The appellant corporation was prosecuted in the municipal court of the city of Dearborn for an alleged violation of the traffic ordinance of said city. The complaint filed alleged that on the 3d of May, 1954, defendant, being the owner of a certain GMC truck and semitrailer, knowingly caused and permitted said motor vehicle to be operated on Ford road in the city of Dearborn with an excessive axle load. It is agreed that at'the time of the alleged violation Ford road was a State trunk-line highway bearing number M-153. The complaint was based on chapter 11 of the ordinance as amended, which ordinance, No 54-873, was adopted by the city council on February 9, 1954. The chapter referred to imposed limits on the gross weight of motor vehicles operating on streets within the city, and the complaint against defendant charged specifically that the load on axle No 2 exceeded by 3,970 pounds the lawful maximum ás. fixed by the ordinance.
Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint and warrant on the ground that Ford road, being a State trunk-line highway, was not subject to the jurisdiction of the city of Dearborn, and that said city had no authority to impose weight restrictions on traffic thereon. In asking dismissal defendant relied on section 726 of the Michigan motor vehicle code * (CLS 1952, § 257.726 [Stat Ann 1952 Eev § 9.2426]) which reads as follows:
“Local authorities and county road commissions with respect to highways under their jurisdiction, except State trunk-line highways, may by ordinance or resolution, prohibit the operation of trucks or other commercial vehicles, or may impose limitations as to the weight thereof on designated highways, which prohibitions and limitations shall be desig *260 nated by appropriate signs placed on such highways;”
Defendant contended before the municipal court that under this statute the city was forbidden to impose weight limitations on traffic using the State trunk line. On behalf of the city reliance was placed on article 8, § 28, of the State Constitution (1908), particularly the clause thereof declaring that:
“The right of all cities, villages and townships to the reasonable .control of their > streets, alleys and public places is hereby reserved to such cities, villages and townships.”
It was insisted by the city that under said provision of the Constitution it was not within the power of the legislature to forbid the enactment of a reasonable ordinance regulating traffic on streets within the municipal limits, including trunk-line roads. The motion to dismiss was denied by the municipal court and defendant was adjudged guilty of a violation of the ordinance. The attorney general intervened in the case on behalf of the State, asking in substance that the validity of the provision of the State motor vehicle law involved in the controversy should be upheld.
Defendant appealed its conviction to the circuit court of Wayne county where the matter was submitted to a circuit judge on a stipulation as to certain facts and a transcript of the testimony taken in the municipal court. Defendant’s motions to quash the complaint and warrant and for' a directed verdict of not guilty were denied. A motion on behalf of the State to dismiss was disposed of in like manner. The circuit judge concluded, as appears from his opinion in the record, that under article 8, § 28, of the Constitution the legislature could not forbid the municipality to adopt a weight restriction ordinance, that ..the clause of the Michigan motor *261 vehicle code on which defendant relied was unconstitutional, and that the ordinance under which defendant was prosecuted was valid. Judgment was entered accordingly, a'fine determined in accordance with the provisions of the ordinance being imposed on defendant. On leave granted, the latter has appealed.
The weight restrictions on truck traffic imposed by the city ordinance are, in substance, .identical with corresponding provisions of the motor vehicle code of the State as set forth in section 724 thereof (CLS' 1952, § 257.724 [Stat Ann 1953 Cum Supp § 9.2424]). The ordinance seeks to protect the trunk-line highways within the city in precisely the same manner and to the same extent as does the State law, There, is no conflict between State and municipal actions.
It is argued here, as it was in the trial courts, that under pertinent provisions of the Constitution plaintiff was clothed with authority to adopt the ordinance under which defendant was prosecuted and convicted. As indicating the general purpose manifest by the Constitution, attention is directed to article 8, §§27 and 28, which read as follows:
“Sec. 27. The legislature shall not vacate nor alter any road laid out by commissioners of highways, or any street, alley or public ground in any city or village or in any recorded town plat.” .
