This is а petition to the Land Court under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 60, § 65, as amended by St. 1933, c. 325, § 12, and St. 1938, c. 305, by the holder of a tax title, for the foreclosure of all rights of redemption. The respondents answered, as provided in G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 60, § 68, as amended by St. 1935, c. 224, § 3; c. 354, § 1; and с. 414, § 3, making no question of the validity of the tax title but seeking to redeem. The petitioner acquired its tax title on June 7, 1933, at a tax sale for nonpayment of the taxes for 1931.
Prior to 1915 an owner of land taken by, or sold to, a municipality, or sold to a private purchaser, for nonpayment of taxes, had two years in which to redeem by payment or tender. If he did not redeem, the tax title became absolute. St. 1909, c. 490, Part II, §§ 59-70. Under that system a strict compliance with the statutes was held essential to the validity of a tax title. Charland v. Home for Aged Women,
By St. 1915, c. 237, the system was changed. The right to redeem was made to continue until foreclosed by decree of court upon a petition filed after the expiration of two years. By § 7, after such a petition, any person claiming an interest in the land might answer, offering to redeem, and the court might allow redemption. If there was no redemption, a decree might be entered that would “forever bar all rights of redemptión.” § 8. That statute, slightly amended, became G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 60, §§ 64-75. Later amendments do not change the general nature of the system. Because of its more liberal and equitable provisions for redemption, as сompared with the earlier system, the statute of 1915 provided in § 17 that “No tax title shall be held to be invalid by reason of any errors or irregularities
In 1918, in the case of Chadwick v. Cambridge,
The statute of 1933 continued as follows: “The collector shall certify to the treasurer on September first of the year following that of their assessment all subsequent taxes which become part of the terms of redemption and the treasurer shall give him a certificate stating that the amount or amounts have been added to the tax title account or accounts and the collector shall be credited аs if the tax had been paid in money.” By St. 1934, c. 48, the foregoing words, “on September first,” were made to read, “not later than September first.” A further amendment by St. 1936, c. 93, § 1, is immaterial.
In Boston v. Cable,
We are asked to re-examine the law laid down in the Cable case, and to hold the requirement of certification “not later than September first” to be merely directory. Until redemption or foreclosure is sought, the taxpayer has little or no cоncern with the question in which office the amount of subsequent taxes is to be ascertained. Before the amendment of 1934, a single day was provided for certification. It is hard to believe that the Legislature intended to stakе the collectibility on redemption of many thousands of dollars of taxes upon the chance that a collector, with his manifold duties and perhaps with inadequate assistance, would succeed in certifying all taxes within the limits of the office hours of a single day. Though the present statute gives him more freedom, its nature and purpose remain the same.
The treasurer of a municipality is the custodian of tax
The purpose of requiring certification on or before a particular day is, we think, to fix a time when the responsibility of the collector ends and that of the treasurer begins. With that matter a taxpayer has little or no concern. His interests are sufficiently protected by the provision that on redemption he need not pay subsequent taxes that have never been certified.
In the Cable case reliance was placed upon the indisputable fact that the statutory languagе as to the time of certification is mandatory rather than permissive. Brennan v. Election Commissioners of Boston,
We think that the statutory provision fixing the time for certification .is merely directory, and that compliance with it is not essential to the validity of certification. The rigidity of the Cable case ill comports with the liberal trend of statutes and decisions that began with St. 1915, c. 237. The case of Boston v. Cable,
The respondents contend that the form of certification for most of the years subsequent to 1931 was such as to destroy its validity. Before St. 1933, c. 168, § 3, forms were prescribed for use in proceedings for the collection of taxes, and if "substantially followed” they were to be "deemed sufficient,” though "other suitable forms” might
No other question is open on this record. The decision of the Land Court is reversed. The paymеnt not only of the tax sale price, with interest, costs and charges, but also of all the subsequent taxes for the years 1932 to 1939, inclusive, with interest, costs and charges, is to be made part of the terms of redemption. The matter of payment of the taxes of still later years is to be decided by the Land Court. The petitioner is to have costs in the Land Court, and also costs of this appeal.
So ordered.
Notes
Cheney v. Coughlin,