The City of Dalton filed a petition to condemn land owned by Mark and Terry Smith. The superior court appointed a special master to conduct the condemnation proceeding. The special master awarded the Smiths $182,000 as the fair market value of the condemned property. The Smiths appealеd to the superior court, challenging the special master’s finding as to the property’s value. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the Smiths in the amount of $271,126. The cоurt entered final judgment on the verdict. The city appeals from that judgment.
1. The city argues that the court erred in charging the jury on the
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statute of frauds requirement that a contract concerning an interest in land must be in writing to be binding because the Smiths waived an affirmative defense based on the statute of frauds by failing to raise it in the pleadings. See
Brantley Co. v. Simmons,
2. The city contends that the court erred in excluding from evidence a document purporting to grant the Smiths an easement across the condemned property to their remaining property. “Evidence must relate to the questions being tried by the jury and bear upon them either directly or indirectly. Irrelevant matter should be excluded.” OCGA § 24-2-1;
King Cotton, Ltd. v. Powers,
3. In its third and fourth enumerations of error, the city contends that the court’s jury charge regarding admissions in judicio was insufficient and that the court erred in refusing to give four of its requested charges on such admissions. “It is axiomatic that a jury charge need not bе given in the exact language requested if the charge as given clearly covers the circumstances of the case. All that is necessary, provided the requested charge accurately states the relevant principles of law, is that these principles be fairly given to the jury in the general charge. When it can be determined that the charge actually given conveys correctly the intent of the law and is so framed as to be applied with understanding to the fact situation, denial of a request for a specific charge is not reversible error.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Swint v. Smith,
4. The city complains that the court erred in giving four of the Smiths’ requested charges regarding the law of access to a public road. The record reveals that the сity waived any objections to these charges by failing, upon inquiry by the court, to object or reserve exceptions to these charges.
Rodriquez v. Davis,
5. The city argues thаt the court erred in refusing to give its written request to charge the jury that loss of privacy caused by a public project is not a proper element of dаmages. “[W]here the trial court refused to instruct the jury in accordance with a timely submitted written request, in order to secure review of that action on appeal it is unnecessary for the party to state grounds of objection to such refusal at the conclusion of the charge. It is only necessary that the refusal to charge be objected to at some point.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Kres v. Winn-Dixie Stores,
Even if the city had not waived the objection, it is without merit because the requested charge is not an entirely correct and accurate statement of the law.
Lee v. Bartusek,
6. The city contends that the court erred in failing to give its requestеd charge on the Smiths’ duty to mitigate damages. The only evidence cited by the city in support of such a charge is the fact that the Smiths objected to the admission into evidence of the document discussed in Division 2 of this opinion. The city’s contention is wholly without merit; an objection to inadmissible evidence cannot itself bе considered evidence of failure to mitigate damages. As the record is devoid of any evidence that the Smiths failed to mitigate damages or that it was in fаct possible to do so, the court correctly refused to give the requested charge.
Dept, of Transp. v. Eastern Oil Co.,
7. The city complains that the court erred in allowing two non-exрert witnesses to give opinion testimony as to the fair market value of the property in question. “Direct testimony as to market value is in the nature of opinion evidence. One need not be an expert or dealer in the article in question but may testify as to its value if he has had an opportunity for forming a correct opinion.” OCGA § 24-9-66. “To give an opinion on value the witness must supply reasons by showing knowledge, experience or familiarity as to value. Testimony that the witness is familiar with the value of the item in question is sufficient.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.)
City of Alma v. Morris,
8. The city’s complaint that the court erred in permitting two expert witnesses to give their оpinion of the consequential damages to the remainder property presents nothing for review because the city did not object to the testimony at trial. “In this state it is necessary to object to evidence at the time it is actually offered, and failure to do so amounts to a waiver of any objection which the party might have had.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Ramey v. Leisure, Ltd,., supra at 132 (2).
9. The city asserts that the court improperly submitted to the jury the question of whether the Smiths have either temporary or permanent access to their remainder property. This assertion is without merit because the Smiths sought consequential damages based on impaired access to their remaining property and there was conflicting evidence as to whether the city had guaranteed such access at the time the property was taken. “It is up to the trier of fact to decide if there has been substantial impairment and if so, the value. Whether a propеrty owner has reasonable access to the property under the circumstances and whether the existing access was substantially interfered with are questions of fact to be decided by the jury.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.)
Taylor v. Dept. of Transp.,
Judgment affirmed.