184 Mich. 512 | Mich. | 1915
The Hecla Company is in process of dissolution, and is in the hands of a receiver. The city of Detroit, on September 14, 1914, filed a claim for $50.22 for general city taxes for the year 1914, assessed on the personal property of said company, accompanied by a petition, praying that the court make an
The claim of the city is:
“There is nothing in section 3832 of our statute that especially exempts money deposited in a bank from taxation. Money is tangible personal property, as much so as any other class of personal property enumerated for taxation purposes in section 3831 of the statute. It was not the intention of the legislature in classifying personal property for taxation purposes, as provided for by said section 3831, to permit the moneys of the taxpayer, although deposited in a bank, to be set off by his debts in assessing taxes against him” (citing several cases).
The case requires the construction of certain portions of sections 3832 and 3842,1 Comp. Laws, sections 1777 and 1787, 1 How. Stat. (2d Ed.). The provision of section 1777, important here, reads:
“The following personal property shall be exempt from taxation, to wit: * * * So much of the debts due or to become due as shall equal the amount of the bona- fide and unconditional debts by the person owing.”
2. “All credits of every kind owing to such person, * * * including' all deposits in banks.”
As long ago as in 1875, Justice Campbell, speaking for this court, said:
“It is well settled that in the case of all but special deposits the money deposited becomes the property of the banker, and he becomes the debtor of the depositor.” Perley v. Muskegon, 32 Mich. 132, 20 Am. Rep. 637.
To the same effect are Davis v. Bank, 53 Mich. 163 (18 N. W. 629); Neely v. Rood, 54 Mich. 134 (19 N. W. 920, 52 Am. Rep. 802); Grammel v. Carmer, 55 Mich. 201 (21 N. W. 418, 54 Am. Rep. 363); People v. Wadsworth, 63 Mich. 500 (30 N. W. 99); and Stumpf v. Storz, 156 Mich. 228 (120 N. W. 618, 23 L. R. A. [N. S.] 152, 132 Am. St. Rep. 521).
We have examined the cases cited by counsel for appellant, and find them based upon statutory provisions unlike those of our statutes.
The decree is affirmed, with costs.