CITY OF GOLETA et al., Petitioners, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF SANTA BARBARA COUNTY, Respondent; OLY CHADMAR SANDPIPER GENERAL PARTNERSHIP, Real Party in Interest.
No. S129125
Supreme Court of California
Dec. 21, 2006.
270
Julie Hayward Biggs, City Attorney; Burke, Williams & Sorensen, Brian A. Pierik, Geralyn L. Skapik, Amy E. Morgan; Shute, Mihaly & Weinberger, Rachel Hooper and Ellison Folk for Petitioners.
Meyers, Nave, Ribak, Silver & Wilson, Peter S. Hayes, Amrit S. Kulkami and Kyle W. LaLonde for League of California Cities and City of Laguna Woods as Amici Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.
Moscone, Emblidge & Quadra, G. Scott Emblidge and Rachel J. Sater for Carmel Valley Association as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Petitioners.
No appearance for Respondent.
Allen Matkins Leck Gamble & Mallory, Patrick E. Breen, Anthony J. Oliva, Patrick A. Perry; Hollister & Brace, Richard C. Monk, Marcus Bird; Lascher & Lascher and Wendy C. Lascher for Real Party in Interest.
June Babiracki Barlow and Grant Michiaki Habata for California Association of Realtors as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.
Stoel Rives and James P. Corn for Consulting Engineers and Land Surveyors of California as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.
Stephen Shane Stark, County Counsel (Santa Barbara), Alan L. Seltzer, Chief Assistant County Counsel, and Kelly A. Casillas, Deputy County Counsel, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.
California Rural Legal Assistance and Kirk Ah-Tye for Kathryn Lubahn as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.
James S. Burling for Pacific Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.
Hill & Trager and Russell R. Ruiz for Goleta Water District as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.
Richard Kelton for Bollenbacher & Kelton, Inc., as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.
Reetz, Fox & Bartlett and Randall Fox for Coalition of Labor, Agriculture and Business as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.
Nick Cammarota for California Building Industry Association and California Land Surveyors Association as Amici Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.
Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Tom Greene, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Mary E. Hackenbracht, Assistant Attorney General, and Denise Ferkich Hoffman, Deputy Attorney General, for Department of Housing and Community Development as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Real Party in Interest.
CORRIGAN, J.—Here we conclude that a newly incorporated city had discretion to disapprove a final subdivision map when the vesting tentative subdivision map had been approved by the county. We also conclude that actions taken by the city did not divest it of this discretion or subject it to estoppel.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The City of Goleta (Goleta or City) was created from unincorporated territory within the County of Santa Barbara (County). After the incorporation process began, Oly Chadmar Sandpiper General Partnership (Sandpiper) submitted a vesting tentative subdivision map to the County for a multiunit residential project within Goleta‘s proposed boundaries. The County approved the vesting tentative map after Goleta‘s incorporation was approved by the electorate on November 6, 2001. The sequence of these events is significant because it bears on whether Sandpiper qualified for the safe harbor provision of
When the incorporation became effective on February 1, 2002, the newly empowered City Council of Goleta (City Council) adopted the County ordinances. A newly created city is required to “adopt an ordinance providing that all county ordinances previously applicable shall remain in full force and effect as city ordinances for a period of 120 days after incorporation, or until the city council has enacted ordinances superseding the county ordinances, whichever occurs first.” (
The manner in which the City Council undertook its action is central to this litigation. The resolution adopting the County ordinances replaced references to the County and its board of supervisors with references to the City and its City Council. (Goleta Ord. No. 02-01.) The parties disagree as to whether, in taking this action, the City bound itself to approve Sandpiper‘s final map. The gist of Sandpiper‘s argument is that, while Goleta would otherwise have had discretion under
The following facts bear on the estoppel claim. On November 28, 2001, three weeks after the incorporation election, Goleta‘s mayor-elect wrote to the County Board of Supervisors expressing the City-Council-elect‘s concerns about the Sandpiper project. On January 15, 2002, the Board of Supervisors approved the vesting tentative map. On March 18, 2002, a City consultant notified a County planning staff member that the City Council wished to be consulted before the County made any other decisions affecting the project. On June 4, 2002, the interim city attorney informed the same County staff member that the City‘s concerns were both jurisdictional and substantive. The City states, and Sandpiper does not deny, that Sandpiper was informed of these communications.
