*1
Bridge
of Detroit
v Ambassador
CITY OF DETROIT v AMBASSADORBRIDGE COMPANY
(Calendar
3).
Argued
2,
Docket No. 132329.
October
No. Decided
7,May
2008.
brought
Wayne
The
an
action
Circuit Court
against
Bridge Company, doing
the Ambassador
business as De-
Bridge Company (DIBC),seeking
injunction
troit International
city zoning
stop
to enforce a
ordinance in order to
several DIBC
Bridge.
construction
related to the Ambassador
The
regarding
cited concerns
increases of truck exhaust and noise. The
court,
Rashid, J., ultimately
J.
James
held that the
DIBC is
instrumentality
purpose
facilitating
for the limited
of
bridge,
supported
purpose
traffic across the
which
the federal
free-flowing
commerce,
foreign
interstate and
and that the federal
government’s
demonstrated intent to control the entire
complex preempted
city’s zoning
ordinance. The Court of
EJ.,
Appeals,
JJ., reversed,
and Wilder
Hoekstra,
Zahra,
concluding
finding concerning
that the trial court’s
interstate and
clearly
international commerce was
erroneous
that federal law
preempt
zoning
govern-
did not
ordinance because the federal
bridge.
ment did not intend to exercise exclusive control over the
Bridge
Detroit,
curiam,
unpublished opinion per
Detroit Int’l
vCo
(Docket
257415).
September
issued
Nos. 257369 and
The
applied
appeal,
Supreme
DIBC
for leave to
which the
Court
(2007).
granted.
Constitutional
Law
Federal
Commerce
Interstate
—
—
Commerce
Private Actors
Federal
Instrumentalities.
preemption may
Federal
occur
regulation
when a state
or
law local
prevents private entity
carrying
a
from
out a federal function that
Congress required
perform;
acting
it to
when
in furtherance of the
applicable
purpose,
private entity
is a federal instru-
mentality; part-time
federal actor is a limited federal instrumen-
tality
regulations
that is immune
only
from state laws and local
acting
when
furtherance of a limited federal function and
(1)
scope
purpose
when
its actions are within the
of the federal
(2)
Congress assigned
regulation,
to it and
the state
or local
law
if
applied,
sufficiently
private entity’s
would
restrict the
purpose.
Johnson,
John
Jr.,
E.
Corporation Counsel, and
Linda D. Fegins, Senior Assistant Corporation Counsel,
for the plaintiff.
Jeffrey Coburn, Willard, David (by LLP Richard Johnson Sevcenko), defendant. for the Catherine Amici Curiae: Driker,
Barris, Sott, (by Daniel M. Denn & P.L.L.C. Robinson), Michigan Tiffany L. Share Association, Bridge- League, Bagley Housing Municipal Detroit, Community Development Mexicantown watch Church, Southwest Ste. Anne’s Catholic Corporation, Association, Inc., Community People’s Detroit Business Detroit, and the Interna- Metropolitan Services for Lawyers Municipal tional Association. presents J. This case us with invitation CAVANAGH, findings the trial court’s factual second-guess Bridge Plaza projects
construction on the Ambassador congestion traffic and facilitate inter- would alleviate court, foreign commerce. Because the trial state delivering bench trial and conducting after a four-week rely clearly did not on erroneous 20-page opinion, facts, Accordingly, decline that invitation. we reverse judgment Appeals of the Court of because the (DIBC) is a Bridge Company Detroit International facili- instrumentality for the limited and, such, as tating traffic over the zoning regulation is immune from the fur- preclude Detroit that would construction thering purpose. this limited federal
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE *4 ordi- zoning The of Detroit seeks to enforce its stop nance on the DIBC to DIBC’s construction Bridge’s located in and around the Ambassador Bridge v Ambassador footprint.1 Part of the Ambassador Bridge sits on land owned the DIBC that is within the city’s geographi- cal boundaries. The DIBC is for-profit, private com- pany that has a unique relationship with the federal government. In 1921, Congress gave the DIBC the construct, authority maintain, and operate the Am- bassador Bridge and its approaches. Ambassador Bridge act, authorization PL 66-395, 41 Stat 1439. This autho- rizing statute requires that bridge’s private opera- (the DIBC) tor also comply with the Bridge 1906, Act of 33 USC 491 et seq. The Bridge Act of applies to all bridges over navigable waters, and it requires all bridge operators to obtain the approval of the United States Secretary of Transportation regarding the “plans and specifications and the location of such bridge acces- sory works” before commencing construction of a new bridge or construction on an old or bridge its accesso- ries. 33 USC 491. late the DIBC was working with the several agencies that operate in and around the bridge gain approval for the installation of new tollbooths trucks, cars and a diesel fuel duty-free station for its