! “Sec. 28. No person, partnership, association or corporation operating a public utility shall have the right to the use of the highways, streets, alleys or other public places of any city, village or township for wires, poles, pipes, tracks or conduits, without the consent of the duly constituted authorities of such city, village or township; nor to-transact a local business therein without first obtaining a franchise' therefor from such city, village or township. The right of all cities, villages and townships to the reasonable control of their streets, alleys and public *262 places is hereby reserved to such cities, villages and townships.”
Plaintiff also relies on the decision of this Court in
People
v.
McGraw,
“Prom this, and also from reading the debates with reference to the insertion of the word ‘reasonable,’ it is clear that it was not the intention of the framers of the Constitution to deprive absolutely the State itself of control over its highways and bridges in the cities, villages, and townships. The claim that the reservation should be limited to the control of public utility corporations, to our minds, overlooks entirely the express language of the last sentence of said section 28. By giving the language of the whole section its ordinary and natural meaning, public utilities were placed under control of the local authorities, and the local authorities may control within reason the use of their streets for any. *263 purposes whatsoever not inconsistent with the State law.
“Taking the sections together, they should be so construed as to give the power to municipalities to pass such ordinances and regulations with reference to their highways and bridges as are not inconsistent with the general State law. In other words, the municipality retains reasonable control of its highways, which is such control as cannot be said to be unreasonable and inconsistent with regulations which have been established, or may be established, by the State itself with reference thereto. This construction allows a municipality to recognize local and peculiar conditions and to pass ordinances regulating traffic on its streets, which do not contravene' the State laws. The congested condition of traffic on many of the streets of the city of Detroit is a matter of common knowledge, and these conditions make it absolutely necessary, for the protection of pedestrians and the drivers of vehicles, to enact rules and regulations peculiarly adapted to the conditions there found, and to enact ordinances to diminish the danger, and the words ‘reasonable control’ in section 28 give the power to meet just such conditions.”
The scope of the holding in the
McGraw Case
was discussed in the opinion of the Court in
Brennan
v.
Recorder of the City of Detroit,
“In our opinion, this decision should not be given any such construction. The force of that decision is that the rule of conduct established by the State' with reference to the highways of a municipality cannot be relaxed or made less stringent by a city ordinance, but incidents that may be found necessary by the legislative body to enforce the rule of con *264 duct are not what was contemplated in the previous decision when we said that the ordinance should not contravene' the State law. . There is no question in the instant case that the rule of conduct established' by the ordinance does not contravene the State law, in that it does not make it less stringent or relax it. The recording with the secretary of State of the infractions of the State law and the other requirements of the statute for recording and certifying the convictions, are merely incidents of the enforcement of the statute that do not affect the rule of conduct therein prescribed.”
■ See, also, with reference to the general question at issue,
Melconian
v.
City of Grand Rapids,
Attention is directed by counsel to statements made by this Court in its opinion in
Allen
v.
Rogers,
In the case of
Allen
v.
State Highway Commissioner,
As before noted, the ordinance of the plaintiff city is not at variance with the State statute. It! does not assume to authorize conduct by- those'using *266 its streets and highways of a character forbidden by general State law. It is, rather, in the nature of an assertion by the municipality that it has such an interest in the preservation of the trunk-iine road, which is one of the main thoroughfares through the city, as entitles it under its constitutional authority to impose restrictions and limitations with reference to the use of such road and the safety of those traveling thereon. No claim is made that any of its provisions are inherently unreasonable or otherwise subject to specific attack. Obviously it is designed to further the same purpose as is the State statute above cited.
' Plaintiff asserts also that the injury or destruction of the road by heavy traffic may result in a financial burden falling on the city. In this connection reliance is placed on CL 1948, § 250.31, as amended by PA 1951, No 53 (Stat Ann 1953 Cum Supp § 9.881). Furthermore, as pointed out in the opinion of the circuit judge before whom the case was tried, the city is concerned in protecting its people against such use of the trunk line as may render it unsafe for travel. In
People
v.
Wolfe,
For the reasons above stated we are in accord with the conclusion of the trial judge that under the provisions of article 8, § 28, of the Constitution (1908), the legislature exceeded its authority in undertaking to prevent municipalities from adopting any traffic regulations limiting the weight of commer *267 cial vehicles, and that the ordinance of the city Of Dearborn in question here is valid. The judgment is affirmed.