City of Hannibal v. Hannibal & St. Joseph RailroadCity of Hannibal v. Hannibal & St. Joseph Railroad
delivered the opinion of the court.
The city of Hannibal established a street across the track of defendant’s road, and on аppeal to the Common Pleas the proceedings were dismissed. Defendant claims that the city had no right to establish the street;
1. Because no power to establish any new streеt is given in the charter; the power being to open new streets, which counsel would limit to oрening streets contained in the plan of the city and of its additions. The power to opеn a street appears to be used in the city charter as synonymous with the power to lаy out and establish such street. I infer this, because otherwise this important power would be withheld еntirely from the city, but more especially because the whole statute shows that it was so
2. Dеfendant secondly excepts to the proceedings because there was no рetition by the property-holders. No such petition is required in the proceeding under consideration. The findings under section 2 of chapter 9 of the act of 1851 (Sess. Acts 1851, p. 336) are entirеly different from the present, and no-private property is taken, except by consеnt or petition of all the holders of property on the street, and in such case without сompensation.
3. But the chief point relied upon is predicated upon the fact thаt the land appropriated had already been taken for public use by the railroad company, and it is claimed that the city corporation has no right to appropriate for another public use any portion of the land so taken- — as by laying out and opening a* street across the track of the railroad — without paramount necessity and' еxpress legislative authority. It was not claimed that the city cannot be clothed with power to establish streets across the track, but that no such power will be inferred from a generаl grant.
■ I do not suppose that a power to appropriate the property of the railroad in such a manner as to destroy or greatly injure its franchise, or render it impossible or very difficult to prosecute the-object of the organization, could be so inferred. Thus, in Springfield v. C. River R.R. Co.,
As to the necessity of opening the street, the city council must be the judge, аid the fact that it was opened is the best evidence of their view in the matter. (Young v. City, etc.,
Of the propriety of the action of the city council we can know nothing ; they alonе have jurisdiction in the premises, and their action is affirmed, and the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas is reversed.