CITY OF HARRIMAN, Tennessee v. ROANE COUNTY ELECTION COMMISSION et al.
No. E2008-02316-COA-R3-CV
Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Knoxville.
June 9, 2011.
Jan. 5, 2011 Session.
339 S.W.3d 685
Harold D. Balcom Jr., Kingston, Tennessee, for the appellee, City of Harriman, Tennessee.
OPINION
JANICE M. HOLDER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which CORNELIA A. CLARK, C.J., GARY R. WADE, WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., and SHARON G. LEE, JJ., joined.
I. Facts and Procedural History
Pursuant to
The coordinating committee held several meetings in 2005 and 2006 and discussed a number of proposed urban growth boundaries, but the committee took no action. On September 12, 2007, the Roane County mayor announced that the coordinating committee would reconvene within six weeks. The county mayor requested that municipalities in Roane County seeking to alter their growth boundaries submit proposed amendments to the committee.
In response, the Harriman City Council acted in special session on October 17, 2007, to adopt Resolution Number R1007-1, which designated a proposed amendment to its urban growth boundary to include a portion of Midtown that it wished to annex. Although Harriman submitted the proposed amendment to the coordinating committee, the coordinating committee did not meet following Harriman‘s submission.
On December 27, 2007, the City Council for the City of Kingston (“Kingston“) adopted a resolution to hold a referendum to annex a portion of Midtown identified by Harriman in Resolution Number R1007-1.
More than a week before the referendum, the Harriman City Council adopted on first reading an ordinance annexing the part of Midtown at issue. Harriman subsequently filed a complaint in chancery court against Kingston and the Roane County Election Commission. The complaint sought to hold Kingston‘s annexation referendum in abeyance while Harriman‘s annexation proceedings were pending. Harriman also requested a temporary restraining order prohibiting the Roane County Election Commission from conducting the referendum. After the chancery court declined to grant the restraining order, Harriman moved for a temporary injunction to prohibit the commission from certifying the referendum results. The motion for an injunction was not granted.2 The referendum proceeded, and the voters approved Kingston‘s annexation of the portion of Midtown both cities wished to annex. The election commission certified the referendum results on February 5, 2008.
Kingston answered Harriman‘s complaint, and the chancery court held a hearing on June 10, 2008. Harriman and Kingston submitted a stipulation of facts to the chancery court. With the agreement of Harriman and Kingston, the chancery court dismissed Harriman‘s complaint against the Roane County Election Commission as moot. The chancery court also dismissed Harriman‘s complaint against Kingston because it concluded that Chapter 58 does not permit a municipality to use an ordinance to annex territory that is beyond its urban growth boundary. The chancery court therefore held that Harriman‘s annexation ordinance was void and created no conflict with Kingston‘s successful annexation of the same territory by referendum.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the chancery court‘s judgment and remanded to the chancery court for further proceedings. We granted Kingston permission to appeal.
II. Analysis
Harriman contends that its effort to annex Midtown has priority because of its larger population.3 The threshold issue, however, is whether Chapter 58 permits a municipality such as Harriman to annex territory by ordinance when the territory is outside the municipality‘s urban growth boundary.
(c) A municipality may not annex territory by ordinance beyond its urban growth boundary without following the procedure in subsection (d).
(d)(1) If a municipality desires to annex territory beyond its urban growth boundary, the municipality shall first propose an amendment to its urban growth boundary with the coordinating committee under the procedure in § 6-58-104.
The chancery court concluded that
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the chancery court‘s construction of
“The construction of a statute and its application to the facts of a case
The Court of Appeals observed that the ordinary meaning and purpose it attributed to the words of section 6-58-111 resulted in a construction that “defeats the policies behind” Chapter 58. City of Harriman, 2009 WL 5083477, at *7. The construction of a single subsection should not violate the General Assembly‘s stated intent. See In re C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 722 (Tenn.2005) (quoting Marsh v. Henderson, 221 Tenn. 42, 424 S.W.2d 193, 196 (1968)) (stating that the plain meaning of the statute‘s language should be given full effect “if so doing does not violate the obvious intention of the Legislature“). We instead are compelled to avoid a construction that places one statute in conflict with another and to construe statutes “to provide a harmonious operation of the laws.” Graham v. Caples, 325 S.W.3d 578, 582 (Tenn.2010) (quoting Cronin v. Howe, 906 S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tenn.1995)); see Wilson v. Johnson Cnty., 879 S.W.2d 807, 809 (Tenn.1994) (stating that we are to construe together statutes “relating to the same subject or having a common purpose“). We therefore consider the language of
The General Assembly enacted
Chapter 58 regulates annexation and incorporation by requiring each county to adopt a countywide growth plan and dictating that land use decisions in the county “be consistent with the growth plan.”
A growth plan must describe and depict municipal corporate limits, urban growth boundaries, any planned growth areas, and
Chapter 58 prohibits a municipality from unilaterally altering its urban growth boundary. A municipality instead must propose amendments to its urban growth boundary to the coordinating committee “by filing notice with the county mayor and with the mayor of each municipality in the county” and may do so only after the county growth plan has been in effect for three years, “absent a showing of extraordinary circumstances.”
Against this legislative backdrop, we conclude that
This construction satisfies the intent of the General Assembly and avoids undermining or creating conflict with other sections in Chapter 58. Because Harriman did not complete the process of amending its urban growth boundary to include Midtown, we hold that Harriman‘s annexation ordinance is void and creates no conflict with Kingston‘s annexation referendum.
III. Conclusion
We hold that
Notes
If two (2) municipalities that were incorporated in the same county shall initiate annexation proceedings with respect to the same territory, the proceedings of the municipality having the larger population shall have precedence and the smaller municipality‘s proceedings shall be held in abeyance pending the outcome of the proceedings of such larger municipality.
(c)(1) Prior to a municipality annexing by ordinance territory outside its existing urban growth boundary whether the territory desired for annexation is within another municipality‘s urban growth boundary or a county‘s planned growth area or rural area, it must first amend the growth plan by having its desired change to the urban growth boundary submitted to the coordinating committee and then receive a recommendation for or against the amendment from the coordinating committee, the coordinating committee then must submit the proposed amendment with its recommendation to all the legislative bodies for approval. If the amendment to the growth plan is approved by the legislative bodies or by the dispute resolution panel, it is then submitted to the local government planning advisory committee for its approval. This amendment process must follow the procedure as outlined in § 6-58-104 and the criteria for establishing an urban growth boundary as delineated in § 6-58-106.
(2) As an alternative to a municipality annexing in a county‘s planned growth area or rural area by first amending the growth plan as described in subdivision (c)(1), a municipality may annex within a county‘s planned growth area or rural area, but the annexation must be by referendum only and not by ordinance. The municipality must follow the referendum process as provided for in §§ 6-51-104 and 6-51-105. Act of May 26, 2010, pub. ch. 917, §§ 2-3.