plaza, and truck weighing stations.2 The federal agen- cies initially refused to allow projects, citing con- cerns about projects’ plans and locations. Eventu- ally, after making changes suggested by those federal The Ambassador bridge is an international that connects Detroit, Michigan, Windsor, Ontario. The trial court found that “largest is the crossing commercial in North America. It carries (30%) approximately thirty percent per day of more than $1 billion daily trade between the United States and Canada.” time, At that the tollbooths were located on the Canadian side of the Bridge. proposed change, With the the tollbooths would be holding located outside the customs area on the American side of the bridge. voiced up concern that this could cause vehicles to back leaving on the American side after paying customs but before bridge-use toll. *5 Mich 29 481
34 Opinion op the Court government’s the federal gained the DIBC agencies, Next, requested DIBC the for the the projects.3 approval The denied begin construction. city’s approval to ordinance, and refused to zoning its request, citing the increased variances, citing regarding concerns issue Nonetheless, the DIBC went and noise. truck exhaust result, a city’s building its As the projects. forward with sites and DIBC’s construction inspectors visited the to the for violations related issued several citations construction. city filed February 2001, injunctive
In the action the After a stop the DIBC to construction. against trial, orally trial ruled that bench the court four-week zoning DIBC was immune from the ordinance the instrumentality. The of its status as a because decision, but, planned prepare trial court to written concerns, security the events of border given 9/11 suggested parties the enter extended the court they agreed. negotia- After the negotiations, which failed, delivered a decision in tions the court written DIBC The ruled that was July again 2004. court immune from the ordinance as a federal instrumental- city’s addition, the trial court held that ity. govern- the federal zoning preempted ordinance was the entire bridge ment’s demonstrated intent control complex.4 Court of reversed city appealed. Appeals
The The on First, relying Bridge on Detroit Int’l Co v grounds. both 289; (1930), Mich 791 Co, American Seed 249 228 NW 3 government approved projects implicitly The federal it but, adopted initially disapproved projects, after the DIBC recommendations, government longer disapproved the federal no began completed projects, and the then construction projects. 4 interim, completed August 2001. were In the Bridge Detroit v Ambassador 35 York, and Int 'l Bridge 56; Co v New 254 US 41 CtS (1920), L Ed the Court of Appeals held that the finding trial “court’s that DIBC was constructed facilitating interstate and international com clearly merce is erroneous” and that the DIBC could not instrumentality. be Int'l Detroit Co v Detroit, unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of (Docket Appeals, issued September Nos. 257415), p Appeals 7. Court of also held *6 that the city’s zoning ordinance not was preempted by law because federal government not did intend to exercise exclusive bridge. control over the Id. at 11-12.
II. STANDARD of
review
This case involves an issue of federal
of
preemption
state law and local regulation, which involves statutory
interpretation.
141,
v New
Philadelphia
Jersey, 430 US
(1977).
142;
987;
97 S Ct
L Ed 2d
51
224
Statutory
interpretation
law,
is a
of
question
which we
de
review
novo. In re Investigation March 1999 Riots in East
of
(2000).
Lansing,
378, 383;
Mich
463
617
NW2d 310
addition, we review the trial
findings
court’s factual
support
legal holdings
clear
error. MCR
2.613(C);
Services,
Appliance
Wilson,
Sands
Inc v
463
(2000).
231, 238;
Mich
615
241
A
NW2d
trial court’s
findings
factual
clearly
are
erroneous
when the
“
reviewing court is
‘left with the definite and firm
”
conviction that a
has
Miller,
mistake
been made.’
