OPINION
Opinion by
The City of Dallas filed these interlocutory appeals from orders denying its pleas to the jurisdiction in four lawsuits filed against the City by current and former police officers, firefighters, and rescue officers (the Officers) alleging that the City breached its contract with them regarding their pay. We consolidated the appeals for the purpose of briefing and argument. For the following reasons, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the pleas to the jurisdiction in part and reverse in part. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. Background
In 1979, the voters of Dallas approved a pay referendum for the City’s sworn police officers, firefighters, and rescue officers, and the City enacted an ordinance adopting the referendum. The Ordinance stated:
Be it ordained that: (1) From and after October 1, 1978, each sworn police officer and fire fighter and rescue officer employed by the City of Dallas, shall receive a raise in salary in an amount equal to not less than 15% of the base salary of a City of Dallas sworn police officer or fire fighter and rescue officer with three years service computed on the pay level in effect for sworn police officers and fire fighter and rescue officers of the City of Dallas with three years service in effect in the fiscal year beginning October, 1977; (2) The current percentage pay differential between grades in the sworn ranks of the Dallas Police Force and the Fire Fighter and Rescue Force shall be maintained; and (3) Employment benefits and assignment pay shall be maintained at levels of not less than those in effect for the fiscal year beginning October, 1977.
Dallas, Tex., Ordinance 16084, § 4 (Jan. 22,1979).
The City also passed two resolutions implementing the Ordinance. In the succeeding years, the City raised salaries through annual pay resolutions passed by
Beginning in 1994, these lawsuits were filed by the Officers alleging that the Ordinance was a contract requiring the City to maintain the percentage pay differential in all future salary adjustments and that the City breached the contract by repeatedly increasing the pay of higher-ranking officers without making the same percentage adjustments to the pay of the lower-ranking officers. The City contended that the Ordinance was a one-time salary adjustment and was not intended to apply to all future salary adjustments. The trial court granted summary judgment against the City and the City appealed. Id. at 665. This Court concluded that the Ordinance was ambiguous about whether it was intended to be a one-time salary adjustment or apply to- all future salary adjustments, and we remanded the issue to the fact-finder. Id. at 659.
On remand, the City filed pleas to the jurisdiction asserting it had governmental immunity. See City of Dallas v. Albert,
In addressing the Officers’ declaratory judgment claims, we concluded that the trial court was correct to deny the City’s pleas to the jurisdiction to the extent the Officers sought only to declare the rights, status, and legal relations of the parties under the Ordinance. Id. at 637. In addressing the Officers’ breach of contract claims, we concluded that the City had immunity and reversed the trial court’s ruling. See id. at 636, 638. However, we noted that while the appeal was pending in our Court, the Texas Legislature enacted a new statute that waived immunity from suit for certain breach of contract claims filed against local governmental entities. Id. at 636-37 (citing Tex. Local Gov’t Code Ann. §§ 271.151-.160 (West 2005)). We also noted that the statute applied retroactively to claims already filed. Id. Consequently, we remanded for the trial court to determine whether the Officers’ breach of contract claims fell within the limited waiver of immunity found in section 271.152. Id. The parties filed cross-petitions for review, which the Supreme Court of Texas granted and consolidated. City of Dallas v. Albert,
While the petitions for review were pending, in August 2009, the attorney for the Officers died and new counsel was substituted in each of the four cases. However, new counsel was unable to locate and contact all the Officers and, as a result, many were unrepresented after counsel died.
In 2011, the supreme court issued its opinion in Albert. The supreme court concluded that the City had governmental immunity from the Officers’ claims for declaratory judgment because the Officers were “not attempting to invalidate the pay ordinance. To the contrary, they are attempting to enforce the ordinance according to its terms as they read it.” Id. at 378. The court concluded that “[bjecause the Officers’ only potential relief was an award of money damages, the City is im
On remand, the represented Officers amended their petitions to drop their claims for declaratory relief, but the unrepresented Officers did not. The City filed special exceptions on the remaining claims, which included the unrepresented Officers’ claims for declaratory relief and all the Officers’ claims for attorney’s fees for breach of contract. The trial court sustained the special exceptions on the attorney’s fees claims, and the represented Officers nonsuited their claims for attorney’s fees; the unrepresented Officers did not. The City then filed pleas to the jurisdiction, with evidence, arguing that the local government code did not waive its immunity from the Officers’ breach of contract claims. It also argued that the unrepresented Officers’ claims for declaratory judgment should be dismissed pursuant to Albert and their attorney’s fees claims should be dismissed because the trial court sustained the City’s special exceptions on those claims. The trial court denied the pleas to the jurisdiction, and these interlocutory appeals followed.