On May 13, 2002, the County approved a coastal development permit for the project. Three weeks later the City challenged that approval before the California Coastal Commission. In its letter of appeal, the City stated it had discretion under
At several regularly scheduled meetings between August and November 2002, the City Council reviewed Sandpiper‘s plan and identified a significant number of concerns.
On November 26, 2002, the city surveyor wrote the city engineer that Sandpiper‘s final map was “technically correct.” The City does not dispute that the final map was in “substantial compliance” with the vesting tentative map. However, on January 6, 2003, the City Council denied approval of Sandpiper‘s final map, concluding that the project‘s design and improvements would be inconsistent in specified respects with the general plan being prepared by the City.3
The trial court granted Sandpiper‘s writ petition and ordered the City to approve the final map. The Court of Appeal reversed the order by writ of mandate.
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
The Subdivision Map Act (Act) gives local agencies authority to regulate subdivision development within their boundaries. (
“The Subdivision Map Act (Act) permits a subdivider to file a ‘vesting tentative map’ whenever the Act requires a tentative map. This procedure is intended to provide greater statutory protection to subdividers than was afforded under the common law vested rights doctrine. [Citations.]” (Bright Development v. City of Tracy (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 783, 792 [24 Cal.Rptr.2d 618].) This case does not turn on the fact that Sandpiper filed a vesting tentative map.
A. Section 66413.5
Before enactment of
By enacting subdivision (a) of
However, subdivision (a) of
The original legislation had no time constraints. (Sen. Bill No. 186 (1987–1988 Reg. Sess.) as introduced Jan. 16, 1987.) However, the Legislature came to recognize that the prospect of an incorporation often resulted in a “run” on development rights. To prevent such “runs,” the bill was amended to incorporate the temporal conditions set out in
The trial court correctly found that the vesting tentative map here did not satisfy either of
The Court of Appeal agreed with the City that, under these circumstances, “the plain language of
As noted (ante, at p. 274), in compliance with
Sandpiper contends Goleta was obliged by section 21-10 of its adopted ordinances to give ministerial approval to the final map. Goleta Municipal Code section 21-10 read in pertinent part: “When the [City] Surveyor is satisfied that the map is technically correct, conforms to the approved tentative map or any approved alterations thereof and complies with all applicable laws and regulations, the [City] Surveyor will notify in writing the licensed land surveyor . . . who prepared the map and request delivery of the original tracing of the final or parcel map. . . . In the case of a final map . . . the [City] Surveyor will transmit the same to the Clerk of the [City Council] for filing and approval. The [City Council] shall approve the map at its next regular meeting if it conforms with all the requirements of applicable laws and regulations made thereunder.” (Italics added.)
Goleta responds that when section 21-10 of its Municipal Code is read in light of section 21-6, it is clear that the City was obligated to grant ministerial approval to final maps only when it, not the County, had given initial approval to the tentative map. Section 21-6, subdivision (b) identifies the City Council as the decision maker for all tentative maps submitted to the City for land use projects within the City‘s jurisdiction.7 Section 21-6, subdivision (m) provides that the decision maker, i.e., the City Council, shall approve, conditionally approve, or disapprove all tentative and final maps.8
Sandpiper labels Goleta‘s position “nonsensical.” It states its argument as follows. The City‘s theory “would require a finding that after February 1, 2002, when the City adopted all [of the] County‘s Ordinances and inserted the name change, there no longer was a vesting tentative map as defined in the City‘s [Subdivision Map Act] ordinances. [¶] The City‘s own actions
Sandpiper‘s characterization of the City‘s position is overbroad. Sections 21-6 and 21-10 can be reconciled as stating the City‘s intention to retain discretion over final maps when the County approved the tentative maps, but to defer to the general rule of ministerial approval for final maps when the City, itself, has approved the tentative maps.
