47 So. 547 | Miss. | 1908
delivered the opinion of the court. This is an appeal by the city of Jackson, the appellant, from a judgment recovered against it in the court below by Preston, the appellee. The declaration in the case alleges -substantially that during the entire year 1907, and for some years prior thereto, Preston, the appellee, was the sole owner of that certain property in the city of Jackson, Miss., upon which was situated what is known as “Belhaven College,” an educational institution; that the appellee was the president of said-college and sole proprietor thereof; that Belhaven College is an institution for the education of youth, and that the property in question was during the entire year 1907 used by the appellee directly and exclusively for such educational purposes, and therefore was not liable to the appellant for an ad valorem tax for the year 1907, being -exempt, as it is claimed, under paragraph “d” of section 4251 of the Code of 1906; that, notwithstanding the fact entitling the appellee to claim its exemption, the board of mayor and aldermen of the city of Jackson proceeded to assess the appellee’s property for the taxes of said year, and, according to the allegations of the declaration, would
The corresponding section of the Code of 1892 was section 3744, and paragraph “d” thereof contains the following language: “All property, real or personal, belonging to any religious or charitable society or incorporated institution for the education of youth, used exclusively for the purpose of such society or institution and not for profit.” Substantially the same provision was contained in the Code of 1880, the Code of 1871, and the Code of 1857. It is contended by the appellant that the property upon which Belhaven College is situated, and which is admitted to be used directly and exclusively for educational purposes within the meaning of the provision under construction, did not, during the year 1907, belong to any college or educational institution, but was the property of Preston, and therefore not exempt under the terms of the statute. While’ the demurrer of the appellant presents one or two other minor questions, we are led to infer, -from the brief of counsel and the oral argument in this court, that no other question is relied upon for a reversal of the judgment in this ease. In discussing this question the intention of the legislature is the guide which we
When we look at the public policy of the state, we know that it is va matter of history that its cherished ambition has been that every youth within its borders should be provided with proper and sufficient educational facilities. This we gather, not only from the organic law of the state, but from the enactments of the legislature, and from the public utterances of our great men. The state was the first to realize its own inability to provide the educational advantages which were even reasonably necessaiy, and that the advantages offered by it must be supplemented by the efforts of private' educational institutions. It therefore became a part of the public policy of this state to •encourage private educational institutions by exempting “incorporated institutions” from taxation. The fact that, under the previous statutes, the exemption was confined to- incorporated
We are therefore of the opinion that the judgment of the-court below was correct, and is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Fletcher, J., being disqualified, recused himself, and W. H. Watkins, Esq., a member of the supreme court bar, was appointed and presided in his place in this case.