II. BREACH of Contract Claims
In issues one and two, the City contends that the trial court erred by denying its pleas to the jurisdiction on the Officers’ breach of contract claims. The City argues that it has immunity from those claims because the Officers did not plead jurisdictional facts bringing their claims within the waiver under section 271.152 of the local government code.
A. Standard of Review
Governmental immunity protects cities from lawsuits for money damages. Ben Bolt-Palito Blanco Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tex. Political Subdivisions Prop./Cas. Joint Self-Ins. Fund,
B. Applicable Law
In 2005, the legislature enacted a statute waiving the immunity of local governmental entities for certain breach of contract claims:
A local governmental entity that is authorized by statute or the constitution to enter into a contract and that enters into a contract subject to this subchapter waives sovereign immunity to suit for the purpose of adjudicating a claim for*342 breach of the contract, subject to the terms and conditions of this subchapter.
Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 271.152. The statute waived immunity retroactively for a claim arising under a contract executed before the effective date of the statute if governmental immunity had not been waived for the claim. Act of May 28, 2005, 79th Leg., R.S., ch. 604, § 2, 2005 Tex. Gen. Laws 1548,1549.
The statute defines “contract subject to this subchapter” as “a written contract stating the essential terms of the agreement for providing goods or services to the local governmental entity that is properly executed on behalf of the local governmental entity.” Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 271.151(2). The supreme court has interpreted “contract subject to this sub-chapter” to mean that the contract must be in writing, state the essential terms of the agreement, provide for goods or services to the local governmental entity, and be executed on behalf of the local governmental entity. City of Houston,
C. Discussion
The Officers’ Pleadings
In their live pleadings, the Officers alleged that the City conducted a special election to submit a pay referendum to the voters, the voters passed the referendum, and the City adopted the referendum by passing the Ordinance. They alleged that the City implemented the pay raises contained in the Ordinance by adopting two pay resolutions, Resolutions 79-0348 and 79-0434, specifying the base pay by rank. They alleged that “the Ordinance became a non-negotiable and essential written term in each [Officerj’s contract of employment with the City, which was accepted by [the Officers] through their performance.” They alleged that the City breached the Ordinance by failing to “maintain the established percentage pay differentials between the grades” in all future salary adjustments. They alleged that they did not become aware of the City’s non-compliance until December 1993. The Officers alleged that they each had a contract of employment with the City, that the City breached the contracts, and that the Officers suffered “actual damages equal to the difference between the amount of each [Officer]’s salary that the City actually paid, and the amount that the City should have paid had it maintained the percentage pay differential between all grades that existed on the effective date of the Ordinance in all pay resolutions adopted by the City after that date.... ” The Officers do not seek back pay after May 1998.
The Officers also alleged a waiver of governmental immunity under section 271.152. They alleged that “the combination of the pay referendum, the Ordinance, other ordinances, the City Charter, and the relevant pay resolutions adopted by the City, all of which were properly executed by the City, and all of which contain the essential terms of the City’s agreement to employ [the Officers] and to pay them the compensation provided by these documents, satisfy the requirements of a written contract within the meaning of § 271.151(2) of the Local Government Code.”
The City’s Pleas to the Jurisdiction
In its pleas to the jurisdiction, the City did not dispute that it is a local governmental entity or that it is authorized by statute or the constitution to enter into a contract as required by section 271.152. However, the City did dispute whether it entered into a contract subject to section 271.152. We conclude that it did.
In City of Houston, the supreme court examined whether city ordinances and oth
The City of Houston Case
A group of firefighters sued the city of Houston alleging wrongful underpayment of lump sums due upon termination of their employment. Id. at 131. The city argued it was immune from the firefighters’ lawsuit, and the issue was whether the city ordinances and other documents relied on by the firefighters constituted a contract within the waiver of section 271.152. Id. The city argued that the legislature did not intend for section 271.152 to apply to municipal ordinances. Id. at 135.
The supreme court examined whether certain city ordinances relied on by the firefighters constituted a “contract subject to this subchapter.” Id. at 134-35. The court stated that a contract to which section 271.152 applies is in writing, states the essential terms of the parties’ agreement, provides for goods or services to the local governmental entity, and is properly executed on behalf of the local governmental entity. Id. at 137 (citing Tex. Loo. Gov’t Code Ann. § 271.151(2)).