In re
(1989) (citation
331, 337;
433 Mich
III. ANALYSIS
“The doctrine of
preemption
origin
has its
2,
the Supremacy
VI,
Clause of article
cl
of the United
29
481 Mich
36
Opinion op the Court
laws of the
Constitution,
that the
which declares
States
Law of the
be the supreme
States
‘shall
United
20, 27;
454 Mich
Ryan
Corp,
v Brunswick
Land
(1997), abrogated in
on other
part
541
NW2d
557
Marine,
US 51
Mercury
v
537
grounds
Sprietsma
(2002).
‘stands as
“when a state law
Preemption occurs
of
execution
accomplishment
to the
an obstacle
”
Wisconsin
objectives
Congress.’
purposes
full
Mortier,
597, 605; 111 S
501
Ct
Intervenor v
US
Pub
(1991)
omitted).
(citations
2476;
L
2d
115
Ed
532
regula
or local
Preemption can occur when
state law
entity
carrying out a
from
prevents
private
tion
per
it with
Congress
function
has tasked
178-179;
Train,
167,
v
96
forming. See Hancock
426 US
(1976),
2006;
citing
We part-time refer to federal as actors limited federal they instrumentalities because are immune from state laws and local regulations they acting when are in furtherance of the limited purpose that served as impetus granting them federal- Also, instrumentality status. “[designating entity colors instrumentality typical preemption analysis by requiring presume, the court absence of clear and unambiguous congressional autho- the contrary, Congress rization to intended to preempt regulation state or local of federal instru- Olivet, mentality.” 486, Mount 164 F3d at Don’t citing Down, Tear It Pennsylvania Inc v Corp, Avenue Dev 206 122, 129-130; US App DC (1980); F2d 527 see also Train, 178-179; Hancock v US at 167, Mayo States, 441, United 446-448; 319 US 63 S L Ct (1943). And, Ed 1504 case, in this there no such congressional regulation. authorization local How- ever, despite above, the presumption noted a limited federal instrumentality is immune from local state and (1) regulation only when actions are within the scope purpose Congress the federal it assigned has (2) the or if regulation, state law local would applied, sufficiently restrict the private entity’s purpose. See Fed York, James v Reserve Bank New 471 F Supp (ED 2007). NY, 2d case,
In this the trial court relied on primarily federal-instrumentality preemption holding that the immune the city’s zoning was from ordinance. Indeed, the trial court found the DIBC was a federal instrumentality for the limited of facili- *8 29Mich 481
38 Opinion the of Court Bridge, which the Ambassador tating traffic across free-flowing interstate the of supports foreign commerce. first decide is Accordingly, we must whether issue, instrumentality. On that limited federal a has that is fair “[i]t Court stated Supreme United States when action deciding private might ‘our say that cases a model state have not been deemed that of the be ” Passenger Corp, v Railroad consistency.’ Lebron Nat’l (1995) L Ed 2d 902 374, 378; 115 S Ct 130 513 US omitted). (citations Thus, is rule bright-line there no instrumentality. if is a determining a actor private Olivet, result, As courts Mount F3d at 486. a have determining in federal- numerous tests applied in United States status. Id. For instrumentality example, (CA 1988), Michigan, 851 F2d 803, 6, the court v (1) the which three factors: function for considered (2) established, claiming immunity actor was private that private actor continues to serve func whether (3) tion, of the federal control exerted significance on, with, the private and the federal involvement actor. the factor-based to the example approach This is one analysis. federal-instrumentality addition, a applied federal courts have varia- some v Michigan United States test when the tion of claiming to a limited entity be private Name.Space, instrumentality. example, the court in For (CA Solutions, Inc, Inc v Network 573, 581-582 F3d 2000), differentiated between “conduct-based immu- evaluating nity” immunity and “status-based” entity federal-instrumentality private status contract operating government under a with was immunity from a evaluating entity’s While agency. Name.Space suit, Act antitrust Sherman court instrumentality that a federal has status-based noted *9 immunity, is immunity, which absolute when “the fed- eral or government agencies its directly own and/or plenary exercise control over the [private] entity ... And, Id. alternatively, at 581. a limited federal instru- mentality has that less immunity is than absolute Id., under a “conduct-based instrumentality doctrine.” Motor citing Southern Carriers Rate v Conference, Inc States, 48, 58-59; United US 471 105 S Ct 85 L Ed (1985). 2d 36 The in Name.Space court that held such limited immunity by conduct-based could be evaluated activity to the ‘nature “looking challenged, of the rather than the . identity defendant’. . .” Name.Space, Carriers, 581, citing 202 F3d at Southern Motor 471 US at 58-59. the Finally, gave entity court the private federal-instrumentality that immunity was limited its required acts that were under contract with the government agency. Name.Space, F3d at 582. acknowledge
