City of Hope, Inc. v. Fisk Building AssociatesCity of Hope, Inc. v. Fisk Building Associates
Order of the Supreme Court, New York County, entered March 11, 1977, denying appellants’ motion to dismiss the amended comрlaint of respondents, unanimously modified, on the law, by substituting for the first decretal paragraph therein a parаgraph granting appellants’ motion to dismiss the second cause of action in the amended complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 (subd [a], par 7) and, as so modified, the order is in all respects affirmed, without costs or disbursements. Appellants shall serve their answer to the first cause of action in the amended complaint within 20 days after servicе of a copy of this court’s order with notice of entry. The amended complaint sets forth two causes of action, on the theory of "unjust enrichment”. The first cause seeks recovery in the sum of $300,000. It alleges that the leаses of respondents contain various escalation clauses providing for additional rent in the event оf increases in operating expenses, real estate taxes, the consumer price index and electricity; that with respect to the operating expense and electricity clauses, appellаnts have misapplied said provisions by incorrectly computing the additional rent claimed thereunder; and that with respect to the real estate tax clause, appellants have failed to credit respоndents with refunds received on such real estate taxes. The second cause seeks recovery of $100,000 for alleged duplication of payments under the consumer price index clause and the electricity еscalation clause. Although the notice of appeal seeks a review of each and every part of the order of Special Term, in the absence of any argument in appellants’ brief to support a challenge on this appeal to the first cause in the amended complaint, the order is affirmеd insofar as it denied appellants’ motion to dismiss that cause. Appellants’ challenge to the second cause of action in the amended complaint on the ground of res judicata (CPLR 3211, subd [a], par 5) is untenable, inasmuch as that cause complies with the suggestions appearing in Special Term’s decision of February 25, 1976 which denied aрpellants’ motion to dismiss the complaint, with leave to replead. Notwithstanding that appellants’ challеnge under CPLR 3211 (subd [a], par 7) is directed to the entire complaint, this court is not precluded from considering the sufficiency of the second cause of action under that rule, particularly in the circumstances herein that а separate challenge was made to the second cause albeit under CPLR 3211 (subd [a], par 5). (Great Neck Assoc, v Village of Great Neck Estates,