CITY OF ELMIRA, Respondent-Appellant, v SELECTIVE INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK, Appellant-Respondent.
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York
[921 NYS2d 662]
Peters, J.P.
Plaintiff owned a historic three-story brick building in the City of Elmira, Chemung County known as the Armory Building. On March 10, 2006, a windstorm caused a portion of the Armory‘s southern wall to collapse. Plaintiff subsequently hired Hunt Engineers, Architects & Land Surveyors, PC to assess the Armory‘s condition. Hunt issued a report which concluded that the collapse of the southern wall was caused by hidden deterioration of mortar which weakened the wall and left it un
After Hunt provided an estimated cost to renovate the Armory of $7,350,000, plaintiff elected to have the Armory demolished and accepted a bid from a firm for $1,022,000 to do so. Plaintiff purchased a building on another site for approximately $227,000 for relocation of the functions formerly served by the Armory. Plaintiff thereafter submitted claims to defendant, its insurer, under its “all-risk” insurance policy. Acknowledging that the collapse of the Armory‘s south wall was covered under the policy, defendant paid plaintiff a sum of $440,000 for the damage sustained in March 2006,1 but refused to cover the cost of demolishing the undamaged portions of the Armory and purchasing a replacement building at a different location.
Plaintiff commenced this action for breach of contract, claiming that it was entitled to coverage under the “Ordinance or Law” provision of an endorsement to the policy referred to as the ElitePac endorsement, which extended coverage to include certain losses resulting from enforcement of “any ordinance or law.” After the parties each moved for summary judgment, Supreme Court denied defendant‘s motion and partially granted plaintiff‘s motion, awarding plaintiff $500,000 for demolition costs and approximately $227,000 for the cost of replacing the Armory under the Ordinance or Law provision. These cross appeals ensued.
When confronted with an insurance coverage dispute, “‘[c]ourts must determine the rights and obligations of parties under an insurance contract based on the policy‘s specific language‘” (Pepper v Allstate Ins. Co., 20 AD3d 633, 634 [2005], quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v Glinbizzi, 9 AD3d 756, 757 [2004]; accord White v Rhodes, 34 AD3d 951, 952 [2006]). “While [u]nambiguous provisions of a policy are given their plain and ordinary meaning, where policy language is unclear or
The Ordinance or Law provision of plaintiff‘s policy provided, in relevant part, that
“(1) If a Covered Cause of Loss occurs to covered Building property, we will pay:
“(a) For Loss or damage caused by enforcement of any ordinance or law that:
“(i) Requires the demolition of parts of the same property not damaged by a Covered Cause of Loss; ...
“(c) The cost to demolish and clear the site of undamaged parts of the property caused by enforcement of the building, zoning or land use ordinance or law.”
As the language makes clear, the only requirement necessary to trigger the Ordinance or Law provision is the occurrence of a “Covered Cause of Loss” (see e.g. Regents of Mercersburg Coll. v Republic Franklin Ins. Co., 458 F3d 159, 168 n 11, 170 [3d Cir 2006]; Medical Plaza, LLC v United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 2008 WL 4335572, *6, 2008 US Dist LEXIS 73661, *16-17 [SD Miss 2008]). Here, the parties agree that the damage to the Armory‘s south wall that occurred in March 2006 was a “Covered Cause of Loss” under the policy. Thus, plaintiff is entitled to coverage so long as the costs to demolish the Armory and clear the site of undamaged parts were caused by enforcement of the building, zoning or land use ordinance or law. In that regard, the record undisputedly reveals that, as a result of the fire marshal‘s finding that the Armory was in violation of several provisions of the
Defendant contends that the Ordinance or Law provision of the endorsement cannot be invoked because the covered cause of loss—i.e., the windstorm—did not cause the enforcement of
Defendant next contends that plaintiff is not entitled to coverage under the Ordinance or Law provision of the policy for the cost to replace the Armory because it did not incur “increased construction costs.” Specifically, defendant argues that the language explicitly and unambiguously states that the insurer will only pay for a loss resulting from “[t]he increased cost to repair, rebuild or construct the property caused by enforcement of . . . [an] ordinance or law” and that, because plaintiff purchased an existing structure to replace the Armory instead of repairing, rebuilding or constructing a replacement, no coverage is afforded under the Ordinance or Law provision. We agree.
In addition to providing coverage for demolition costs, the Ordinance or Law provision provides further coverage for the “increased cost to repair, rebuild, or construct the property caused by enforcement of building, zoning or land use ordinance or law.” The provision continues that “increased construction costs” will not be paid “[u]ntil the property is actually repaired or replaced, at the same premises or elsewhere.” It then goes on to set forth limits on the amount defendant will pay “[i]f the property is not repaired or replaced on the same premises.”
While Supreme Court correctly found that the plain language of the policy permits plaintiff to “replace” the building at a different location, it erred in concluding that the term “replace” covered the purchase of an existing structure. The policy uses the word “replace” only after explicitly stating in the coverage subsection that the insurer will only pay for the increased cost to “repair, rebuild or construct” the property. Construing the Ordinance or Law provision as a whole and giving meaning to all of the words of the provision (see Raymond Corp. v National Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 5 NY3d 157, 162 [2005]; Travelers Indem. Co. v Commerce & Indus. Ins. Co. of Can., 36 AD3d at 1122), we find that the word “replace” is modified by the repeated references to construction and, thus, encompasses only the costs to “rebuild or repair” the property. Indeed, these
Lahtinen, Malone Jr., Kavanagh and Garry, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the order is modified, on the law, without costs, by reversing so much thereof as (1) granted plaintiff‘s motion for summary judgment awarding it $227,040.88 in increased construction costs and $500,000 in demolition costs and (2) denied defendant‘s motion for summary judgment dismissing that part of plaintiff‘s cause of action seeking construction costs; defendant‘s motion granted to that extent and matter remitted to the Supreme Court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this Court‘s decision; and, as so modified, affirmed.