We that the in Name.Space court was with dealing slightly the issue governmen- different immunity tal Further, from antitrust suits. courts that analyzed have general the federal-instrumentality issue have used several variations of used by the factors the court in United States Michigan, and additional in factors some instances.5 The question essential to be in case Did Congress answered this is: to give intend private actor authority the limited carry unique out federal such purpose that the is private actor immune from state or local it regulation when is carrying out that purpose? Because we are convinced applying that the factors from United in Michigan States v conjunc- tion analysis by with “conduct-based” used the count (CA See Mendrala, 7, 1992) (reviewing 955 F2d at 1136 these factors: “(1) (2) government’s ownership entity; the federal interest in the (3) activities; government structure; entity’s entity’s control over the (4) (5) government finances; entity’s entity’s involvement in the mission”). function or 481 Mich op Opinion the Court believe that question, answer this Name.Space will unique present facts of analysis for the
it is the correct federal-instrumentality involving of limited a claim case Clause. immunity Supremacy based on this case matter, we note that preliminary As a free- long-recognized purpose involves The commerce. Ambas- foreign flowing interstate pur- distinctly related to that federal sador transportation, it is a conduit pose, given and the United States. commerce, between Canada thus accepted by and was parties riot disputed This is case this concerns dispute both lower courts. has to further the DIBC been tasked whether necessary for it to be to the extent *10 instrumentality. That as a limited federal recognized earlier. hybrid test discussed question initiates First, when the test from United States apply it that the trial court under- becomes clear Michigan, factual being pivotal this as laden with stood issue its “unique” in its of the case as on description disputes dutifully court understanding, facts. With that trial hotly trial. The facts were con- conducted four-week Indeed, produced both numerous parties tested at trial. support evidence to their witnesses voluminous claims, its vigorously oppo- and each cross-examined result, As a the court nent’s witnesses and evidence. heavily relied opinion thorough, 20-page issued findings. on The trial made several its factual court bridge’s findings regarding opera- of fact important surrounding property: tion and (1) 3.5 million trucks and approximately bridge. cars passenger million crossed (2) area complex separated The is an enclosed bridge walls, by fences, brick and barbed surroundings from its wire. v Ambassador
(3) DIBC, under federal supervision, controls all of the few entrance and exit points the complex.
(4) The government DIBC and the federal each owns property bridge within the complex.
(5) Several agencies share control over the bridge complex: United States Customs and Border Protection, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the General Administration, Services the Department of Agriculture.
(6) The federal government has plenary control over bridge complex: “[I]f it is in the compound, it is under federal control.” Trial court opinion, p 9.
(7) All DIBC are personnel under federal government control. They report must to the government before leaving the complex.
(8) Federal employees at the bridge complex are charged with enforcing laws, maintaining border security, controlling immigration, and con- ducting customs They missions. have responsibil- no ity for regulating or facilitating traffic flow over the bridge.
(9) The solely DIBC is responsible for regulating and facilitating traffic flow over the bridge.
The trial court also made findings several of fact regarding the proposed DIBC’s construction projects and their effect on traffic:
(1) The DIBC had proposed three construction *11 (a) (b) projects: cars, new toll booths for changes in the (c) location and number of pumps, diesel and new tollbooths for trucks. delays Traffic due to backups on the bridge were
(2) problem a serious to the steady flow of traffic across the bridge. Mich 29 Opinion op the Court
(3) delayed being trucks were delivery Commercial occasions. regular on several for hours suffering were manufacturers Large automobile (4) delayed just-in-time as a result of economic losses acute deliveries.
