituted a valid caretaking function which did not implicate Jerome’s Fourth Amendment rights. The court denied the motiоn, and Jerome entered a conditional guilty plea to the charges, reserving the right to appeal the denial of her motion to suppress evidence.
II
[¶ 4] On appeal, Jerome asserts the trial court erred in failing to conclude Shahin committed an unreasonable seizure by stopping Jеrome without having a reasonable and articulable suspicion she had committed a crime.
[¶ 5] The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees “the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizurеs.” A temporary restraint of a person’s freedom, or a “Terry stop,” is a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Terry v. Ohio,
[¶ 6] A person alleging her rights havе been violated under the Fourth Amendment has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of illegal seizure.
City of Fargo v. Sivertson,
[¶ 7] The relevant facts in this case are not in dispute. Upon receiving the dispatch of an anonymous tip that Jerome was intoxicated and driving her vehicle, Shahin located and followed Jerome’s vehicle. He did not, however, make any attempt to pull over or stop Jerome. After Jerome voluntarily parked her vehicle in her driveway and exited from it, Shahin asked, in a conversational and nonthreatening manner, if he could sрeak with her for a minute. Jerome turned, recognized the officer, and without hesitation or condition responded, “yes.” In denying the motion to suppress evidence, the trial court found Shahin was merely conducting a caretaking activity when he talked with Jerome, and the court concluded Shahin did not, therefore, “stop” Jerome within the Fourth Amendment context of search and seizure.
[¶ 8] We disagree with the trial court’s finding that Shahin, in talking with Jerome, was conducting a сommunity caretaking function. The community care-taking function is an activity “totally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidenсe relating to the violation of a criminal statute.”
State v. Langseth,
[¶ 9] We agree, however, with the trial court’s conclusion that, under these circumstances, Shahin’s approach toward and conversation with Jerome was not a stop within the context of the Fourth Amendment and did not implicate Jerome’s rights against unreasonable search and seizure. When Shahin approached Jerome he requеsted permission to speak with her and she readily agreed to talk with him. Shahin did not escalate this casual encounter into a seizure by ordering Jeromе to do something, by demanding a response, or by threatening her with a show of authority or command. There is no assertion or evidence that Jerome’s сonsent was based upon any show of authority by Shahin or demand by him that she talk to him. Only when an officer by means of physical force or show of authority has in sоme way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a Fourth Amendment seizure has occurred.
State v. Halfmann,
Ill
[¶ 10] We affirm the judgment and the trial сourt’s order denying Jerome’s motion to suppress evidence.
Notes
. The notice of appeal was filed after entry of the order denying the suppression motion but prior to entry of the judgment of conviction. We treat the attempted appeal as being from the subsequently entered consistent judgment.
See, e.g., Schuck v. Montefiore Public School Dist. No. 1,