45 Mich. 263 | Mich. | 1881
Defendant in error recovered a judgment against the city for injuries sustained by reason of a defective sidewalk. It is not claimed that the action would lie in tin's State in the absence of a statute creating the liability. The plaintiff below relied upon act No. 244 of the Laws of 1879, p. 223, which is entitled “An act for the collection of damages sustained by reason of defective public highways, streets, bridges, crosswalks and culverts.” The first section of the act creates a liability in favor of persons “ sustaining ■bodily injury upon any of the public highways or streets in
It is noticeable that sidewalks are not in express terms mentioned in this statute, and that the act is made applicable to townships, villages, cities and corporations whose duty it is to keep the highway in repair. It must be seldom, indeed, if at all, that sidewalks can be found in townships outside of the corporate limits of villages, while crosswalks,, bridges and culverts will be found in cities, villages and townships. In the repair and construction of crosswalks, bridges and culverts, the expense or cost is collected by a general tax upon the property within the corporation, or some district therein, and for this reason the authority given in the fourth section to raise an additional sum for such purpose, when necessary, is appropriate. The expense of constructing and repairing sidewalks, however, is not usually paid out of the general highway fund, but is made a charge upon the owners of property abutting thereon, and to this extent the fourth section would have no application.
Again, if sidewalks are embraced in the general terms used, then if an animal is driven on the sidewalk and injured, the municipality would be liable for the damages sustained, if liable under the first section for injuries to persons traveling on the sidewalk, and this evidently could not have been intended by the Legislature.
We have but little doubt that if the liability had been ere
As already said, the city would not be liable in the absence of this statute, which creates the liability, and we cannot by construction enlarge the liability. Where a statute attempts, in derogation of the common law, to create a liability, we cannot go beyond the clearly-expressed provisions of the act. Such statutes are not to be extended or enlarged in their scope by construction.
The judgment must be reversed with costs of both courts.