(5) caused, too few part, were delays These tollbooths.
(6) would construction proposed The DIBC’s and reduce traffic over the increase traffic flow delays.
(7) bridge complex within the agencies All federal locating, designing planning, involved were plans (present all DIBC construction processes of past). the court espoused by trial the test applied court Michigan
in United States v
to these facts. After
error,
any
we decline to reverse
review for clear
However,
recognize
we do
findings.
trial court’s factual
city
at trial contradicted
proffered
that the evidence the
Court,
Indeed, before this
findings.
of these
several
testimony
of two fed-
city
marshaled
persuasively
in the
Their
bridge complex.
eral
who work
employees
DIBC’s contentions that the
testimony contradicted the
delays
would reduce traffic
construction
proposed
overtly controlled or man-
government
that the federal
Furthermore,
projects.
dated the construction
that federal control
strong
argument
makes a
factual
attenuated at best because the federal
over the DIBC is
(or veto
negative
exercises
control
government
proposed projects.
over the
power)
argued be-
But those factual assertions were better
court under a
preponderance
fore the trial
face review
arguments
Those factual
evidence standard.
error,
means the
must
for clear
which
by this Court
*12
Ambassador
Opinion of the Court
leave us with the definite and firm conviction that a
mistake
in
has been made
the factual basis that the trial
Miller,
court relied
In
on.
re
The first question whether, under the United test, States v Michigan the DIBC is a federal instru- mentality. The first factor of that test asks for what function the DIBC was established and whether that function advances a federal purpose. Applying this factor to this case is somewhat like putting a square peg into a round hole because the DIBC was existence before the Bridge’s commission.6 Nonethe- less, case, in this it is reasonable to apply by this factor asking what function served as the impetus for the DIBC to enter into its current interaction with the federal government.7
The DIBC’s interaction with the federal government
is tied to the federal purpose of the Ambassador Bridge,
which is ostensibly facilitating the flow of interstate and
actuality,
predecessor
bridge’s
the DIBC’s
existed before the
commission,
viewing
corporate
but we see no error in
the DIBC and its
predecessor
purposes
as one for the
of this case because the act autho
rizing
bridge
just
does
that.
Johnson,
57, holding
federal-instrumentality
See
254 US at
(because
immunity applied
employee
obviously
ato federal
who
existed
born)
gained
he had
federal-instrumentality
by
been
before he
status
being
government
hired
as a mail carrier.
foreign commerce. “construct, maintain, the DIBC to Congress directed Thus, 66-395, 41 PL Stat 1439. bridge. operate” build, and maintain operate, if DIBC is tasked to made for the and if the was bridge, commerce, then the function free-flowing *13 for the DIBC’s interaction impetus that as the served purpose the federal government the federal was with There- foreign commerce. free-flowing interstate federal-instrumentality status fore, factor this favors for the DIBC. DIBC continues factor asks whether the
The second maintaining The DIBC is still to serve that function. Bridge, which necessar- the Ambassador operating free-flowing the federal inter- ily furthers Thus, this factor favors foreign state and commerce. for the DIBC. federal-instrumentality status significance The third factor evaluates the on, and the federal involvement federal control exerted by the trial with, Relying the DIBC. on the facts found court, legal holding that court’s agree with Federal strong is a and substantial level of “there control and involvement with the DIBC within this factor favors federal- Bridge Complex,” such the DIBC. instrumentality status for this findings support legal The trial court’s factual maintains strict government conclusion. The federal compound. The trial court stated that control over “if it in the it is under federal control.” compound, is is maintained as a sterile area that is not compound edict, public usage. By to the for common open is not associated with a federal entering all traffic that or the DIBC must continue on to Canada. agency vehicle randomly any customs can search United States workers. including in the all DIBC person compound, or v Ambassador agencies The federal do not any personnel allow photograph any portion of the compound. The federal agencies power exercise veto over all construction in projects compound. When the DIBC began plan- ning construction it question, was re- quired, any project, as with such gain agencies’ approval. agencies Those denied the DIBC’s requests initial for approval. adopted The DIBC then federally mandated modifications and began con- Thus, projects. struction the federal government, hav- ing power to preclude the DIBC’s construction projects, at least implicitly approved the projects’ final design and construction. This is most evident physical structures’ today. existence In light of these facts, the trial court stated that “[t]he evidence in this case establishes that the overall effective and efficient management of the bridge only accomplished through the cooperative mutual effort and coordinated activity of the DIBC and the various federal agencies maintain- ing presence at the bridge Therefore, complex.” this third factor favors federal-instrumentality *14 status for the DIBC.
