delivered the opinion of the court:
On October 12, 1971, the City of De Kalb filed its complaint for the condemnation of the North 30 feet of Lot 51 in County Clerk’s Assessment Subdivision of Block 12 of the original town of De Kalb. The property is owned by Theodore L. Anderson and Dora C. Anderson, his sister. It is improved by a two-story brick building erected in either 1909 or 1910. On Novеmber 5, 1971, the defendants filed an appearance and jury demand. On April 14, 1972, the defendants filed a traverse and a motion to dismiss. On April 28, 1972, amendments tо the traverse and a motion to dismiss were filed and on May 19, 1972, defendants filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings as amended, or for summary judgment. The motions were denied on June 1, 1972. On June 1,1972, a hearing was held on the traverse and the motion to dismiss and the motion for summary judgment. These three motions were dismissed on that day and the matter was set for jury trial. The trial was held on July 10,1972, and a jury returned a verdict finding just compensation to be *45,000. The funds were deрosited with the De Kalb county treasurer. On August 9, 1972, plaintiff filed a post-trial motion which was never called upon for hearing. Defendants subsequently filed a motion for “post-trial relief from verdict of judgment” and this was set for September 21, 1972, at which date they amended their post-trial motion. On that datе the post-trial motion was denied and on October 18,1972, defendants filed a “motion to vacate order entered September 21, 1972.” On November 22, 1972, the defendants again filed a petition for leave to appeal from the July 10, 1972, judgment and order denying the amended post-trial motion. On Dеcember 12, 1972, this was denied and on January 16,1973, the court denied defendants’ petition for rehearing. Subsequent to that date the defendants have bеen in court approximately 17 times for various amendments and motions. Finally, three years later, on August 21,1975, the defendants filed a notice of аppeal.
The condemnation of defendants’ property is a part of the acquisition by the City of De Kalb of approximately 12 blоcks in area, being 2 blocks wide and 6 blocks long. This acquisition was authorized by various ordinances of the City of De Kalb under the provisions of seсtion 11 — 11—1 of the Illinois Municipal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 24, par. 11 — 11—1).
The pro se brief of the defendant is extremely difficult to follow. Arguments are presentеd, theoretically, on eight issues in their brief. However, they argue only one, that the defendants’ property is not “slum or blighted.” The defendants conclude that the City of De Kalb lacks the right and power to condemn defendants’ real property. At no time do the defendants argue that the amount awarded under the condemnation proceeding is insufficient. The issue of just compensation, therefore, is specifically waivеd.
Indirectly, it would appear that defendants’ argument may be that the City of De Kalb abused its power in condemning defendants’ property. Section 11 — 11—1 of the Illinois Municipal Code gives the City of De Kall^ the power “to acquire by purchase, condemnation or otherwise any improved or unimproved real property the acquisition of which is necessary or appropriate for the rehabilitation or redevelopment of any blighted or slum area or any conservation area as defined in Section 3 of the Urban Community Conservation Act * ” The рredecessor of this specific section has been upheld by the Illinois Supreme Court in People ex rel. Tuohy v. City of Chicago (1946),
At the jury trial the City of De Kalb introduced its resolution approving the urban renewal plan and the ordinances passed by the city to condemn sрecific parcels of property, including defendants’ property, under the urban renewal project as necessary, required аnd needed for such rehabilitation and redevelopment purposes. As the City points out, it is well established that the introduction into evidence of the resolution and the ordinance approving the resolution for condemnation makes a prima facie case. (City of Chiсago v. Walker (1971),
“There is no merit in the contention. In this kind of case the fact that there may be some sound buildings in the slum and blighted area is no defense to the proceedings. Property may be taken which, standing by itself, is unoffending, for the test is based on the condition of the аrea as a whole.”30 Ill. 2d 255 , 257,195 N.E.2d 629 , 631.
In Berman v. Parker (1954),
“Property may of course be taken for this redevelopment which, standing by itself, is innocuous and unoffending * * * it is the need of the areа as a whole which Congress and its agencies are evaluating. If owner after owner were permitted to resist these redevelopment programs on the ground that his particular property was not being used against the public interest, integrated plans for redevelopmеnt would suffer greatly. * * * [Community redevelopment programs need not, by force of the Constitution, be on a piecemeal basis — lot by lot, building by building.” (348 U.S. 26 , 35,99 L. Ed. 27 , 39,75 S. Ct. 98 .)
As stated at the outset of this opinion, it is extremely difficult to follow the arguments of the defendants. We have examined the record nonetheless and find no error. The order of the trial court entering judgment on the verdict of the jury in the sum of *45,000 for the defendants herein is therefore affirmed.
Affirmed.
SEIDENFELD and T. J. MORAN, JJ., concur.