The court began its analysis by noting that a contract may be bilateral or unilateral. Id. at 135-36. A unilateral contract is formed in the employment context when an employer promises a benefit if the employee performs. Id. at 135-36 (citing Vanegas v. Am. Energy Servs.,
The firefighters in that case relied on city ordinances that addressed termination and overtime pay. Id. at 138. One ordinance stated that firefighters and police officers who leave the service “shall receive, in a lump sum payment, the full amount of his salary for the period of his accumulated vacation leave, minus any hours of vacation leave previously taken during the calendar year in which the termination occurs.” Id. at 150 n. 10 (quoting Houston, Tex., Code of Ordinances ch. 34, art. I, § 34 — 3(b)). Another ordinance stated that firefighters “shall be entitled to overtime pay-” Id. app. at 152 (quoting Houston, Tex., Code of Ordinances ch. 34, art. Ill, § 34-59(b)). The supreme court said the ordinances “promised the Firefighters specific compensation in the form of overtime pay and termination pay.” Id. at 138. It said the ordinances evidenced the city’s intent to be bound by the “extensive use of the word ‘shall.’ ” Id.
The supreme court next examined whether the documents contained the essential terms of the agreement. Id. at 138-39. It said that “essential terms” has been characterized as including “ ‘the time of performance, the price to be paid, ... [and] the service to be rendered.’ ” Id. (quoting Kirby Lake Dev., Ltd. v. Clear
Having determined that the ordinances when read together contained the essential terms of the agreement, the court next examined whether the ordinances provided for services to the city. The court characterized “services” as “encompass[ing] a wide array of activities, generally including any act performed for the benefit of another.” Id. (citing Kirby Lake,
The final element the court examined was whether the ordinances were executed by the city. Id. The city did not deny that the ordinances “were duly enacted,” but challenged whether the ordinances were “executed.” Id. The court noted that section 271.151(2) did not define the term “executed,” but said that it “means to ‘finish’ or to ‘complete,’ and that it is not necessary to sign an instrument in order to execute it, unless the parties agree that a signature is required.” Id. (citing Mid-Continent Cas. Co. v. Global Enercom Mgmt., Inc.,.
After examining all the elements of a contract required by section 271.151(2), the supreme court concluded that the ordinances when read together constituted a unilateral employment contract with the city within the waiver of section 271.152, which the firefighters accepted by performing their jobs. Id. at 137-39.
The City’s Arguments about At-Will Employment
Before we examine whether the Ordinance and other documents upon which the Officers rely constitute a contract, we first address the City’s contention that there can be no employment contract because the Officers are at-will employees. In its pleas to the jurisdiction, the City contended that the Officers are employees at will who do not have
The issue in this ease, however, is not whether the parties agreed that the City would not “terminate the employee except in clearly specified circumstances.” Instead, the issue is whether the City and the Officers entered into a contract within the waiver of section 271.152. Even in an at-will employment situation, an employer and an employee may enter into an employment-related contract. See, e.g., Vanegas,
The City also cites a personnel rule that disavows the creation of an employment contract. Section 34-1 of the personnel rules states, “Nothing in this chapter conveys a contract of employment with the City of Dallas. Nothing in this chapter conveys a private cause of action to any employee.” Dallas, Tex., Code ch. 34, § 34-1 (2011). The City argues that section 34-1 “negates any implication that the City’s personnel rules convert the employment-at-will relationship into an employment contract.” The Officers argue that this rule was not in effect when their claims accrued, and the City responds by stating the Officers are bound by the rule because they continued their employment.
By its terms, section 34-1 is specifically limited to the provisions in chapter 34; it does not apply to the Ordinance. But even if it did, the issue here is not whether the at-will employment relationship between the City and the Officers was “convert[ed],” but whether the Ordinance constituted a unilateral employment contract regarding the Officers’ pay that the Officers accepted by performance within the waiver of section 271.152.
The City also argues that none of the documents upon which the Officers rely “evidence a definite intent on the part of the City to be contractually bound to terminate [the Officers] only in clearly specified circumstances.” It cites our opinion in Seals v. City of Dallas,
Is There a Contract Under Section 271.151(2)?