Regarding factor, this third we note that the and the Court of Appeals, in suggesting deficient federal control for federal-instrumentality status, make much of the fact that the DIBC is financially independent from the federal government. They argue that DIBC is simply a moneymaking private citizen whose purely interest is in moving more traffic in gain order to tolls, more profit from the sale duty-free goods, and fuel dispensing. essence, In they believe that the cannot metamorphose being itself into a federal instru- mentality on the basis of a financially driven decision coincidentally that has a beneficial effect on an unre- lated federal purpose. They support argument this by noting that the federal agencies bridge compound Mich 29 that, changes DIBC’s proposed mandated the
never expressed have ambivalence fact, agencies those forward. going projects’ toward the arguments. those disagree We with is not necessar- federal-instrumentality status Again, the private status for all of all-encompassing an ily monetary the DIBC’s regard, activities. actor’s are irrelevant to its federal- interest and motivations is relevant is that instrumentality status. What acting purpose. in furtherance of a federal DIBC is that showed that trial court relied on record evidence by attempt projects the construction were motivated new, tollbooths bridge separate facilitate traffic: the separate automobiles attempts were successful trucks, project and the allowed diesel- diesel-pump efficiently in a location trucks to fuel more powered gasoline-driven from that automobiles. separate Also, required 53-foot-long diesel location semi- the old turn, whereas the new negotiate 90-degree trucks to straighter for a and more efficient location allowed earlier, fueling. Accordingly, as stated system DIBC, that the accept finding irrespec- the trial court’s motives, trying financial to facilitate tive of its projects. traffic means of these the federal at the Additionally, agencies the fact that did is irrel- bridge complex projects not mandate are directed to control and agencies evant because those that are distinct from the regulate purposes customs, immigra- such as free-flowing-traffic purpose, control, security. explains This tion border projects; agencies ambivalence toward the agencies’ any projects are unconcerned with traffic-facilitation their distinct federal pur- unless such inhibit noted, Yet, foreign and interstate poses. previously as *15 Thus, purpose. traffic over the is a federal what Opinion Court is relevant here is whether acting DIBC was in furtherance of that federal purpose. accepting the trial court’s statement that “[t]here was sufficient evidence presented by DIBC for the [c]ourt to conclude proposed that DIBC’s construction will have a positive impact on traffic flow and reduce delays for traffic at the bridge,” necessarily accept such an action was in furtherance of the DIBC’s federal mandate to maintain and operate bridge. all
With three factors favoring federal- status, instrumentality we next apply the conduct- based test used the court in Name.Space. Like the instrumentality in Name.Space, DIBC does not have immunity, status-based which is absolute immu- nity, because it is tasked to conduct a limited Thus, purpose. like the in instrumentality the DIBC Name.Space, has conduct-based immunity, applies which only to its conduct furthers purpose. earlier, As discussed Congress has build, required the DIBC to operate, and maintain Thus, bridge. like the instrumentality Name.Space, which had immunity conduct that it was required to do under its contract with the federal agency, the DIBC has immunity for its conduct in the operation and maintenance of the Ambassador Bridge. operat- While ing the the DIBC must bridge, keep the flow of bridge Thus, traffic at an optimal level. the DIBC’s conduct- based immunity extends to its conduct that facilitates bridge traffic.
