138 Ky. 157 | Ky. Ct. App. | 1910
Opinion op the Court by
Reversing.
While the appellee was driving his horse along one of the streets of the city of Harrodsburg, the shafts of the vehicle became detached by the breaking of a
The evidence showed the facts to have been substantially as above stated, and in addition, that the fire engine was about 8 feet wide and stood close to the curbing of the sidewalk, occupying some 8% or 9 feet of the street, and had stood there several months; that the street, at the point where the accident occurred, was about 70 feet in width from curb to curb; and that, deducting the width occupied by the engine, there was more than 60 feet of highway left free from obstruction and reasonably, suited for the use of the traveling public. It may be postulated that the fright of the horse was not caused by the negligence of the owner. The question, then, arises: Is the city liable for the accident which occurred ?
Sixty feet is the average width of a public street, including the sidewalk, and very few municipal highways are more than 45 feet in width between the curbing; so that, after deducting the width of the street occupied by the fire engine, the evidence shows without contradiction there was left for the. use of the traveling public in width considerably more highway than is afforded by the average street when en
Appellee relies upon the opinion in Fugate v. City of Somerset, 97 Ky. 46, 29 S. W. 970, 16 Ky. Law Rep. 807, to support the judgment; but the circumstances were not the same in that case as here. It appears from the opinion that it was alleged in the petition that the municipality had “ placed, or suffered and permitted others to place, large piles of lumber on one of its principal streets, whereby same was made and left in an unsafe and dangerous condition for public travel;” and it also appears that the evidence adduced on behalf of plaintiff substantially proved the allegations of the petition. But it is neither alleged nor proved in the case at bar that the street where the accident occurred was in either an unsafe or dangerous condition; and, even if it had been so alleged, the evidence entirely refutes the supposition. It is well established that it is the duty of municipalities to exercise reasonable care and diligence to keep its public highways in a reasonably safe condition for travel, and that if they fail in this they are liable for all resulting injuries caus'ed by the negligent failure to discharge this important public duty. But it does not follow — and the case of Fugate v. City of Somerset, supra, is not authority for the proposition — that, if the street is in a reasonably safe condition for public travel, the municipality will be liable to the owner of a runaway horse which blindly and unnecessarily dashes into an obstruction left by the city authorities near the curbing. The duty of the municipal authorities is to maintain its highways in a reasonably safe condition for ordinary
In Kieffer v. Hummelstown Borough, 151 Pa., 304, 24 Atl. 1060, 17 L. R. A. 217, the plaintiff’s horse became frightened and ran into a pile of stone left in the highway, where it was injured. The stone occupied some 5 or 6 feet of the width of fhe roadway, and the space left for travel was some 26 or 27 feet in width. It was held by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania that the municipality was not liable for the damage to the horse. In the opinion it is said: “In the present case there was no testimony showing, or tending to show, that the accident which caused the plaintiff’s injury was either the natural or probable consequence of the presence of the stone pile. • The plaintiff himself said he always got along, in passing this place, without any. difficulty, on account of the stone pile, and that his horses did not
In the case of Moulton v. Inhabitants of Sanford, 51 Me. 127, there was a bridge over a narrow stream in the town of Sanford, which the plaintiff was crossing with his horse. The animal became frightened at some unusual noise and jumped over the side of the bridge and was injured. ' The bridge was of sufficient Avidth, and well built; but there was no railing. It was held by the Supreme Court of Maine that the plaintiff had no cause of action against the municipality. The case of Bleil v. Detroit Railway Co., 98 Mich. 228, 57 N. W. 117, arose as follows: The plaintiff’s horse was hitched on one of the streets of Detroit. It became frightened by an object falling from an upper window in a building near which it was hitched. The frightened animal broke away from its fastening and ran into a pile of iron material which the street car company had piled along the side of the curb in the street, and was so injured that it had to be killed. Ample room had been left in the street for the passage of vehicles in the ordinary manner while under control of their drivers. The
It may be conceded that there is respectable authority for holding the city liable under the circumstances detailed in this case; but we are of opinion that the great weight of authority, as well as of reason, sustains the theory that, if the city authorities provide and maintain a highway reasonably wide and reasonably safe for public travel in the ordinary way. they have discharged their whole duty to the public, and are not bound to anticipate the extraordinary exigency of i una way horses. Indeed, it would be difficult to provide against frightened animals injuring themselves while running away. If there was unexcavation in the street, an ordinary barricade would not stop a frightened horse; nor would the ordinary signals of danger avail. It is considered sufficient if the city authorities give timely and reasonable warning of obstructions in the highway, so that the traveling public may see and avoid the danger created; but, of course, no sort of signals or warnings would avail in the case of a runaway horse, and, therefore, no ordinary provision for the safety of
The uncontradicted facts herein show that the city was in no wise to blame for the accident to appellee’s horse; it had nothing to do with the fright which caused the horse to run away, and, as there was more than sufficient space at the place where the injury occurred for the use of the traveling public, under the rule announced before, there was no liability on the part of the city for the resulting injury. The trial court should have sustained the motion of appellant for a peremptory instruction to the jury to find for it at the close of the testimony.
For these reasons, the judgment is reversed for further procedure consistent with this opinion.