Using City of Houston as our guide, we now examine whether the documents upon which the Officers rely constitute a unilateral employment contract between the
1. Ordinances and Other Documents May Constitute a Contract in Writing
We begin our analysis by noting that the Ordinance and other documents upon which the Officers rely are in writing as required by section 271.151(2). Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 271.151(2). The City argues that these other documents “do not relate at all to any agreement to maintain pay differentials” and the Ordinance and other documents cannot be construed together to constitute a contract because they were not “executed at the same time, for the same purpose, and in the course of the same transaction.” But the cases the City cites to support its arguments were decided before the supreme court’s opinion in City of Houston and did not involve municipal ordinances or government employees. And in City of Houston, the supreme court construed multiple code provisions together as a contract without regard to when those provisions were passed or adopted. See City of Houston,
The City also argues that this case is distinguishable from the City of Houston case because here the Officers are not “seeking to be paid specific compensation promised for the past performance of specific duties, [but] seek to use the provisions to alter the presumption of at-will employment. ...” As we have explained, however, the Officers have not alleged that the Ordinance altered their at-will employment status with the City. Instead, they argue that, to the extent the Officers’ employment with the City was not terminated after the Ordinance was enacted, the Ordinance bound the City to pay the Officers in accordance with its terms.
2. States the Essential Terms
Section 271.151(2) also requires the written contract to state the essential terms of the parties’ agreement. Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 271.151(2). In City of Houston, the court stated that the essential terms are “time of performance,” “price to be paid” and “service to be rendered.”
With regard to the “time of performance,” the Officers cited provisions in Chapter 34 of the City’s code defining “work period” and “work hours” for “sworn employees of the police department”; “work period” and “work hours” for “sworn employees of the fire department”; and various holiday, vacation, and leave provisions. See, e.g., Dallas, Tex., Code ch. 34, §§ 34-4 (definitions), 34-16 (standard work day and 24-hour staffing), 34-17 (overtime and paid leave), 34-19(a) (work period and hours for sworn employees of police department), 34-19(b) (work period and hours for sworn employees of fire department), 34-22 (sick leave), 34-23 (vacation leave), 34-24 (compensatory leave), 34-25 (holidays for fire department and employees who regularly work holidays), 34-26 (court leave), & app. A (alternate work schedules) (1995).
The City argues that those provisions do not mention “a time of performance for the accrual of the right to a pay differential.” But the code sets out the work period, work hours, and various leave provisions for the police and fire department employees. And those provisions are similar to the provisions in Houston’s code of ordinances that the supreme court found satisfied the element of “time of performance.” See City of Houston,
b. Compensation/price to be paid
The Ordinance states that the Officers “shall” receive a certain pay raise and the City “shall” maintain the percentage pay differential between grades. Dallas, Tex., Ordinance 16084. It is undisputed that the Officers received the salary raise included in the Ordinance; the issue is whether the City was required to maintain the percentage pay differential from that date forward. The City argues that “[m]aintaining pay differentials is not a specific price to be paid” and “is not a promised benefit, because differentials can be maintained by raising all salaries by the same percentage, keeping salaries the same, or even lowering all salaries by the same percentage.” It also argues that the various holiday, vacation pay, and sick leave provisions cited by the Officers “are simply general policies pertaining to the accrual and payment of those benefits and do not relate to any alleged contract to maintain pay differentials forever.” But the various holiday, vacation, and leave provisions are similar to those provisions in Houston’s code of ordinances that the supreme court concluded satisfied the “compensation” or “price to be paid” element of a contract. See City of Houston,
The City also contends that the “only payments due that can be determined from the documents” are the salaries referred to in the resolutions that the Officers do not complain about (the 15% pay raise). But the Ordinance, along with the resolutions adopted to implement the Ordinance, stated more:
(1) From and after October 1, 1978, each sworn police officer and fire fighter and rescue officer employed by the City of Dallas, shall receive a raise in salary*348 in an amount equal to not less than 15% of the base salary of a City of Dallas sworn police officer or fire fighter or rescue officer with three years service computed on the pay level in effect for sworn police officers and fire fighter and rescue officers of the City of Dallas with three years service in effect in the fiscal year beginning October, 1977; (2) The current percentage pay differential between grades in the sworn ranks of the Dallas Police Force and the Fire Fighter and Rescue Force shall be maintained[.]