Therefore, under both the test in United States v Michigan and the conduct-based test Name.Space, correctly the trial court concluded that the DIBC is an instrumentality of the federal lim- government for the ited traffic facilitating bridge. flow over the *16 29 481 Mich
48 Opinion of the Court status as a federal instru- note that the DIBC’s We clearly that are mentality is limited to actions of traffic across with the facilitation directly associated may not Accordingly, the Bridge. the Ambassador actions into this status. fit its non-traffic-facilitative scope of evaluating could be described as This issue immunity. This issue is instrumentality’s the federal in cases of limited federal instru- particularly important case, mentalities, immunity because ex- such as this of instru- scope tends to acts that are within the attempt While we do not mentality’s purpose. do not fall within the list all the actions that do or agree of we with the trial court scope immunity, DIBC’s its projects that the DIBC’s construction are within scope immunity. of findings compelling trial court’s factual are on
this issue. It held that the volume of
traffic was
low,
projects
that the construction
were
problematically
volume,
projects
meant
to increase that
and that
Therefore, under a conduct-
accomplished
goal.
that
test,
immunity
projects
based
the DIBC’s construction
of
its
limited federal-
scope
were within
directly
instrumentality immunity
they
because
were
they
motivated
the DIBC’s
Finally,
we
actually
promote
purpose.
worked
immunity stops
caution that there is a line where this
instrumentality’s
scope
because the
act is outside the
however, the
purpose;
its federal
DIBC’s construction
line in this
projects have not crossed the
case.
by declaring
But our
does not end
the DIBC
analysis
instrumentality
holding
a limited federal
scope
were actions within its
construction
Indeed,
with federal instru-
immunity.
entity
“where
from a
mentality
immunity
particular
status claims
exaction,
state
test is whether that exaction
proper
Detroit
v
James,
function.”
entity’s
interfere with the
will
And,
2d
if the
ordinance does
Supp
city’s
471 F
at 242.
DIBC’s limited federal
purpose,
interfere with the
of that
interference be
analyze
magnitude
must
instrumentalities
are not “insulated from
cause federal
local requirements.”
incidental or nonburdensome
130-131,
Down,
App
citing
Don’t Tear It
206 US
DC at
2285;
Mexico,
529, 543;
Ct
v New
426 US
96 S
Kleppe
(1976), Evansville-Vanderburgh Airport
L Ed 2d 34
Airlines,
720-721;
Inc,
Auth Dist v Delta
405 US
(1972),
Cook,
Ed
US
S Ct
31 L
2d 620
Wilson
*17
474, 486-488;
(1946),
66 S Ct
Justice Holmes made this
clear
his
Johnson,
earlier,
In other
the defendant
in Johnson was immune
regulations
sufficiently
from state or local
that
inhib-
immune from
purpose,
ited his federal
but he was not
Next, the primarily contends that ordinance expansion any restricts the DIBC’s business and that restriction on the is incidental to the effect on projects bridge city supports by noting traffic. The this that the can still these construction bridge operate without past. response as it did in the Our is twofold. projects, First, reiterate that the DIBC’s economic interests no projects these are of moment. What is relevant is ordinance application city’s sufficiently whether hinders the DIBC in out its federal carrying purpose. Second, argument that city’s limiting bridge preconstruction merely incidentally its state affects point. traffic misses the fails to acknowl- edge government’s the federal interest lies sustaining free-flowing by increasing bridge commerce In- preconstruction, problematic traffic above level. stead, city wrongly contends that the preconstruc- traffic, commerce, acceptable. tion level of or was But by the court’s argument supported is not trial findings. Therefore, argument factual this is of no avail city. to the DIBC,
Accordingly, the
as a limited federal instru-
it
mentality,
city’s
is immune from the
ordinance as
before us.
applies
to the construction
reliance on American
Finally,
Appeals
Court of
Those cases
misplaced.
Seed Co and Int’l
Co is
*19
Because we are satisfied that the trial court was correct in federal-instrumentality analysis, and be- cause analysis provides we believe that an adequate basis for ruling today, our we see it as prudential not to the rulings evaluate of the trial or court the Court of Appeals any other regarding preemption theories.