We conclude the City had discretion under
C. Estoppel
Sandpiper contends in the alternative that the City was estopped from disapproving the final map.
“The doctrine of equitable estoppel is founded on concepts of equity and fair dealing. It provides that a person may not deny the existence of a state of facts if he intentionally led another to believe a particular circumstance to be true and to rely upon such belief to his detriment. The elements of the doctrine are that (1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) he must intend that his conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel has a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) he must rely upon the conduct to his injury. (City of Long Beach v. Mansell (1970) 3 Cal.3d 462, 488–489 [91 Cal.Rptr. 23, 476 P.2d 423].)” (Strong v. County of Santa Cruz (1975) 15 Cal.3d 720, 725 [125 Cal.Rptr. 896, 543 P.2d 264]; see Hughes v. Board of Architectural Examiners (1998) 17 Cal.4th 763, 794 [72 Cal.Rptr.2d 624, 952 P.2d 641] (Hughes).)
Equitable estoppel “will not apply against a governmental body except in unusual instances when necessary to avoid grave injustice and when the result will not defeat a strong public policy. (Bib‘le v. Committee of Bar Examiners (1980) 26 Cal.3d 548, 553 [162 Cal.Rptr. 426, 606 P.2d 733]; Hock Investment Co. v. City and County of San Francisco (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 438, 449 [263 Cal.Rptr. 665].)” (Hughes, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 793.)
City authorities began voicing concerns about the project from virtually the moment of the City‘s creation. The City-Council-elect informed the County Board of Supervisors of its reservations in November of 2001. After the County approved the vesting tentative map, City representatives continued to voice concerns in March and June of 2002. The City appealed the County‘s grant of a coastal development permit, and during the appellate process, asserted the City‘s discretion to withhold final map approval.9 The City Council continued to identify problems with Sandpiper‘s plan at its meetings in August through November of 2002. In light of this history, the City‘s decision to disapprove the final map should not have come as a surprise to Sandpiper.
Sandpiper contends that Goleta‘s adoption of the County subdivision ordinances created a reasonable expectation on Sandpiper‘s part that its final map would receive ministerial approval. We conclude above that the City‘s action did not entail this result. (See, ante, at pp. 278–279.) Therefore, this lynchpin of Sandpiper‘s estoppel argument fails.
Sandpiper also claims it relied on the fact that Goleta exempted its project when it extended a moratorium on development. On February 11, 2002, Goleta adopted an ordinance placing a 45-day moratorium on approval of development proposals. On March 25, 2002, the City extended the moratorium for the 10 months and 15 days permitted under
Finally, Sandpiper claims it relied on the fact that the City “worked extensively with [Sandpiper] to clear the County-imposed conditions from the vesting tentative map at considerable expense to [Sandpiper].” However, as the Court of Appeal held, estoppel may not be based on expenditures made before a building permit or its functional equivalent has issued. (Shea Homes Limited Partnership v. County of Alameda (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1246, 1269–1270 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 739].)
III. DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.11
George, C. J., Baxter, J., Werdegar, J., Chin, J., and Moreno, J., concurred.
KENNARD, J., Dissenting.—I dissent for the reasons given below.
The majority opinion has three holdings: First, it concludes that under
Second, the majority holds that the city in question is not equitably estopped by its conduct—participation in and encouragement of the developer‘s efforts to clear conditions imposed on the tentative map—from withholding final subdivision map approval. Because of my conclusion that the city was required under
Third, the majority concludes that the city, after its incorporation and notwithstanding its adoption and readoption of the county‘s land use regulations, retained discretion to withhold ministerial approval of the developer‘s final subdivision map. I disagree. In my view, the city lacked such discretion.
