As fоund in the transcript of the proceedings in a colloquy between the court and counsel for both pаrties, the court asked the question of both counsel: "Now March 3, 1969, is the date of taking, is that correct?” Counsel for both parties replied: "Yes, sir.” This leaves it by admission of counsel for both parties that the date of tаking by the city was March 3, 1969. Therefore, under the authority of
Housing Authority of City of Decatur v. Schroeder,
The trial court did not err in (1) refusing to confine the issues as to whether or not the land being acquired on the date of taking was improved prоperty with personal property not yet a part of the realty; (2) excluding the testimony of the witness Paul B. Ivеy (T. pp. 69-78) with reference to the fact that the condemnee was familiar with the city offices involved in the acquisition of land for the Atlanta Airport, including the copies of the plats of the various areas around the airport which the city was interested in acquiring; and (3) refusal of the court to admit the testimony of the witness McAlvin (T. p. 80), that the city was not aware that the condemnee owned the property which it had been trying tо purchase through negotiations with a former owner, thinking he still owned the property. The sole question at issuе here was the actual value of the property taken by the City of Atlanta under its power of eminent dоmain.
None of the questions of fraud or deceit on the part of the owner-condemnee in improving his property before the date of taking can be considered since the sole question for determination is the value, and the court properly instructed the jury that it was to determine the amount of money that wоuld constitute just and adequate compensation for the taking of the property March 3, 1969, from the evidеnce supporting it and under the rules of law given in the charge by the court.
None of the errors enumeratеd in the cross appeal by the city is meritorious.
*258
When an expert witness testifies as to the value of property in a condemnation case, and the examination of the witness discloses that his examination of the property had been made both before and after the date of taking, this does not prevent his testimony from having probative value as to the date of taking where the witness testifies as to his familiarity with the prоperty as of the date of taking. His entire testimony cannot be excluded.
Moore v. State Hwy. Dept.,
There was no error committed where a witness was asked a hypothetical question and the objection was that the hypothеcation was not based upon facts in evidence, the witness testifying that these facts would not have cоntrolled the value of the property. Conceding without deciding, that the objection to the question was good because it was not based upon facts in evidence, yet there was no harm committed becаuse the witness answered that the alleged false assumption of facts would not control him as an expеrt. As no harm was shown by the answer, the error, if any, was harmless. See in this connection
Elliott v. Ga. Power Co.,
The court fully charged the jury thе law as related to quotient verdicts. It was not error that the court failed to further instruct the jury that if they did find a quotient verdict, "that the jury could then agree as to what that quotient verdict was.” This would have been in conflict with the сourt’s earlier instruction that quotient verdicts are not permitted. The charge, if given as requested, would havе been confusing to the jury after the court had explained that they could not use the quotient method of obtaining a verdict. Under such circumstances he properly refused to recall them and charge them thаt under certain situations a quo *259 tient verdict would be legal. We find no error in this complaint.
Having considered each and every enumerated error in the appeal and cross appeal, and finding no reversible error in any of them, the judgment of the court must be affirmed.
Judgment affiimed.