IV CONCLUSION After accepting the facts established the trial court, affirm the judgment court, we of the trial reverse judgment Court of Appeals, hold that the DIBC is a federal instrumentality for the pur- limited pose facilitating traffic flow across the Ambassador Bridge is, therefore, immune any from state law or regulation local that directly inhibits that purpose. Further, we affirm the trial court’s holding this particular application of the city’s zoning ordinance inhibits the DIBC’s purpose. However, choose not to formulate an arbitrary bright-line rule concerning future DIBC, conflicts between the in its federal-instrumentality status, limited and state or Detroit v Opinion by Concurring Corrigan, J. trial to examine trust courts regulation. We local inhibits directly regulation or local a state law whether federal-instrumentality and limited unique DIBC’s *20 any disputes. future status reversed, of Appeals of the Court judgment entry trial court for the remanded to the
and the case is opinion. with this injunction consistent Young, Weaver, Kelly, Corrigan, Taylor, C.J., and CAVANAGH,J. MARKMAN,JJ., concurred with in Justice I concur CORRIGAN, (concurring). J. emphasize I separately write analysis. CAVANAGH’s federal-instrumentality sta- scope the limited Bridge Company International tus of the Detroit (DIBC) operation to its commercial regard with that are less and similar activities fueling stations facilitating bridge tolls or directly taking related to Justice CAVANAGH’s I also write to underscore traffic. to the that are related that even activities point immune from entirely not purpose DIBC’s federal are regulation. local states, an instru- CAVANAGH “the DIBC is
As Justice
limited
for the
mentality
government
of the federal
Ante
facilitating
bridge.”
traffic flow over the
purpose
concluded that the new
reasonably
at 47. The trial court
aided traffic flow.
of the diesel station
configuration
argued that
Further,
appear
not
to have
does
previous
in its
wrongly
maintained
station
merely by
zoning requirements
local
location or violated
I
Accordingly,
pumps.
the number of
slightly increasing
result and this Court’s
the trial court’s
agree with
affirming that result.
reasons for
the record does
first, that
emphasize,
I
simply
would
maintaining a diesel
the extent
which
not establish
to the DIBC’s
at all relates
fueling station
Second, I would emphasize that all regulation local is not automatically preempted with respect to the DIBC’s immune activities. Justice CAVANAGH notes that the city issued a variance to the DIBC that included amorphous noise, smoke, conditions concerning and odor at the DIBC’s site. The effectively give conditions the city unrestricted authority to revoke the variance. Ante at 50. Because the variance gives city the same broad power to inhibit the DIBC’s federally mandated activi- ties did zoning ordinance, as the variance would be similarly preempted. But seeks, because the city in part, 1 Perhaps commercial may trucks’ use of the include —which idling delays as a including result of federal activities customs inspections significantly by facilitated on-site to access diesel fuel. —is Perhaps profit fueling operation DIBC derives from its that offsets maintaining bridge and, therefore, the costs of enables tolls to remain Nonetheless, at affordable challenged only levels. because the reconfiguration fueling station, the exact nature of the station’s relationship to the DIBC’s federal is not at issue. v Concurring Opinion Corrigan, J. including local air safety, health and public regulate to police the traditional I that the retains note quality, citizens.2 safety of its the health protect to power regu- safety health and certainly impose city may The not regulations those do to the extent lations pur- ability carry out its the DIBC’s inhibit pose. Supreme in Pike v Bruce Court observed As the United States (1970), 844;
Church, Inc,
137, 142;
“the
burden
“conferring
Congress
regulation
upon
Constitution when
legislating
commerce,...
offfrom
never intended to cut
States
health, life,
safety
subjects relating
of their
to the
on all
might indirectly
citizens, though
legislation
affect the com-
Detroit,
country.” [Huron Portland Cement Co v
merce of the
(1960) (citation
813;
440, 443-444;
4 L
80 S Ct
Ed 2d 53
US
omitted).]
278, 306-307;
Corp Tracy,
Similarly,
117 S Ct
see Gen Motors
519 US
761(1997);
Optometry
811;
L Ed 2d
Head v New Mexico Bd
(1963).
428-429;
Examiners,
83 S