I.
The property in dispute consists of 14.46 acres within the coastal zone of the County of Santa Barbara (County). In 1993, the County adopted the Goleta Community Plan, which designated the parcel as lying within an affordable housing zone. Two years later, the County approved development of the site with 105 residential units, half of them affordable housing. The County prepared and certified a final environmental impact report for the proposed development. The proposed development, however, was never built.
In June 1999, Oly Chadmar Sandpiper General Partnership (Sandpiper) bought the parcel. On July 4, 1999, a petition to incorporate Goleta as a city received its first signature.
On November 18, 1999, Sandpiper submitted to the County its vesting tentative map application calling for construction of 109 residential units, with 20 percent affordable housing. The County deemed the map application complete on January 1, 2000.
On November 6, 2001, voters residing within the boundaries of the proposed city passed a measure to incorporate Goleta.
On January 15, 2002, the County board of supervisors approved Sandpiper‘s development plan and its vesting tentative map for the 109-unit project.
On February 1, 2002, Goleta‘s incorporation as a city took effect. Under
In June 2002, after the statutory 120 days had elapsed and the City of Goleta had not enacted its own subdivision ordinances superseding those of the County, it readopted the County‘s subdivision ordinances without change. (
II.
The issue presented is simple: Did the newly incorporated City of Goleta have discretion to deny approval of the developer‘s final subdivision map that substantially complied with a tentative vesting map previously approved by the County? The answer is “No.”
In 1998, the Legislature enacted
The majority reasons that because Sandpiper does not come within the safe harbor created by
In language that could not be any clearer,
The majority here concludes that because it was the County, acting through its board of supervisors, that approved Sandpiper‘s tentative subdivision map, Goleta‘s city council is not subject to
A newly incorporated city that comprises formerly unincorporated land is required by statute, “immediately following its organization and prior to performing any other official act, [to] adopt an ordinance providing that all county ordinances previously applicable shall remain in full force and effect as city ordinances for . . . 120 days after incorporation, or until the city council has enacted ordinances superseding the county ordinances.” (
Nor did the City of Goleta seek to avail itself of an urgency provision in the Map Act permitting a local public entity that has approved a vesting tentative map to “condition or deny” final approval on findings that “[a] failure to do so would place the residents of the subdivision or the immediate community, or both, in a condition dangerous to their health or safety.” (
Only on January 6, 2003, when the City of Goleta denied approval of Sandpiper‘s final subdivision map, did the city council give a nod to this
For the reasons stated above, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Notes
“(1) The application for the tentative map or the vesting tentative map is submitted prior to the date that the first signature was affixed to the petition for incorporation pursuant to Section 56704, regardless of the validity of the first signature, or the adoption of the resolution pursuant to Section 56800, whichever occurs first.
“(2) The county approved the tentative map or the vesting tentative map prior to the date of the election on the question of incorporation.”
Subdivision (g) of
In its amicus curiae brief, the Pacific Legal Foundation argues that development rights should not be “abrogated by a change in governmental structure.” In enacting
“(1) The continued approval of the development of multifamily housing projects would have a specific, adverse impact upon the public health or safety. As used in this paragraph, a ‘specific, adverse impact’ means a significant, quantifiable, direct, and unavoidable impact, based on objective, identified written public health or safety standards, policies, or conditions as they existed on the date that the ordinance is adopted by the legislative body.
“(2) The interim ordinance is necessary to mitigate or avoid the specific, adverse impact identified pursuant to paragraph (1).
“(3) There is no feasible alternative to satisfactorily mitigate or avoid the specific, adverse impact identified pursuant to paragraph (1) as well or better, with a less burdensome or restrictive effect, than the adoption of the proposed interim ordinance.”