64 Ohio App. 2d 58 | Ohio Ct. App. | 1979
The error asserted in appellant's single assignment of error is that the trial court unconstitutionally imposed a sentence of thirty days incarceration on him for a violation of the Cincinnati ordinance against reckless driving. Appellant (the defendant in the trial court) pleaded no contest to the charge of violating Cincinnati Municipal Code Section 506-6, and the penalties imposed were thirty days of confinement in the Community Correctional Institution, a fine of $250 and costs. This was the maximum punishment under C.M.C. 506-6 and 512-6.1 Under the state statute against reckless driving,2 the punishment could not have exceeded a fine of $100.
Appellant asserts three constitutional errors. The first two involve Section
The city replies initially that appellant waived any error in sentencing because he did not raise the constitutional question until after the court declared his punishment. We find no merit in this position for two reasons. First, appellant could not know before that moment whether his punishment would exceed the $100 fine allowed under the statute. Second, the constitutional question was raised orally in the trial court before an entry was journalized, and thus the trial court had ample opportunity to correct its error, if any.
The first two questions have been decided contrary to appellant's claim by Columbus v. Molt (1973),
The third issue raised by appellant is that he was denied the equal protection of the law under the United States and the Ohio Constitutions, because the disparity in penalties between the state statute and the city ordinance infringed on (or chilled) his right to travel, which he asserts is a fundamental right under the United States Constitution.
We do not find that the right to travel by automobile within a state has been held to be a fundamental right, the restriction of which is subject to rigid judicial scrutiny. A right of such a fundamental or special nature requires that any *61
classification (or different treatment) of citizens be justified by a compelling state interest that has no alternative means of accomplishment, and only then by reasonable means specifically designed to protect the compelling state interest. See,generally, Note, Of Interests, Fundamental and Compelling: TheEmerging Constitutional Balance, 57 Boston U. L. Rev. 462 (1977).Shapiro v. Thompson (1969),
On the contrary, as illustrated by Columbus v. Molt, supra, the Ohio Supreme Court has repeatedly sustained the position that the home rule provisions of the Ohio Constitution granting municipalities "all powers of local self-government" prevail in the regulation of vehicular traffic over requirements of uniform statewide operation.4 On the other hand, in such other matters as the regulation of criminal conduct and business hours, the requirements of uniform statewide application prevail over the home rule powers.5
Equal protection is satisfied if legislation applies alike to all persons within a class, the definition of which is reasonable rather than arbitrary or capricious, and provided that the class has a real and substantial relationship to the health, safety and *62
welfare of the public. Cincinnati Motor Transp. Assn. v.Lincoln Heights (1971),
We find no merit in the single assignment of error. We affirm.
Judgment affirmed.
PALMER, P. J., and BETTMAN, J., concur.
"No person shall operate a vehicle on any street or highway without due regard for the safety of persons or property."
The punishment for a violation of this section, as set forth in C.M.C. 512-6, is not more than $250 and not more than 30 days in jail.
"No person shall operate a vehicle, trackless trolley, or streetcar on any street or highway without due regard for the safety of persons or property."
Under R. C.