Dallas, Tex., Ordinance 16084, § 4. The Ordinance expressly stated that the pay raise was to be calculated on the respective base pay of an officer with three years’ service. And the resolution implementing the Ordinance expressly stated the amount of the base pay for a police officer with three years’ service, a firefighter with three years’ service, and a rescue officer with three years’ service. Dallas, Tex., Resolution 79-0348 (1979). It also stated that a pay differential “shall be maintained.” When construed together, we conclude that they established the “compensation” or “price to be paid.” See City of Houston,
The City also argues that the Officers “seek to use the pay differential provision in the 1979 Ordinance” differently from the firefighters in Houston. It contends that the Officers do not seek a specific compensation that was promised for past performance, but, instead, “seek to use the provisions to ... obtain consequential damages from the alleged failures to maintain differentials.” We do not agree that this case is different from the City of Houston case. The Officers interpret the Ordinance to mean that maintaining the differential in all future salary adjustments was part of the Officers’ contract with the City. The lawsuits seek damages for breach of that contract. We conclude that the documents when read together provide the element of “compensation” or “price to be paid.”
c. Service to be rendered
Next, the City argues that none of the documents on which the Officers rely states the essential term “service to be rendered” in exchange for the promise to maintain the percentage pay differential. We disagree.
The City’s charter describes the duties and responsibilities of the sworn members of the police and fire departments. For example, section 6 describes the duties of a police officer to include the prevention of crimes, the enforcement of laws, the detention and arrest of offenders, and the preservation of the public peace, health, and safety. Dallas, Tex., Charter, ch. XII, § 6 (1976). The charter describes the duties of the chief of the fire-rescue department as protecting “the city and the property of its citizens from destruction by fire or conflagration” and states that one of the chiefs duties is to provide fire-rescue personnel and services for emergency use. Id. ch. XIII, § 2. Construing section two in the Officers’ favor, we conclude that the fire-rescue personnel referred to in that section have the same duties to protect the city and its citizens’ property from destruction by fire or conflagration. See id.; see also Miranda,
3. That Provides for Goods or Services to the Local Governmental Entity
The City argues that an employment contract is not a contract for goods or services. However, in City of Houston, the supreme court held that the provision of firefighting services constituted a “service” for purposes of section 271.151(2). The court said that “ ‘services’ under section 271.151(2) encompass a wide array of activities, generally including any act performed for the benefit of another.” Id. at 139. It concluded that the firefighters in that case provided a benefit to the city “by providing fire protection services as defined in the Ordinances themselves.” Id.
As in that case, the Officers here provided a benefit to the City by providing police protection and fire-and-rescue protection services as defined in the City’s charter. We perceive no difference between the services rendered in City of Houston and those rendered here.
4. That is Properly Executed by the Local Governmental Entity
Section 271.151(2) also requires the contract to be executed on behalf of the local governmental entity. Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 271.151(2); City of Houston,
By use of the word “shall” in the Ordinance, the City made a promise that evidenced its intent “to act in a specific way[.]” See City of Houston,
Additionally, chapter XVIII, section 14 of the City’s charter states that when the majority of the qualified electors vote in favor of a proposed ordinance the ordinance becomes “a valid and binding ordinance of the city, and ... cannot be repealed or amended except by a vote of the people.” Dallas, Tex., Charter, ch. XVIII, § 14. To require the city manager’s signature on the Ordinance to make its terms valid and binding on the City would render both the charter and the Ordinance meaningless. See id.; see also City of Houston v. Petroleum Traders Corp.,
We affirm the trial court’s order denying the City’s pleas to the jurisdiction on the Officers’ claims for breach of contract.
III. Claims for Declaratory Judgment and Attorney’s Fees
In 2011, the supreme court issued an opinion in the Albert case holding that the Officers’ claims for declaratory relief must be dismissed because their “only potential relief was an award of money damages” and the City was immune from those claims. See Albert,
The Officers also sought attorney’s fees for breach of contract. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 38.001 (West 2008). The City filed special exceptions arguing that it was not an individual or a corporation for purposes of chapter 38. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code Ann. § 5.904 (West 2008) (stating that municipality not considered corporation unless express words are used); see also City of Alton v. Sharyland Water Supply Corp.,
The City argues that the trial court erred by denying its pleas to the jurisdiction on the unrepresented Officers’ claims for attorney’s fees when they did not amend their petitions pursuant to the trial court’s orders. We agree the court erred with respect to the Officers the court
In the Barber case: Kenneth E. Brooks, Bernardo Croitoru, Blaine A. Danyluk, James R. Larabee, Clay P. Reed, Donald L. Sutton.
