135 Mo. App. 697 | Mo. Ct. App. | 1909
(after stating the facts). — We are not called on to determine the adequacy of the original petition, because that point was determined in favor of defendant, which has appealed, contending the amended petition should have been struck out as constituting a substitution of an entirely different cause of action; in other words, a departure. This position is untenable. Whether good or not, the first petition sought to recover from defendant the identical debt alleged to be owing in the amended petition, to-wit: payment for the use of the streets and public grounds of the city by defendant in the maintaining and operating a telephone system from June, 1904, to April 21, 1906. The difference between the two petitions is the first one declared on an ordinance granting an exclusive franchise to defendant, or its promoters, in consideration of certain-
The whole argument in favor of the demurrer to the amended petition goes back to the alleged invalidity of the original petition, and counsel for defendant insist the latter stated no cause of action because it declared on a contract which conferred a monopoly on defendant and was, therefore, invalid; citing Town of Kirkwood v. Meramec Highlands Company, 94 Mo. App. 644. We cannot look at the original petition to determine whether the demurrer should have been sustained to the amended one, for a demurrer reaches only defects in the pleading against which it is lodged. Hence we will not say the ordinance granting an exclusive franchise was either void or valid; for this ordinance is not presented or alluded to in the amended petition and is not before us for construction. Section 7659 of the Statutes, which regulates the form of contracts entered into by municipalities though referred to in the demurrer, is not brought forward or even mentioned in the brief for defendant as relevant to the propositions for which they contend.
The judgment is affirmed.