The opinion of the court was delivered by
This wаs an action brought to recover the price of a steam fire-engine, alleged to havе been built by
The main question is whether the plaintiff has a valid contract binding on thе corporation. The first objection raised is that the contract is invalid, because it was not mаde or authorized by ordinance, but only by resolution of council.. To this, it is a sufficient answer that nothing in the charter requires that any contract should be made by ordinance. Where a charter commits the decision of a matter to the council, and is silent as to the mode, the decision may be madе by resolution, and need not be by ordinance. State v. Jersey City, 3 Dutcher 493. Contracts made in a similar mode have been repeatedly sustained by our Supreme Court. In. Bigelow v. City of Perth Amboy, 1 Dutcher 297, the action was brought to recover the value of a lоt of flag-stone sold to-the city. Prior to the purchase, the city council had resolved that a large quantity of flag-stone should be provided for the use of the city, and the mayor was appointеd to carry the-resolution into effect. The contract was made by the mayor,, under the resolutiоn, and was sustained by the court.
In Green v. City of Cape May, 12 Vroom 45, the action, asín this case, was brought to recover the price of a fire-engine, and it was objected that- the proceedings relative to the purchase wеre by resolution, and not by ordinance. The court held that the city could exercise its power еither by resolution or ordinance, when not restrained to a particular method, and sustained the contract.
Secondly, it is contended that the council never decided to-purchase a fire-engine, and that no ordinance or resolution-was ever passed, showing such decision or detеrmination. The appointment of a committee to purchase the engine, is plenary evidеnce of the determination of council to make the-
It is сontended, in the third place, that the council could not delegate the power to makе the contract to a committee, but that the specific terms of the contract, as negоtiated, must be either previously authorized by council or afterwards adopted by them. This objection is fully answered by the cases in the Supreme Court heretofore cited. The general rule on the subject is clearly and tersely stated in Dillon on Mun. Corp., §§ 60, 374, as follows: “ The principle that municipal powers or discretion cannot be delegated, does not prevent a corporation from appointing agents and empowering them to make contz’acts, nor from appointing committees and investing them with duties оf a ministerial or administrative ehaz’acter. The authorized body of a municipal corporаtion may bind it by an ordinance or resolution, or may, by vote, clothe its officers, agents or committеes with power to act for it, and a contract made by persons thus appointed by the cоrporation will bind it.”
It is further objected that the resolution under which the committee acted is void beсause it was not presented to the mayor for his approval. Approval by the mayor of thе proceedings of a city council is essential to their validity only by special requirement of charter. The charter of Burlington requires that ordinances should be pz’eseuted to the mayor for approval before going into effect, but does not inclzide resolutions. In the cases in this state and in California where such proceeding was held essential, the charters expressly include resolutions in the requirement. The case of Kepner v. Com., 40 Penna. St. 124, relied on by the plaintiff in error,
The question of the performance of the contract on the part of the plaintiff was fаirly submitted to the jury, and the principle upon which damages should be assessed was correctly stated.
The judgment should be affirmed.
For affirmance — The Chancellor, Chief Justice, Dixon, Knapp, Reed, Mague, Scudder, Dodd, Green, Lathrop, Wales—11.
For reversal—None.