In the Albert case: Enriquez Andres, Irving Butler, Henry Castro, Isaac F. Conway, Marshall W. Cook, Kenneth W. Cren-shaw, Kenneth H. Cunningham, James L. Davis, Richard L. Dewees, Gerald W. Fields, Jeffery Lyn Francis, Claude L. Hight, Jennifer Bradley a/k/a Jennifer Hopps, Michael A. Johnson, James P. Kean, Donald R. Kern, Frank E. Medina, Brian A. Partington, Donald W. Reed, Woodson R. Russell Jr., Thomas S. Swing, David Sypert, Kevin George Tuma, Ulysses Underwood, George W. Williams, Douglas R. York, and Rodney B. Young.
In the Willis case: Donald W. Casey, William D. Cowley, Rita M. Dotson, Todd M. Graves, Ronald A. Guy, Garry D. Hasty, Richard E. Henderson, David Jackson, Donnie M. Mashburn, Agustín J. Ser-ratos, Maurice L. Simmons, Terry C. Smith, Elvin E. Spears, Lawrence F. Stromile, Theodore G. Weissenborn; Patrick W. Alexander, Timothy E. Allen, James W. Almy, Frankie J. Anderson, Chris R. Aulbaugh, Charles L. Avery, Carl A.Barnes, Leslie A. Bassham, Norman Bell III, David 0. Brown, Tommy R. Buggs, Duward W. Burgess, Santos Cade-na Jr., Sandra D. Caro, William D. Cowley, Helena A. Davis, Larry C. Davis, Jacque-lynne D. Dennis, Rita McKay Dotson, Kyge C. Edmonds, Lenard L. Farrow, Michael E. Finley, Reginald G. Franklin, Todd M. Graves, Dwaine E. Hall, Kim E. Hammond, Scott A. Hanten, Bobby W. Hargis, Garry D. Hasty, Kevin J. Heath, Richard E. Henderson, Timothy J. Holland, Townsend B. Howard, Charles W. Hudson, David Jackson, Lorrie A. Jackson, John H. James, Milton R. Jarvis Jr., Rodney E. Jones, Bradley M. Jordan, Donnie M. Mashburn, Clark D. Menden-hall, Billie L. Miller, Albert C. Moore, John K. Morris, Frank C. Muscato, Karen B. Muscato, Anthony W. Neely, Marvin J. Ned, Lonnie W. Osborn, Richard L. Pace, David L. Peeples, Bobby J. Reeves, Vanessa A. Rudloff, Agustín J. Serrates, Steven G. Shaw, Robert A. Sherwin, Maurice L. Simmons, Terry C. Smith, Steven E. Sparks, Elvis E. Spears, Vickie Stonaker Snow, Gloria D. Spencer, Paul A. Stokes, Lawrence F. Stromile, Douglas W. Thig-pen, Bryant C. Thomas, Brian K. Verdine, David G. Vestal, Daryl D. Walker, Lynette C. Washington, Diana G. Watts, Jewel K. Warren, Peggy J. Warren, Donald E. Williams, and Pedro Zamora.
IV. Conclusion
We reverse the trial court’s order denying the City’s pleas to the jurisdiction on the unrepresented Officers’ claims for declaratory judgment and render judgment granting the City’s pleas on those claims. We reverse the trial court’s order denying the City’s pleas to the jurisdiction on the named unrepresented Officers’ claims for attorney’s fees, and we render judgment granting the City’s pleas on those claims. We otherwise affirm the trial court’s order denying the City’s pleas to the jurisdiction.
Notes
. For a more detailed procedural background, see City of Dallas v. Albert,
. The Officers also referred to many other rules and code and charter provisions to support their arguments that the contract stated the essential terms of the parties' agreement, but we do not address those for purposes of this appeal.
. The cited code is the version through March 1995 amendments; the parties do not contend that the relevant sections have changed since 1979.
. The Officers also contend that Arredondo concluded that the Ordinance was a contract and that Arredondo is the law of the case. But the issue of whether the documents constituted a contract for purposes of waiver under section 271.152 was not before the Court in that case. See generally Arredondo,
. It appears the trial court’s orders were addressed only to those unrepresented Officers who had notice of the hearing on the City’s special exceptions.
. Some of the names in the orders were duplicated across multiple orders and some appear to have been included in the wrong trial court cause number.