70 So. 184 | Ala. | 1915
By direction of the court
prepared the following opinion for the court:
The city of Birmingham levied a license tax on waterworks companies for the year 1912 which the Birmingham Waterworks Company refused to pay, on the ground that it was exempt from said tax under section 36f of the statute entitled “An act to further provide for the revenues of the state of Alabama,” approved March 31, 1911. — Acts 1911, p. 159. D. J. O’Connell, appellee in the Court of Appeals, who was the superintendent of the company, was arrested and convicted in the recorder’s court of Birmingham on a charge of conducting a business without having first taken out the license prescribed
The question is whether section 36f is violative of the Constitution of Alabama and of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States? Section 36f is as follows: “36f. The maximum amount of privilege or license tax which the several municipalities within the state many annually assess and collect of persons, firms, or corporations operating street railroads, electric light companies, gas companies, steam heating companies, and waterworks companies under the laws of this state or any other state or whether incorporated at all or not, shall not exceed two per centum of the gross receipts of said business of such persons, firms, or corporations, provided, however, that the amount paid by such persons, firms, corporations as intangible property tax to such municipalities shall be allowed as a credit on and against the said privilege or license tax.”— Acts 1911, p. 188.
This court, in Ex parte Bozeman, 183 Ala. 91, 63 South. 201, gave consideration to this section (221) of the Constitution; but the decision then made is not applicable to the status now presented by section 36f. See, also, Bozeman v. State, 7 Ala. App. 151, 61 South. 603, for opinion of the Court of Appeals.
This court is of the opinion that satisfactory reason and authority justify the conclusion that such a classification is well grounded, and that, being so warranted, there is wrought by the section no illegal or unwarranted discrimination against any effected by the section; that the section in and of itself, or when considered in connection with other pertinent tax laws, does
The statute or system there brought into question was pronounced not offensive to the Fourteenth Amendment — a conclusion that could not have prevailed if the distinction or classification on which the statute’s exemption was based had been arbitrarily or illegally discrimnatory. This decision is, as we understand it, rested upon the affirmative fact that a distinction in respect of taxation may be taken and made effective in a statutory system; that is, grounded in substantial considerations suggestive of equity and natural justice in the imposition of the burdens of taxation. There the distinction underlying the prescribed exemption was predicated of the listing or nonlisting for taxation of other property. Here the distinction in consequence of which the credit provided by the proviso is prescribed is predicated of payment of taxes on intangible property by the licensee. We can see no difference in the applica
Our case of City Council, etc., v. Kelly, 142 Ala. 552, 559, 38 South. 67, 70 L. R. A. 209, 110 Am. St. Rep. 43, is not opposed to the view prevailing in this court. The ordinance there pronounced void was found by the court to be but the expression of an unjustifiable, wrongful purpose to penalize a tradesman engaged in an innocent business because of the mere method or manner in which he conducted his business. No such wrongful purpose can be found in section 36f,
The petition for the writ of certiorari to the Court of Appeals is denied.
Writ denied.